Showing papers on "Delegation published in 1989"

The Organization of Hypocrisy: Talk, Decisions and Actions in Organizations

Abstract: Part 1 Organizations and inconsistent norms: institutional environments inconsistent environments. Part 2 The political organization principle: the ideal type of action organization the ideal type of political organization organizations in the real world - politics and action politics in organizational processes. Part 3 Politics in practice: attempts at action produce politics politics again inconsistencies in ideologies and roles the dominance of politics. Part 4 Decisions as transition between politics and action: the case of Greaton decision-makers as defensive scrutineers opinion-making implementation decision-makers as bearers of responsibility. Part 5 Responsibility as an impediment to influence - the case of budgeting: budgeting budgeting under stagnation roles and actors in the budget process the allocation of responsibility control - supply and demand budgeting as an instrument for external financing. Part 6 The responsible organization: society as hierarchy implementation or legitimation an illustration Stanby - implementation or legitimation? the role of politics. Part 7 Projects and organizations: two projects strategies for meeting external demands - delegation, rationality and ideology. Part 8 Ideas, decisions and actions in organizations: ideas and actions alternative interpretations of organizational decision-making decision-making and the allocation of responsibility decisions as legitimation four roles of decisions. Part 9 The dynamics of hypocrisy: the paradoxes of presentation and result public organizations and the publicness of organizations implications for organizational stakeholders.

On credible delegation by oligopolists: a discussion of distribution channel management

Abstract: Several papers in the recent marketing literature have suggested that delegation in distribution e.g., the use of independent middlemen helps manufacturers to precommit strategically to profit-enhancing competitive actions. Further, the literature suggests that the profitability of such actions depends on market structure. We challenge these conclusions here. This is done in two steps. First, we perform an analysis of the entire class of models which have been used in the literature. Using internally consistent assumptions about market structure and contracting, the only subgame perfect equilibrium is one in which all distribution channels have infinitely many levels of delegation. Obviously, this is not what we see in the real world. Next, we relax a key hidden assumption, namely that all intra-channel agreements are observable to competitors. Without this assumption, the usual results unravel. Unless channel members can offer credible guarantees that unobservable agreements do not exist, the strategic effects of delegation disappear. Since these guarantees are virtually impossible to maintain credibly, we would expect to reject the hypothesis in the earlier literature relating channel structure to competition in an empirical study controlling for observability. We conclude that mechanisms other than strategic ones must be responsible for the existence of delegated channels, and make some suggestions about promising avenues for future theory research in channel structure.

Delegation as Commitment: The Case of Income Tax Audits

Abstract: In this article we study the value of delegating authority over income tax audit policy, arising from the incompleteness of contracts. Consider a utilitarian government whose ability to commit is limited to aggregate dimensions of its audit policy, as publicly verifiable information about detailed allocations of audit budgets is not available. We show that the welfare level associated with the full-commitment solution can be attained by delegating authority over audit policy to a manager. The latter is offered a simple incentive scheme based only on the aggregate variables which are publicly observable. In contrast, if the government retains authority, direct commitment to these same variables does not allow the full-commitment welfare level to be achieved. Thus, despite sharing a common informational basis, delegation may perform better than centralized arrangements in the presence of incomplete contracts.

Have your lawyer call my lawyer: Bilateral delegation in bargaining situations

Abstract: Many bargaining situations involve simultaneous attempts to commit by the parties involved. This paper studies the consequences of bilateral commitment by delegation, modelling the parties' non-cooperative choice of negotiators at stage one contingent on the bargaining outcome these negotiators achieve at stage two. In a leading case, there is a unique interior Nash equilibrium where, except when tastes are identical, both parties genuinely delegate. Although one party may gain at the expense of the other by this process, relative to self-representation, it is often the case that both parties lose by such strategic manoeuvering.

Interests or Institutions: An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC Relations

Abstract: This essay examines the relationship between Congress and the International Trade Commission (ITC). Using the logic of principal-agent theory, we find that rising constituent pressures on Congress to increase trade protectionism have not led to increased political control over the trade bureaucracy. The essay suggests that the absence of this expected relationship between Congress and the ITC may be explained by the historical circumstances under which Congress originally delegated power. We provisionally argue that delegation in the 1930s established rules and norms which continue to influence the range of remedies to which Congress will turn to aid ailing industries. These rules and norms forestall direct congressional involvement in protectionism, thereby insulating the ITC.

Delegated law enforcement and noncooperative behavior

Abstract: Law enforcement is generally carried out by delegated authority. Policymakers (the legislature or the executive administration) delegate enforcement of laws and regulations to public or private agencies. Policymakers do not precommit to enforcement effort. Instead, they enunciate policy goals, appropriate funds, and specify broad objectives for the enforcement agency, which typically has considerable discretion in carrying out its assigned task. This article addresses two significant problems arising from the delegation of law enforcement. First, the policymaker's problem of designing incentives to induce efficient performance by the enforcement agency is examined. Second, the effect of delegation on the enforcer's strategic interaction with potential offenders is specified. The observability of law enforcement effort plays an important role in the

Access control and authorization plan for customer control of network services

Abstract: One challenge for future network service systems is to make customer control feasible while ensuring the security of both the customer's service and the control system itself. The author addresses the security problems that result from direct customer control. He argues that simple security mechanisms, such as access control lists, used in general-purpose computer systems are insufficient for administration control and authority delegation in network service systems. He proposes a security policy called an authorization policy that is suitable for both ensuring network security and facilitating administration and authorization control. This security policy is enforced through a unified protection mechanism called an access control hierarchy. An example is given to demonstrate the application of this access control hierarchy in existing network services. >

Variance Reporting and the Delegation of Blame: A Case Study

Abstract: The traditional functionalist analysis of the motivational properties of budgetary controls and variance reports has identified a number of dysfunctional features of typical systems, but has failed to explain why these persist. Through an examination of the case of a simple labour cost reporting system, it is suggested that part of the reason is that, for senior managers, accounting control systems serve to delegate the blame for organisational problems. The features of a system which enables this to be easily accomplished are, in some respects, the precise opposite of those which are generally considered ideal from the motivational point of view.

The Simple Analytics of the Principle-Agent Incentive Contract

Abstract: The traditional theory of the firm, as presented in virtually all economics textbooks, implicitly treats the firm as an owner-managed, or entrepreneurial, entity. In reality, ownership and control of the firm are often separated. The consequent delegation of tasks and information asymmetry lead to a principal-agent problem whereby managers may not act in the best interests of the owners. Essentially, if the owners are unable to completely monitor the action of the managers, effort-averse managers are likely to shirk- to pursue their own objectives rather than those of the owners. Shareholders derive utility from profits, and perhaps disutility from risk; managers derive utility from salary, bonus, and prerequisites, disutility from managerial effort, and perhaps disutility from the risk associated with potential variability of the bonus. In order to motivate managers to act in the best interests of the shareholders, owners must offer managers incentive contracts that provide a financial offset to the disutility of work and align the managers’ efforts with the objectives of the owners.

Controllable delegation: an exercise in law-governed systems

Abstract: We believe that the regime governing the patterns of sharing between objects, and of exchange of messages between them, should not be “hard-wired” into a programming language, but should be specifiable by the builders of a system to fit its particular requirements. This thesis has been the primary motivation behind our general concept of law-governed system, which serves as the foundation for this paper.We show how the law can be used to impose a variety of useful constraints over the structure and behavior of delegation-based systems. Such a law may contain some very specific rules that apply only to small parts of a system; it may also impose some very general regimes, such as class inheritance, on the entire system. We also argue that the constraints established by the law can be easily adapted to the changing requirements of an evolving system. This should be very useful in managing the process of software development from its design stage, through prototyping, construction, and beyond.

Rule-based delegation for prototypes

Abstract: Arguments have been given recently for providing the functionality of prototypes in object-oriented languages. Prototypes allow more flexible sharing of code and data by delegating messages to parent objects without the rigid structure of a class hierarchy. Prototypes can implement classes, and delegation can be used to model both single and multiple inheritance. However, one drawback with delegation is the difficulty in enforcing the semantics that delegation is used to model. This paper proposes a novel mechanism to control the delegation of messages with rules. In this system, the delegation of messages is governed by a set of rules possessed by each object. Rules can be used to implement classical single inheritance and can implement various solutions to multiple inheritance. In addition, rules can be created dynamically to model application-specific semantics. This paper describes how rule-based delegation works and illustrates various rules for rule-based delegation that have been implemented.

When do anesthesiologists delegate

Abstract: Nurse anesthetists (CRNAs) are a lower cost substitute for anesthesiologists in the delivery of anesthesia services. This article addresses the question of when anesthesiologists delegate in a team approach as opposed to using a solo arrangement. Logistic regression analysis was done using data from the 1986 Anesthesia Practice Survey and revealed that the team approach is more likely in areas with a relatively large supply of CRNAs; in hospitals with large surgical volumes, teaching facilities, and public hospitals; during emergency procedures, more lengthy procedures, and less complex surgeries; and among patients with poorer preoperative physical status. However, as the supply of anesthesiologists increases, the probability of CRNA use declines and in areas outside New England the "solo anesthesiologist" arrangement is significantly more common. Medicare and other third-party payers should eliminate regional variations in provider mix that are due to locational preferences and provider attitudes. Delegation to CRNAs can be encouraged by reducing what anesthesiologists are paid for practicing alone.

Information, transaction costs, and the organization of distribution: The case of Japan's general trading companies

Abstract: This paper develops a transaction cost analysis of the organizational choice for distribution in foreign trade. Implications for the choice between internal organization and agency delegation are drawn and tested with data from Japan's general trading firms. The patterns of agency delegation experienced by these companies are shown to be consistent with the view that the governance cost problems associated with the acquisition and transmission of information have a systematic impact on the organization of trading activities. Specifically, the integrated mode of distribution is ascribed to the hazards of incomplete contracting posed by the existence of a previously disregarded specialized asset, brand name capital.

Hospitality Managers' Stress and Quality of Life: Recommendations for Change

Abstract: A recent investigation conducted by the authors showed that hospitality man agers reported significantly greater stress and careerinterference with theirpersonal and family life, as well as an overall lower quality of life, in comparison with non- hospitality managers. Outlined in this paper are recommendations for better stress management and improvement of hospitality managers' life satisfaction. These include delegation and sharing of responsibilities and authority with staff, helping employees to be more responsible for theirperformance, utilizing a Manageron Duty (MOD) concept of organizational management (especially in non-guest contact areas), implementing fundamental institutional changes in scheduling, building internal support systems formanagers and employees, and encouraging managers and employees to take advantage of educational and therapeutic opportunities available to them in their region.

The Manager's Desk Reference

Abstract: Examples: AIDS in the workplace, career development, coaching employees, customer service, delegation and empowerment, disabled employees, ethics in the workplace, innovation and creativity, listening, mentoring, networking, performance appraisal, project management, quality, sexual harrassment, team building, time managemant, violence in the workplace.

The Response from the Grassroots: Self‐reliance in Zambian Education

Abstract: This article examines the effects of the current economic crisis on education in Zambia, and argues that the crisis has mobilised a remarkable amount of energy among parents, administrators and teachers, which has, paradoxically, helped to implement the recommendations of the Educational Reform document of 1977. Innovations such as production work in schools, teachers’ direct participation in efforts to improve the quality of education and the greater involvement of the community in school construction and maintenance have all challenged the government to introduce greater delegation of decision‐ making, in the interests of both efficiency and self‐reliance.

Family therapy in the People's Republic of China: An update

Abstract: This article describes cultural and structural changes in Chinese families over the past decade and offers descriptions of the increasing, yet limited, recognition of the importance of family systems interventions. These impressions were garnered from a 14-day visit to the People's Republic of China by a delegation of 40 marital and family therapists and researchers led by the authors.

Control of the Reservation Environment: Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation, and the Limits of State Intrusion

Abstract: Inter-sovereign disputes o(,er environmental regulation in Indian country are increasingly common. The federal government, individual states, and native nations all assert interests in controlling pollution on Indian reservations; the question of which sovereign should regulate in this area presents complex issues of federal law, native self-determination, and state autonomy. In this Article, the authors trace the roots of federal, state, and tribal authority to control events within reservation boundaries. Applying a threetiered analysis to the problem, the authors examine: express federal preemption of state pollution control laws; federal program delegation to native governments as a bar to state regulation; and established common law barriers to state authority in Indian country. The authors conclude that state pollution control regulation, whether aimed at native or nonnative persons and activities, is prohibited in Indian country. I. Regulatory Jurisdiction in Indian Country .............. 584 A. Federal Regulatory Jurisdiction .................... 585 1. Federal Plenary Power ......................... 587 2. The Tuscarora Rule ............................ 591 B. Tribal Regulatory Jurisdiction ..................... 593 1. Inherent Tribal Authority ...................... 594 2. Tribal Authority Under Federal Delegation ..... 596 3. Non-Natives and Their Lands Within Indian Country ....................................... 597 C. State Regulatory Jurisdiction ...................... 600 1. The Infringement/Preemption Test ............. 601 2. State Jurisdiction over Non-Natives and NonNative Land ................................... 606 3. The Effect of Public Law 280 .................. 607 4. The Applicability of Local Laws ............... 611 D. Summary of Regulatory Authority in Indian Country .......................................... 612 II. State Pollution Control Laws ........................... 613 * Visiting Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law; J.D. 1986, University of Wisconsin. Work on this Article was completed while Professor Royster was Natural Resources Law Institute Fellow, Northwestern School of Law, Lewis & Clark College. ** Assistant Professor, Native American Studies, University of California-Berkeley; J.D., 1986, University of Wisconsin. Initial work on this Article was completed while Professor Fausett was William H. Hastie Fellow, University of Wisconsin Law School. Professor Fausett is a mixed-blood Siksika (Northern Blackfoot). Washington Law Review A. State "In Lieu Of" Programs ...................... 614 1. State Programs Under the Federal Acts ........ 617 2. Native Nations as States Under the Federal A cts ........................................... 6 19 B. Additional State Pollution Control Laws ........... 622 III. Applicability of State Law ............................. 623 A. Express Federal Preemption ....................... 624 B. Deference to Agency Statutory Interpretation ....... 628 1. Federal Primacy in Indian Country ............. 629 2. Delegation of Program Authority to Native G overnm ents .................................. 638 C. The Infringement/Preemption Test ................. 643 1. Federal Indian Law Preemption ................ 644 a. Backdrop of Tribal Sovereignty ............. 644 b. The Balance of Federal, Tribal, and State Interests ................................... 649 2. Tribal Sovereignty ............................. 657 IV . Conclusion ............................................ 659 [W]e beg leave to observe and to remind you that the Cherokee are not foreigners but original inhabitants of America, and that they now inhabit and stand on the soil of their own territory and that the limits of this territory are defined by the treaties which they have made with the government of the United States, and that the states by which they are now surrounded have been created out of land which was once theirs, and that they cannot recognize the sovereignty of any state within the limits of their territory.' Tribal and state jurisdictional confrontations abound in Indian country.2 Control over reservation environmental protection increasingly is a focus of these inter-sovereign disputes. Native nations, long 1. R. COTTERILL, THE SOUTHERN INDIANs 218 (1954) (from a letter of 1823 to President Monroe from the Cherokee chiefs concerning their suggested removal to Arkansas from their original homelands claimed by the state of Georgia). 2. The authors generally prefer the term "Native American," or the shortened version, "native," to the term "Indian." There are, however, some exceptions. First, "Indian country" is used as a term of art to designate all lands within the territorial boundaries of a reservation, as well as additional native lands located outside reservation borders. See infra note 207 (statutory definition of Indian country). Much of the discussion in this Article pertaining to reservation pollution, however, will differentiate between native and non-native lands within Indian country. Second, while we recognize that the euphemisms of "Indian law" and "'Indian policy" patently are incorrect as reflecting derivations of tribal legal and policy preferences, we use those terms in the popular sense to refer to domestic United States law and policy regarding relations among the federal government, the states, and the native nations. Vol. 64:581, 1989 Control of the Reservation Environment threatened with the loss of their extractable and renewable resources, now are faced with losing as well the ability to protect those natural assets remaining to them. Preserving the natural resources of Indian country for future generations of native peoples ultimately will mean little if the air is polluted, the waters unfit to drink, and the land poisoned. Recent case law and scholarly commentary have served to direct renewed attention to environmental issues and pollution control problems within native territories.3 The primary legal issue that has emerged is who should regulate environmental protection in Indian country.4 3. Washington Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985); Allen, Who Should Control Hazardous Waste on Native American Lands?: Looking Beyond Washington Department of Ecology v. EPA, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 69 (1987); Du Bey, Tano & Parker, Protection of the Reservation Environment: Hazardous Waste Management on Indian Lands, 18 ENVTL. L. 449 (1988); Note, Regulatory Jurisdiction over Non-Indian Hazardous Waste in Indian Country, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1091 (1987) [hereinafter Non-Indian Hazardous Waste Regulation]; Note, Environmental Law--Federal Indian Law--Recent Developments-State of Washington, Department of Ecology v. EPA, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 739 (1987). For a recent non-scholarly overview of environmental activities in Indian country, see [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1920 (Jan. 27, 1989). Attention to environmental matters in Indian country, however, is hardly a recent phenomenon. The midto late 1970's, for example, saw a surge of legal materials on native environmental issues. See, eg., COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, INDIAN RIGHTS AND CLAIMS: ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE STATES (1977); P. MAXFIELD, M. DIETERICH & F. TRELEASE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW ON AMERICAN INDIAN LANDS (1977) [hereinafter P. MAXFIELD]; Anderson, Strip Mining on Reservation Lands: Protecting the Environment and the Rights of Indian Allotment Owners, 35 MONT. L. REV. 209 (1974); Schaller, The Applicability of Environmental Statutes to Indian Lands, 2(8) AM. INDIAN J. 15 (1976); Schnidman, Indians and the Environment: Anl Examination of Jurisdictional Issues Relative to Environmental Management, 4 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1977); Will, Indian Lands Environment-Who Should Protect It, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 465 (1978); Comment, The Applicability of the Federal Pollution Acts to Indian Reservations: A Case for Tribal SelfGovernment, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 63 (1976) [hereinafter Applicability of Federal Pollution Acts]. 4. In this Article the authors address solely the issue of precluding state jurisdiction over environmental matters in Indian country, and not the related issue of which of the remaining sovereigns-native nations or the federal government-should have primacy over environmental affairs within native territorial boundaries. The legitimacy of federal environmental powers over native reservations is much more problematical. The merits of this issue will not be debated fully here; to facilitate the present discussion only, the authors have accepted that federal environmental laws of general applicability to the United States at large apply with equal force to native governments. In the broader context, the authors reject any unilateral arrogation of federal authority. Both tribal and federal sovereigns appear to agree that the optimum solution to pollution control within Indian country is for those tribes that are willing and able, to assume control over environmental regulation, with the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") serving as an interim facilitator and a source of funding, assistance, and technical expertise. To an extent, these practices promote tribal self-government, build tribal expertise in environmental matters, further the concept that native nations are more than mere geopolitical subdivisions of the states, and prohibit the imposition of state regulatory authority over native peoples and reservations. Washington Law Review Section I of this Article presents an overview of regulatory jurisdiction in Indian country, as a necessary backdrop to the issue of state assertions of pollution control authority over native territories. Section II outlines the types of pollution control laws that the states may attempt to impose in Indian country. In Section III, the Article sets forth a three-tiered analysis by which a court may determine whether these state pollution control laws are applicable in Indian country. At the fir

Information Structures and the Delegation of Monitoring

Abstract: If the owner of a firm cannot commit ex-ante to monitor his workers and the monitoring technology may accuse a diligent worker of shirking (produce a "false positive"), the lack of commitment problem is extremely severe : the worker may shirk even if monitoring is costless. However, the same presence of false positives is necessary for this commitment problem to be fully resolved either through delegation of monitoring or through contracting with a passive third party.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Detail and Delegation: A Study in Statutory Specificity

Abstract: Congress included much detail in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 in order to curb administrative discretion. Taking the Clean Air Act, Prevention of Significant Deterioration provisions as an example, I show how often detailed provisions failed to work in practice, or in actuality delegated power to the agency. I suggest that Congress might wish to consider trying not to micro-manage in environmental and other statutes.

Training and development of the technical manager

Abstract: The author examines the training the technical person undergoes in preparation for a career and the development that the technical person will require upon becoming a manager. The author begins by defining what constitutes a technical manager. This includes experience and educational background. The discussion also covers the educational system and its preparation of technical managers. The organizational factors (dualtrack, job functions, organizational goals) and their effect on the technical manager are also discussed. Attention is also given to the personal development area, which concerns the actual management of people and how this determines a technical manager's development. The creativity and innovation concept of development is discussed, leading to a discussion of the delegation of assignments (a task many managers are hesitant to perform). The concept of team management is examined. >

A study of hospice administrative competencies and delegation of functions by program stage of development in Michigan.

Abstract: There are definable stages in hospice program development which require significantly different administrative competencies. In many instances, as programs move from one stage to another, there may need to be significant changes in administrative functions, delegation, and perhaps even changes in personnel. This article reports a study of hospice administrators in Michigan in which they determined not only which stage of development they believed their hospice program to be in, but also what essential competencies they needed in managing the day-to-day operations of their hospice programs.

A guide to delegation.

Abstract: Delegation is an essential requirement for effective nursing management. Used properly, delegation can foster growth of workers, alleviate tension, and contribute to a smoother working environment. This article outlines the four steps of delegation.

Management of change in education

Abstract: Budgetary control leads to the delegation of operational management, as in local management in schools. What are the implications, however, for those left in the centre? In practice, the changes may turn out to be equally significant as education authorities abandon detailed administration and adopt a strategic management approach.