Showing papers on "Cognitivism (psychology) published in 2004"
TL;DR: The overall goals are to make social psychology part of the interdisciplinary integration emerging around the concept of situated cognition, and to advance these four themes as high-level conceptual principles that can organize seemingly disparate areas of research and theory within social psychology itself.
Abstract: Publisher Summary This chapter proposes a new integration of social psychology and situated cognition—that is, socially situated cognition (SSC). This new approach rests directly on recent developments in psychology and cognitive science captured by the label situated cognition. It highlights four core assumptions that are common to social psychology and the situated cognition perspective: Cognition is for the adaptive regulation of action, and mental representations are action oriented; cognition is embodied, drawing on our sensorimotor abilities and environments as well as human brains; cognition and action are the emergent outcome of dynamic processes of interaction between an agent and an environment; and cognition is distributed across brains and the environment and across social agents. With regard to each of these themes, the chapter reviews and integrates relevant social psychological research and suggests ways in which the theme can be advanced by rethinking current assumptions. The overall goals are to make social psychology part of the interdisciplinary integration emerging around the concept of situated cognition, and to advance these four themes as high-level conceptual principles that can organize seemingly disparate areas of research and theory within social psychology itself.
505 citations
13 Jul 2004
TL;DR: Dai et al. as discussed by the authors presented an integrated understanding of Intellectual Functioning and Development in Motivational and Affective Contexts, including the role of affect in cognitive processing in academic contexts.
Abstract: Contents: Preface Part I: Introduction DY Dai, RJ Sternberg, Beyond Cognitivism: Toward an Integrated Understanding of Intellectual Functioning and Development Part II: Cognition in Motivational and Affective Contexts CS Dweck, JA Mangels, C Good, Motivational Effects on Attention, Cognition, and Performance EA Linnenbrink, PR Pintrich, Role of Affect in Cognitive Processing in Academic Contexts S Hidi, KA Renninger, A Krapp, Interest, a Motivational Variable That Combines Affective and Cognitive Functioning Part III: Intelligence and Personality: From Psychometrics and Personal Dynamics PL Ackerman, R Kanfer, Cognitive, Affective, and Conative Aspects of Adult Intellect Within a Typical and Maximal Performance Framework G Matthews, M Zeidner, Traits, States, and the Trilogy of Mind: An Adaptive Perspective on Intellectual Functioning MA Brackett, PN Lopes, Z Ivcevic, JD Mayer, P Salovey, Integrating Emotion and Cognition: The Role of Emotional Intelligence Part IV: Development of Intellectual Competencies J Pascual-Leone, J Johnson, Affect, Self-Motivation, and Cognitive Development: A Dialectical Constructivist View G Labouvie-Vief, MM Gonzalez, Dynamic Integration: Affect Optimization and Differentiation in Development PA Alexander, A Model of Domain Learning: Reinterpreting Expertise as a Multidimensional, Multistage Process N Charness, M Tuffiash, T Jastrzembski, Motivation, Emotion, and Expert Skill Acquisition Part V: Intellectual Functioning and Development in Social and Cultural Contexts BJ Zimmerman, DH Schunk, Self-Regulating Intellectual Processes and Outcomes: A Social Cognitive Perspective D Perkins, R Ritchhart, When Is Good Thinking? J Li, KW Fischer, Thought and Affect in American and Chinese Learners' Beliefs About Learning DY Dai, Epilogue: Putting It All Together: Some Concluding Thoughts
339 citations
01 Jan 2004
TL;DR: For the clearest insights into the mutuality of organism and environment we need to set the clock back quite a few years and return to the work of Darwin and the early functionalist psychologists as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Modern cognitive psychology presents itself as the revolutionary alternative to behaviorism, yet there are blatant continuities between modern cognitivism and the mechanistic kind of behaviorism that cognitivists have in mind, such as their commitment to methodological behaviorism, the stimulus-response schema, and the hypothetico- deductive method. Both mechanistic behaviorism and cognitive behaviorism remain trapped within the dualisms created by the traditional ontology of physical science— dualisms that, one way or another, exclude us from the "physical world." Darwinian theory, however, put us back into nature. The Darwinian emphasis upon the mutuality of animal and environment was further developed by, among others, James, Dewey, and Mead. Although their functionalist approach to psychology was overtaken by Watson's behaviorism, the principle of animal-environment dualism continued to figure (though somewhat inconsistently) within the work of Skinner and Gibson. For the clearest insights into the mutuality of organism and environment we need to set the clock back quite a few years and return to the work of Darwin and the early functionalist psychologists.
71 citations
TL;DR: Theory of Mind has been associated with probably the fastest growing body of empirical research in psychology over the last 25 years, and has given rise to a range of different theoretical positions and elaborations within those positions as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The ‘Theory of Mind’ approach has been associated with probably the fastest-growing body of empirical research in psychology over the last 25 years, and has given rise to a range of different theoretical positions and elaborations within those positions. The basic idea is that understanding other people involves bridging a gulf between observed ‘behaviour’ and hidden mental states by means of a theory. The articles in this Special Issue subject ‘Theory of Mind’ to sustained critical scrutiny, and also present alternative accounts of how we make sense of—and make sense to—other people. They trace the historical sources of ‘Theory of Mind’, criticize its fundamental assumptions and favoured methods, and examine its applications to child development and the explanation of schizophrenia and autism.
60 citations
13 Jul 2004
59 citations
TL;DR: There is a direct connection between deliberative democracy and the pragmatist theory of truth as discussed by the authors, and it is unsurprising that so many pragmatists are moral cognitivists, as Peirce's theory of true beliefs are those that would be unde feated by deliberation and inquiry, seems tailor-made for cognitivism.
Abstract: There is a direct connection between deliberative democracy and the pragmatist theory of truth. The deliberative democrat thinks that correct political decisions can only be reached by free and open deliberation. And the pragmatist, at least the kind of pragmatist who follows the founder of the doctrine, C. S. Peirce, thinks that correctness or truth in any kind of discourse is that which would be the upshot of unlimited deliberation and inquiry.2 Indeed, pragmatists have al ways wanted to bring moral and political judgments under our cognitive scope? under the scope of correctness, truth, falsity, knowledge, error, and reason. Peirce was the least explicit in conducting this task (but see Misak 2004), whereas James and Dewey were very explicit. The tradition has been continued by con temporary pragmatists such as Hilary Putnam and Jurgen Habermas. Moral and political judgments aim at getting things right and the best way of achieving or approximating that aim is to engage in reasoning, debate, and the consideration of different perspectives and evidence. It is unsurprising that so many pragmatists are moral cognitivists, as Peirce's theory of truth, on which true beliefs are those that would be unde feated by deliberation and inquiry, seems tailor-made for cognitivism. It leaves the prospects for cognitivism intact, as it does not require a causal connection between our beliefs and physical objects. Moral and political judgments cannot be candidates for truth and falsity on a theory of truth that, for instance, has it that judgments are true if and only if they correspond to the mind-independent or physical world. The Peircean account of truth is entirely general?that is, it is applicable in principle to any discourse or domain of inquiry.3 A true belief, Peirce main tained, is one that is "unassailable by doubt" (Collected Papers, 5.416).4 It is a belief that would forever stand up to deliberation or inquiry; not lead to disap pointment; be "indefeasible" or not defeated, were deliberation to be pursued as
52 citations
TL;DR: Sternberg and Grigorenko as discussed by the authors argued that the methods available to Hebb, mostly animal research and behavioural human experiments, were not sufficient to provide empirical methods for linking his conceptual nervous system to real events in the human brain.
Abstract: In a recent paper and forthcoming volume, the former President of the American Psychological Association, Robert Sternberg, calls for an effort to reintegrate psychological science (Sternberg, in press; Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2001). In this paper we argue that D. O. Hebb, beginning with his technical volume in 1949 and continuing through a series of introductory textbooks, has convincingly presented the basis for such integration. The basis for this integration lies in understanding how genes and experience shape neural networks underlying human thoughts, feelings, and actions. Why has not Hebb's accomplishment been generally recognized as providing the needed integration for psychology? We suggest that the methods available to Hebb, mostly animal research and behavioural human experiments, were not sufficient to provide empirical methods for linking his conceptual nervous system to real events in the human brain. This methodology has now been provided by neuroimaging. While Hebb also recognized the importance of studying individual differences in intelligence and affect, there were also no methods for exploring the specific genes that were an important source of these differences. The human genome project has provided new methods for exploring this issue. Hebb's basic idea, together with the new methodological tools and new disciplines (e.g., cognitive, affective, and social neuroscience), all based on network views, give abundant evidence of the value of employing the converging operations strategy advocated by Sternberg and Grigorenko (2001). It is important that psychology recognize the need for integrating cognitive, affective and, social neuroscience with psychology, because many of the theoretical questions that need to be addressed by neuroimaging and genetic studies are exactly those that a century of psychologists have explored. The neuroscience approach provides crucial constraints for psychological theories, but also benefits from a closer connection with the psychological level of analysis. The Challenge In their paper, Sternberg and Grigorenko (2001) argue for a milltiparadigmatic and multidisciplinary integrated psychology to replace what they regard as a badly fragmented discipline. They outline three bad habits that they regard as symptoms of the fragmentation of the field. These are: a) the use of single methodologies, b) the identification of scholars with the psychological subfields of social, clinical, etc., and c) adherence to single paradigms such as behaviourism, cognitivism or psychoanalysis. Their paper traces various efforts to provide a unified psychology by Kimble (1994), Staats (1999), Magnusson (2000), and others. They also propose their own ideas, including the importance of using converging methods selected from different levels of analysis and the important role of graduate training in producing needed skills for integrative research. They also discuss political and social reasons why some oppose integration, and what can be done by organizations to foster it. We believe that the scientific basis for the integration is already on the scene, and that potentially integrated efforts under the names of cognitive, affective, and social neuroscience have already appeared. Functional neuroimaging requires the use of a task to activate brain areas. The usual strictures in the design of such tasks stem from cognitive studies, and they are now being taught and used by imagers. In addition, the combination of fMRl, EEC measures and lesions provide a toolkit of methods. Although there are many disagreements about the appropriate converging methods and how to best analyze imaging data, there is little question that a new generation of imagers are employing sophisticated and convergent methods. In our paper, we trace the background to these efforts in the work of D. O. Hebb. We then summarize important new developments that have increased the applicability of Hebb's ideas to many new topics. …
32 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: The evolution of behaviorism from its explicit beginning with John B Watson's declaration in 1913 to the behaviorisms of the present is considered briefly in this article, with the conclusion that regardless of whether or not its opponents and proponents are aware, the essential points of behaviourism have now been absorbed into all of scientific psychology.
Abstract: The evolution of behaviorism from its explicit beginning with John B Watson's declaration in 1913 to the behaviorisms of the present is considered briefly Contributions of behaviorism to scientific psychology then and now are critically assessed, arriving at the conclusion that regardless of whether or not its opponents and proponents are aware, the essential points of behaviorism have now been absorbed into all of scientific psychology It will assist the progress of the science of psychology if its focus now shifts away from incessant relivings of outdated argumentation to empirical discovery and theory construction based on those discoveries
28 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, philosophical aesthetics claims that the properwe first reassess the cognitivist-inspired arguties of the more sensuous nature hold title to ments in light of these recent criticisms, and show that these arguments are still effective or at the very least that the appreciation of such against traditional formalism can to some extent escape of such experience.
Abstract: Pretheoretically, our aesthetic appreciation of focuses primarily on the appreciation of formal both art and nature consists of the appreciation properties and is typically labeled formalism. of a wide range of different kinds of properties. The latter may be called cognitivism since For example, we appreciate the representational it stresses that part of the range where properties of a work of art such as Hieronymus appreciation seemingly requires greater cogniBosch's The Tribulations of St Anthony (1505), tive resources. marveling at the work's portrayal of the temptaIn recent years, the natural animosity tions and tortures the endurance of which are between formalism and cognitivism has come the price of sainthood. Alternatively, we appreto a head concerning the aesthetic experience of ciate the sensuous properties of the sky at sunnature. In the aesthetics of nature, formalists rise, marveling at the brilliant array of pinks and have traditionally focused aesthetic appreciturquoises. Within this range, which stretches ation on the kinds of formal compositional from the sensuous to the representational, we properties characteristic of scenic views, such may appreciate other kinds of properties: we as unity or balance. Cognitivists, on the other may find either the Bosch or the morning sky hand, have attempted to direct such appreciation richly textured, harmonious, balanced, powerful, toward a much wider range of aesthetic properawe inspiring, or expressive of God's wondrous ties, the appreciation of which requires knowways. ledge about the natural world.' The current There are a number of philosophical questions controversy between formalism and cognitivconcerning this range of properties. Chief ism in the aesthetics of nature stems from the among them are the questions of which of such fact that certain cognitivist-inspired arguments properties are the proper focus of genuine against traditional formalism have recently aesthetic experience, and of those that are, come under attack by individuals advocating a which are the most significant-the heart, as it new version of formalism concerning the were, of aesthetic experience. One tradition in aesthetic appreciation of nature. In this essay, philosophical aesthetics claims that the properwe first reassess the cognitivist-inspired arguties of the more sensuous nature hold title to ments in light of these recent criticisms. We being the sole focus of aesthetic experience, show that these arguments are still effective or at the very least that the appreciation of such against traditional formalism, although the new properties is a central and significant dimension version of formalism can to some extent escape of such experience. Another tradition champions their full force. Second, we develop a new, a different part of the range, claiming that the although related, line of thought that both appreciation of properties far removed from the directly challenges new formalism and provides sensuous ones is the heart of aesthetic experiadditional grounds for the cognitivist point of ence. The former tradition characteristically view.
19 citations
TL;DR: In separating the idea of embodied cognition from non-rational intuition, it is shown how 'embodiment' leading to the concepts of distributed cognition and distributed expertise has extensive and important implications for how the authors understand clinical cognition in nursing.
Book•
16 Aug 2004
TL;DR: The early written history of religious dualism is described in detail in this article and the Neolithic Archeology of Dualism is discussed in detail as well as the modern philosophical dualism of modern religious dualisms.
Abstract: Contents: Preface. Introduction. The Paleoanthropology of Dualism. The Neolithic Archeology of Dualism. The Early Written History of Religious Dualism. Modern Religious Dualisms. Modern Philosophical Dualisms. Dualism and Psychology. Summary and Conclusions.
TL;DR: In this paper, Gallagher et al. look at autism through a philosophical lens, arguing that what needs to be rejected in the developmental psycho-logy is an alienated ontology and estranged epistemology that has implicitly become inscribed within it, constraining its explanatory project and limiting its vision of possibilities.
Abstract: THE PAPERS THAT MAKE UP this special issue of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology are obviously united by both topic and approach. They all look at autism through a philosophical lens—both at infantile autism (Gallagher 2004a, 2004b; McGeer 2004; Shanker 2004) and at schizophrenic autism (Stanghellini and Ballerini 2004). Moreover, they are all concerned with the foundations of our understanding of people and their minds, both the minds of others (Gallagher 2004a, 2004b; Shanker 2004; Stanghellini and Ballerini 2004) and that of oneself (McGeer 2004). The developmental disorder of infantile autism provides a conspicuous example of a disruption in the ability to develop such an understanding and enter into the social world, whilst schizophrenic autism provides a conspicuous example of what happens when one falls out of it (Stanghellini and Ballerini 2004). Yet what further affords the opportunity of this introduction is the possibility of discerning a strong common theme that runs through the philosophical treatment the papers provide. For they are united in their rejection of the primarily cognitive approach toward our capacity to relate to one another (or to ourselves) as to minded people taken by many in the mainstream of developmental psycho(patho)logy today.1 Such mainstream approaches ascribe to the developing child a ‘theory of mind,’ tacit knowledge of which supposedly enables them to negotiate the social world. In place of such an intellectualist, disengaged, cognition-focused psychology, we are offered perspectives that stress the primitive foundational character of our pre-reflective (noncognitive) engagement with one another, our emotion, our expression, and our embodiment. The grounds for this stressing of the affective and praxical dimensions of personal life over the cognitive and representational are twofold. First there is the developmental trajectory itself, and the claim is that the autistic child’s interpersonal lacunae manifest themselves considerably before they develop the cognitive capacities for social knowledge (Gallagher 2004a; Shanker 2004). The principle ground, however, is philosophical, and the claim here is that what needs to be rejected in the developmental psycho(patho)logy is an alienated ontology and estranged epistemology that has implicitly become inscribed within it, constraining its explanatory project and limiting its vision of possibilities.2 That at least is how I
TL;DR: A consideration of the matter suggests that technical and conceptual difficulties abound in the effort to localize “high-level cognitive functions” in narrowly circumscribed regions of the brain, and that new approaches to behaviorism may be required to set psychology back on the correct track.
Abstract: A key epistemological difference between behaviorism and cognitivism concerns their respective attitudes toward the analysis of so-called cognitive processes into functional modules. Behaviorists generally say it is not possible. Cognitivists argue that this is an achievable goal. The question has been concretized by recent developments in brain imaging technology. A consideration of the matter suggests that technical and conceptual difficulties abound in the effort to localize “high-level cognitive functions” in narrowly circumscribed regions of the brain. Some of the most serious involve the ambiguous definition of the putative mental components that are to be localized and the generally unacknowledged nonlinear complexity of both psychological processes and the brain. In addition, the imaging techniques themselves are replete with technical difficulties that raise additional questions about this particular application, even though these wonderful machines can make extraordinary contributions to our knowledge of brain anatomy and physiology. The cumulative implication of these difficulties is that the cognitive approach to the study of scientific psychology has once again set out on a search for a chimera. New approaches to behaviorism may be required to set psychology back on the correct track.
01 Mar 2004
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a dictionary for introspection knowledge acquisition knowledge base language language language of thought learning lexicon localization of function logic logicism, psychologism meaning memory mental imagery metacognition mind modality model modularity morphology naturalization neural Darwinism neural network neuropsychology normativity number object or al pattern recognition perception phenomenalism physicalism pragmatic matics problem solving propositional attitude propositional format psychophysics qualia qualitative physics reading realism reasoning and rationality reductionism relevance representational r obotics schizophrenia semantic case, thematic relation semantic network semantics semiotics
Abstract: abduction action activation/inhibition ageing animal cognition artificial life aspect attention autism automatism belief cate gorization causality, mental causation cognitive development cognitive psychiatry cognitivism communication competence, performance complexity computational analysis concept connectionism consciousness constrai nt constructivism context and situation control counterfactual creativity desire d ifferentiation discourse distributed intelligence domain specificity dualism, monism emergence emotion epiphenomenalism epistemic epistemology experience explanation expressiveness ex ternalism, internalism foetal cognition frame problem function functional neuroimaging functionalism fuzzy goal-directed behaviour grammar holism identity individualism infa nt cognition information inheritance intentionality inte raction interpretation introduction (of Dictionary) introspection knowledge acquisition knowledge base language language of thought learning lexicon localization of function logic logicism, psychologism meaning memory mental imagery metacognition mind modality model modularity morphology naturalization neural Darwinism neural network neuropsychology normativity number object or al pattern recognition perception phenomenalism physicalism prag matics problem solving propositional attitude propositional format psychophysics qualia qualitative physics reading realism reasoning and rationality reductionism relevance representational r obotics schizophrenia semantic case, thematic relation semantic network semantics semiotics sense sense, reference sign social cognition space subdoxastic supervenience symbol syn tax text theory of mind time and tense truth Turing machine type, token validation will writing
06 Aug 2004
TL;DR: This paper explores the ability of four theoretical perspectives on cognition to interpret the evolution of competitive capability in a purposive sample of exemplar firms.
Abstract: This paper explores the ability of four theoretical perspectives on cognition to interpret the evolution of competitive capability in a purposive sample of exemplar firms. Interpretations predicated on managers guiding the flow of events using cognitivist, goal-directed processes are shown to be limited. More satisfactory accounts are achieved when evolution is viewed as the product of complex system dynamics.
TL;DR: In this paper, Ricoeur's hermeneutical phenomenology contributions to social psychology are highlighted, since it focuses the personal and collective history as a process integrated to action, narration, language, symbolical elaboration and the construction of identity and alterity (otherness).
Abstract: This presentation of the current French philosophy's renewal underlines Ricoeur's hermeneutical phenomenology contributions to social psychology, since it focuses the personal and collective history as a process integrated to action, narration, language, symbolical elaboration and the construction of identity and alterity (otherness). His historical and cultural approach makes it possible to go beyond the limits of cartesianism, positivism and cognitivism, deepening the study of the subjectivity and its formation, inserted in the personal history, in social relations, in concrete experience and in the broader social history of groups, institutions and communities. It corresponds not only to a progress in the study of language and interpretation, but also to the rising of a new paradigm of Reason, the hermeneutical paradigm, and to the creation of a method capable of exploring new aspects of the psychosocial dynamics, besides being a key to the interpretation of the plurality of languages and identities of the present globalized society.
TL;DR: This review article argues against cognitivism and in favour of the modularity view, and is using the book under review as an opportunity to define the issue and put forward the arguments.
Abstract: William Croft,Radical Construction Grammar: syntactic theory in typological perspective. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. xxviii+416.My reason for writing this review article is that I want to highlight a particular basic opposition in linguistic theory and methodology. On the one hand, we have what is usually called COGNITIVISM, represented in the book under review by the new theory of Radical Construction Grammar, henceforth RCG. On the other hand, there is a variety of schools, together forming a large majority in the field, whose theoretical overlap may be characterized by the term MODULARITY. I argue against cognitivism and in favour of the modularity view, and I am using the book under review as an opportunity to define the issue and put forward the arguments.
TL;DR: Vincent Descombes' remarkable work in two volumes as discussed by the authors is an attempt to change profoundly the logical geography of human action, which is widely accepted in our culture. I want to set out what I think a...
Abstract: Vincent Descombes' remarkable work in two volumes is an attempt to change profoundly the logical geography of human action, which is widely accepted in our culture. I want to set out what I think a...
TL;DR: The Mind's Provisions: A Critique of Cognitivism as discussed by the authors is a recent work of Descombes, which focuses on the topic announced in the subtitle of the book.
Abstract: I will focus on the topic announced in the subtitle of Professor Descombes' profound and provocative work: The Mind's Provisions: A Critique of Cognitivism. In the end, I will agree with practicall...
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this article, a more explicit characterization in which tacitly known theories must act as justifiers for claims that the tacit knower is capable of explicitly endorsing was devised. But the new account is specifically tied to verbal behavior, and if the analysis is correct then it follows that the scope and nature of cognitivist appeals to tacit knowledge are largely mistaken.
Abstract: A central tenet of cognitivism is that knowing how is to be explained in terms of tacitly knowing that a theory is true. By critically examining canonical anti-behaviorist arguments and contemporary appeals to tacit knowledge, I have devised a more explicit characterization in which tacitly known theories must act as justifiers for claims that the tacit knower is capable of explicitly endorsing. In this manner the new account is specifically tied to verbal behavior. In addition, if the analysis is correct then it follows that the scope and nature of cognitivist appeals to tacit knowledge are largely mistaken.
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In the case of linguistics, some events and developments of other disciplines prompt some authors to revise the principles constituting it a scientific discipline as discussed by the authors, and linguistics should be revised and accept new principles so that it can be a scientifically useful discipline for the starting 21rst century.
Abstract: It is customary, at the turn of significant dates, to analyse the situation affecting a particular discipline at the moment, with prospects for the future. In the case of linguistics some events and developments of other disciplines prompt some authors to revise the principles constituting it a scientific discipline. Linguistics should be revised and accept new principles so that it can be a scientifically useful discipline for the starting 21rst century. Linguistics, some authors say, has widened its limits and deepened its views, due to socio-cultural factors and the influence of thought from other sciences. Linguistics today has shifted to peculiar fields of interest, such as cognitivism, pragmatics, text and discourse analysis. Cognitive sciences deal with the problems of knowledge and communication, the solution of which will produce machines which will think and communicate just in the way human beings do. My intention in this article is to contribute with certain observations to the discussion of the topic, since it affects language, the study of language, and the speaking subjects producing language. The claim of this article is that the situation affecting linguistics cannot be defined by external circumstances affecting linguistics or the object of study of linguistics. Linguistics is to be defined in terms of the adequacy of it to the peculiarity of its object of study, the activity of speaking manifesting the nature of those subjects who speak. Language manifests freedom and intelligence of its speakers. This manifestation of language has to do with the essence of human beings, speaking subjects, who are free and historical. Human beings are free, that is creative and absolute, and historical, that is limited. Language manifests in many aspects. This article analyses the conditions affecting language as logos, as the apprehension of things by human historical subjects.
01 Jan 2004
TL;DR: Jameson et al. as mentioned in this paper proposed a perceptual symbol system (PSS) based on the theory of event coding, which can be seen as an alternative to the traditional view that the symbols used in thought are amodal.
Abstract: Sensorimotor Contingencies, Event Codes, and Perceptual Symbols Jason Jameson (j-jameson@northwestern.edu) Department of Psychology, Northwestern University, 2029 Sheridan Road Evanston, IL 60208-2710 USA 1995; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986; Searle, 1980; Smith & Thelen, 2003; Suchman, 1987; Thelen, 1994; Thelen, Schoner, Scheier, & Smith, 2001; Thomas, 1999; Van Gelder, 1998; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1992). In particular, one approach questions the requirement that the symbols used in cognitive processing should be amodal. Instead, in a Perceptual Symbol System (PSS), the symbols are modality-specific representations that do bear a principled resemblance to the things represented (Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou, et al., 2003). Specifically, these symbols are perceptual in the sense that they re-enact selective aspects of experience. But this view, though promising, remains underspecified in important ways. This paper is an attempt to clarify a fundamental construct of the PSS approach, the perceptual symbol. The specific goals of this paper are: (1) to present an account of conceptual representation that is at odds with the traditional view in one important respect—that the symbols used in thought are amodal; (2) to review theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that suggest that PSS should be taken seriously as a plausible alternative to Cognitivism; (3) to show that there are certain respects, however, in which the PSS framework is underspecified, specifically with respect to the foundational concept of a perceptual symbol; (4) based on the assumption that to clarify the concept of perceptual symbol requires some understanding of what perceptual experience is, to present one type of skill theory of perception that provides a comprehensive account of how perception and action interact to support perceptual experience; (5) to connect this account to perceptual symbols by adopting representational structures called event codes that possess key properties required by a PSS; (6) to review consistent empirical evidence that the properties of event codes that hold at the fine level of basic sensorimotor interaction might also hold during higher level cognitive processing; and (7) to suggest limitations and remaining questions for future study. Abstract Cognitivism, the traditional approach to understanding cognition, has argued for the essential role of symbolic computations over internal mental representations. But this view has been criticized on a number of grounds, one in particular being the assumption of amodality: that the symbols involved in processing are arbitrarily related to their referents. An opposing view—the framework of Perceptual Symbol Systems—holds that the elements of thought should be treated not as amodal symbols, but rather as modality specific, analog representations that simulate particular aspects of perceptual experience. Though this approach has been gaining in popularity from intuitively appealing theoretical accounts, and suggestive empirical support, it has suffered from a lack of specificity for key constructs. To address this problem, this paper presents a more detailed study of the foundational concept of perceptual symbol. The proposal builds from recent work on the skill-based nature of visual perception (the Sensorimotor Contingency Theory), and research that provides tools for representing the inseparable link between perception and action (the Theory of Event Coding). From these two sources, the characterization of a perceptual symbol as a selective re-enactment of perceptual experience, treated as a unit, will be elaborated and defended. Introduction Cognitive science, for much of its short history, has been dominated by a view of cognition that emphasizes the necessary role of computation, and which holds that cognitive processing is rule-governed manipulation of internal mental representations (Fodor, 1975, 1983; Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Johnson-Laird, 1989; Minsky, 1975; Newell & Simon, 1972; Pinker, 1998; Pylyshyn, 1984). The symbols that comprise these representations are what codify knowledge, and indeed are knowledge. Under this interpretation, symbols possess several key properties, the most important of which, for the purposes of this paper, is amodality: that a symbol is arbitrarily related to the thing it represents (Barsalou, 1999; Markman & Dietrich, 2000). In addition, specific psychological theories that adopt this framework “generally assume that knowledge resides in a modular semantic system separate from episodic memory and modality-specific systems for perception, action, and emotion” (Barsalou, et al., 2003). This view of cognition has undoubtedly met with much success (for accessible overviews, see Johnson-Laird (1989) and Pinker (1998)). There are critics, however, who have challenged this framework (Barsalou, 1999; Carlson, 1997; Clancey, 1997; Clark, 1997; Damasio, 1994; Dourish, 2001; Dreyfus, 1972; Gibson, 1979; Glenberg, 1997; Harnad, 1990; Hutchins, Why a Perceptual Symbol System? The framework of Perceptual Symbol Systems (PSS) is a perceptually-based approach to conceptual representation that has gained in popularity for many theoretical and empirical reasons. On the theoretical side, the view is more sophisticated than its empiricist predecessors. First, it appears that the rejection of perceptually oriented approaches was too hasty (Barsalou, 1999). For example, the criticism that perceptual symbols are just holistic records of perceptual experience (like internal pictures that lack any interpretation) is based on the assumption that perceptual
Journal Article•
TL;DR: Stress is described from other points of view, such as Grenberg's emotional theory, and the new construct Psychofortology is defined.
Abstract: In this article, a brief account of the psychological sense of stress is referred. Richard Lazarus' transaccional theory is described in detail; his first transaccional cognitive theory and his last cognitive-emotional transaccional theory. Stress is also described from other points of view, such as Grenberg's emotional theory. The new construct Psychofortology is defined and some references about the principal authors are made. Psychotherapeutic possibilities from the different psychological schools mentioned are described.
01 Jan 2004
TL;DR: Research carried out with (60) young ciberspace readers during their process of navigation in the web evidence a new way of reading far from that postulated by critical theory and not contemplated also by cognitivism of the traditional programs of reading.
Abstract: From three matrices of knowledge such as French constructivism, critical theory and cognitivism in reading research , the article describes research carried out with (60) young ciberspace readers during their process of navigation in the web. The results had evidenced four types of reading activities being carried by the young: utilitarian research, research of media, search college and school research. Some regularities of the navigation process had been identified in all the readers as e-mail search and the familiarity (almost natural) with the structure of data base of the InterNet. The paradox raised by pedagogical construtivism was compared to the positions most radical to the left in authors for who is impossible a critical education in ciberespace; the results of the research evidence a new way of reading far from that postulated by critical theory and not contemplated also by cognitivism of the traditional programs of reading.