scispace - formally typeset
Journal ArticleDOI

The Science of "Muddling Through"

Charles E. Lindblom
- 21 Jan 1959 - 
- Vol. 19, Iss: 2, pp 79
Reads0
Chats0
TLDR
Lindblom, C.E. as mentioned in this paper discussed the science of "muddling through" in the context of monetary policy. But he did not consider monetary policy with respect to inflation.
Abstract
Originally published as Lindblom, C.E. (1959). "The science of "muddling" through," Public Administration Review, 19(2): 79-88. Reprinted with kind permission. For a critical analysis of this issue's Classic Paper "The Science of 'Muddling' Through" by Charles E. Lindblom, please refer to Ronald J. Scott, Jr.'s article "The Science of Muddling Through Revisited" on pages 5-18. SUPPOSE an administrator is given responsibility for formulating policy with respect to inflation. He might start by trying to list all related values in order of importance, e.g., full employment, reasonable business profit, protection of small savings, prevention of a stock market crash. Then all possible policy outcomes could be rated as more or less efficient in attaining a maximum of these values. This would of course require a prodigious inquiry into values held by members of society and an equally prodigious set of calculations on how much of each value is equal to how much of each other value. He could then proceed to outline all possible policy alternatives. In a third step, he would undertake systematic comparison of his multitude of alternatives to determine which attains the greatest amount of values. In comparing policies, he would take advantage of any theory available that generalized about classes of policies. In considering inflation, for example, he would compare all policies in the light of the theory of prices. Since no alternatives are beyond his investigation, he would consider strict central control and the abolition of all prices and markets on the one hand and elimination of all public controls with reliance completely on the free market on the other, both in the light of whatever theoretical generalizations he could find on such hypothetical economies. Finally, he would try to make the choice that would in fact maximize his values. An alternative line of attack would be to set as his principal objective, either explicitly or without conscious thought, the relatively simple goal of keeping prices level. This objective might be compromised or complicated by only a few other goals, such as full employment. He would in fact disregard most other social values as beyond his present interest, and he would for the moment not even attempt to rank the few values that he regarded as immediately relevant. Were he pressed, he would quickly admit that he was ignoring many related values and many possible important consequences of his policies. As a second step, he would outline those relatively few policy alternatives that occurred to him. He would then compare them. In comparing his limited number of alternatives, most of them familiar from past controversies, he would not ordinarily find a body of theory precise enough to carry him through a comparison of their respective consequences. Instead he would rely heavily on the record of past experience with small policy steps to predict the consequences of similar steps extended into the future. Moreover, he would find that the policy alternatives combined objectives or values in different ways. For example, one policy might offer price level stability at the cost of some risk of unemployment; another might offer less price stability but also less risk of unemployment. Hence, the next step in his approach-the final selection- would combine into one the choice among values and the choice among instruments for reaching values. It would not, as in the first method of policymaking, approximate a more mechanical process of choosing the means that best satisfied goals that were previously clarified and ranked. Because practitioners of the second approach expect to achieve their goals only partially, they would expect to repeat endlessly the sequence just described, as conditions and aspirations changed and as accuracy of prediction improved. By Root or by Branch For complex problems, the first of these two approaches is of course impossible. …

read more

Content maybe subject to copyright    Report

Citations
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI

The Lessons of Defeat: The Reorganization of the Kuomintang on Taiwan, 1950–52

TL;DR: In the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) as discussed by the authors, the principles of democratic centralism, ideology as guide to policy, hierarchical authority, and Party authority over the government bureaucracy and the military were reasserted.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Rationality Paradox of Nudge: Rational Tools of Government in a World of Bounded Rationality

TL;DR: The authors argue that Nudge is based on a rationality paradox, in that it represents an approach that despite its emphasis on bounded rationality does not reflect on its own "limits to rationality" and consider the implications of this paradox by considering mechanisms that influence government decision-making and mechanisms that lead to unintended consequences in the context of policy interventions.
Journal ArticleDOI

Festival Innovation. Complex and Dynamic Network Interaction

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that festival innovation is a highly cooperative endeavor among many actors in an interorganizational network and that some innovation can become institutionalized and embedded in the routines of the partnership interaction.
Journal ArticleDOI

Complexity: learning to muddle through

TL;DR: The articles in this special issue are placed in the context of the literature of general systems theory and it is concluded that classical hierarchical or servomechanism-type control systems are inadequate as a basis for dealing with the unanticipated variability endemic to complex work domains.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Development of Renewable Electricity Policy in the Province of Ontario: The Influence of Ideas and Timing

TL;DR: This article examined the development of policy to promote renewable electricity in the province of Ontario between 1995 and 2006, drawing upon both the role of ideas in policy development and a multiple-stream approach, and argued that changes in the problem, policy, and politics streams and their coupling by key political entrepreneurs account for two significant shifts in Ontario's efforts to promote the increased use of renewable electricity.