Showing papers on "Delegation published in 1993"

The political logic of economic reform in China

Abstract: Acknowledgments Formal Authority Relations Among Central Communist Party and Government Institutions in the People's Republic of China PART 1. INTRODUCTION 1. The Political Logic of Economic Reform 2. The Prereform Chinese Economy and the Decision to Initiate Market Reforms PART 2. CHINESE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 3. Authority Relations: The Communist Party and the Government 4. Leadership Incentives:- Political Succession and Reciprocal Accountability 5. Bargaining Arena: The Government Bureaucracy 6. Who Is Enfranchised in the Policy-making Process? 7. Decision Rules: Delegation by Consensus 8. Chinese Political Institutions and the Path of Economic Reforms PART 3* ECONOMIC REFORM POLICY-MAKING 9. Playing to the Provinces: Fiscal Decentralization and the Politics of Reform 10. Creating Vested Interests in Reform: Industrial Reform Takeoff, 1978-81 11. Leadership Succession and Policy Conflict: The Choice Between Profit Contracting and Substituting Tax-for-Profit, 1982-83 221 12. Building Bureaucratic Consensus: Formulating the Tax-for-Profit Policy, 1983-84 13. The Power of Particularism: Abortive Price Reform and the Revival of Profit Contracting, 1985-88 PART 4* CONCLUSION 14. The Political Lessons of Economic Reform in China Bibliography Index

Method for delegating access rights through executable access control program without delegating access rights not in a specification to any intermediary nor comprising server security

Abstract: A method in which access control programs (ACPs) permit controlled delegation of access rights from clients to untrusted intermediaries. ACPs are programs that encode arbitrary specifications of delegated access rights. In the method, a client creates an ACP and associates it with a request to a server, the request being made through one or more intermediaries. When processing a request received from an intermediary, the server executes the access control program to determine whether or not to grant the request.

Training for Uncertainty

Abstract: : Uncertainty and confusion in warfare make decision making a challenge. Every commander must determine whether or not the information he has is valid or complete, and whether or not he should wait for additional information which may arrive at any moment. The analytical skill and courage to make this determination are essential for successful combat leadership. This monograph examines the theoretical and doctrinal advantages of junior leader initiative and delegation of decision making authority within a decentralized system of command in a battalion. It analyzes a model for implementing a decentralized system of command which is based on encouraging and teaching risk taking, initiative, and independent decision making. The monograph's main feature is a series of training techniques and exercises which will enable a battalion to achieve each of the five conditions called for in the model. This monograph acknowledges that adopting this model entails risk. Any commander who fosters initiative within his young, inexperienced subordinates is bound to see mistakes and errors. In order to train young leaders who are willing to take risks and make independent decisions, however, providing such opportunities is the commander's duty. This monograph will help commanders and S-3s better understand how they can fulfill that duty....Training, Officer training, Leadership, Leader development, Command, Command and control, Tactical decision making, Risk taking, Professional development.

Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People through Delegation

Abstract: This book argues that Congress's process for making law is as corrosive to the nation as unchecked deficit spending. David Schoenbrod shows that Congress and the president, instead of making the laws that govern us, generally give bureaucrats the power to make laws through agency regulations. Our elected "lawmakers" then take credit for proclaiming popular but inconsistent statutory goals and later blame the inevitable burdens and disappointments on the unelected bureaucrats. The 1970 Clean Air Act, for example, gave the Environmental Protection Agency the impossible task of making law that would satisfy both industry and environmentalists. Delegation allows Congress and the president to wield power by pressuring agency lawmakers in private, but shed responsibility by avoiding the need to personally support or oppose the laws, as they must in enacting laws themselves. Schoenbrod draws on his experience as an attorney with the Natural Resources Defense Council and on studies of how delegation actually works to show that this practice produces a regulatory system so cumbersome that it cannot provide the protection that people need, so large that it needlessly stifles the economy, and so complex that it keeps the voters from knowing whom to hold accountable for the consequences. Contending that delegation is unnecessary and unconstitutional, Schoenbrod has written the first book that shows how, as a practical matter, delegation can be stopped.

Mobility and Cooperation Among Nomadic Shepherds: The Case of the Raikas

Abstract: This paper describes and then analyzes the decision-making arrangements that prevail among the Raikas—nomadic shepherds from Western India. The paper suggests, using a simple analytical framework, that the existing distribution of decision-making during migration helps the Raikasto utilize available economies of scale, represent the different interest groups in their collectives, and control their decision-makers. At the same time, the ordinary shepherds in the camp are able to extract a comfortable subsistence from a complex and harsh environment by delegating much of their decision-making responsibilities to the leaders in the camp. To the extent shepherds in other parts of the world migrate over long distances and must confront similar issues of delegation of responsibilities and control over decision-makers, the analysis holds general relevance.

Evaluating Management Decisions via Delegation

Abstract: A central problem of network management is compressing vast amounts of real-time operational data to accomplish management decisions. A health function provides such eecient compression by combining managed data linearly into a single index of network state. This paper describes a computational theory of network behaviors, their observations, and threshold-decisions via health functions. The model is used to examine feasibility of various methods for computing health functions. Health functions cannot be included as part of a static MIB design, as they may vary from site to site and over time. Nor can they be usefully computed at centralized management platforms , since this can result in excessive polling rates, lead to errors due to perturbation introduced by polling, and miss the very goal of compressing data maximally at its source. Instead, we propose the use of the management by delegation paradigm to support exible and effective evaluation of health functions and linear threshold decisions at devices.

A management synopsis of empowerment

Abstract: Investigates “empowerment” and its relevance to management and organizations. Discusses in detail the advantages and disadvantages of empowerment and disempowerment. Business organizations are set up so that no one is totally empowered nor totally disempowered. Shows various stages of empowered and disempowered people and cultures to enable further progress and concludes that clarifying, coaching and counselling individuals is the progressive way to go.

On distributed system management

Abstract: Device failures, performance inefficiencies, improper allocation of resources, security compromises, and accounting are some of the problems associated with the operations of distributed systems. Effective management requires monitoring, interpreting and controlling the behavior of the distributed system resources, both hardware and software. Current management systems pursue a platform-centered paradigm, where agents monitor the system and collect data, which can be accessed by applications via management protocols. Some of the fundamental limitations of this paradigm include limited scalability, micromanagement, and semantic heterogeneity. We propose an alternative model, Management by Delegation, and contrast its properties via an application example, evaluating the health of a Distributed System.

The Decline of Private Bills: Resource Allocation, Credit Claiming, and the Decision to Delegate

Abstract: In this analysis, we examine how resources and credit-claiming opportunities influence congressional decisions to delegate authority. We review the potential for conflict between institutional (or collective) and individual incentives for delegation, suggesting that this conflict inhibited Congress's attempts to manage the work load created by private claims legislation. Specifically, until an increase in resources created alternative opportunities for credit claiming, legislators were reluctant to eliminate the opportunity provided by private legislation. We hypothesize that as the resources available to legislators increased, new constituent service opportunities could be developed, and the relative value of private bills declined, accounting for the observed decline in the number of private claims bills introduced into recent Congresses. Empirical analysis shows the expected relationship between increased staff resources and private claims, lending support to the explanation we develop.

Competition ruins the good life

Abstract: . Leadership practices in political parties reflect the necessity of delegation as well as the desire by the rank-and-file to control their leaders. Norwegian political parties have traditionally divided their leadership functions between two or even three offices, whose powers have varied between as well as within parties. Non-socialist parties have vested more power in their parliamentary leaders, and socialist parties more in their organizational chairs. The electoral process is in principle open, but contested elections have traditionally been rare. In recent years, however, contested elections have become more common, parliamentary leaders have lost much of their autonomy, and leadership tenure, at least in some parties, has gone down. Heightened electoral competitiveness seems to be driving many of these changes.

Bargaining with noisy delegation

Abstract: Principals delegate to an agent in the context of the Nash bargaining model, but communicate instructions to their agents imperfectly Numerical methods are used to find a unique equilibrium in the principals' strategies Agents fail to agree with a positive probability, invoking a secondary mechanism for the resolution of disputes such as arbitration Comparative statics are informative The risk sensitivity of the Nash bargaining solution is mitigated but not eliminated As uncertainty goes to zero, a stable unique limiting equilibrium is identified from the set of multiple equilibria identified in a model in which principals delegate without trembles

Sir Leslie Melville: an Interview*

Abstract: This interview with Sir Leslie Melville focuses on his career which began in 1924 when he was appointed Public Actuary of South Australia. He became the Commonwealth Bank's first economist in 1931. In 1944 he led the Australian delegation to the United Nations Monetary and Economic Conference at Bretton Woods and was the Australian Executive Director of the IMF/World Bank in the earty 1950s During the 1960s and 1970s he was chairman of the Tariff Board and of the Commonwealth Grants Commission He was appointed Professor of Economics in the University of Adelaide in 1929 and was Vice-Chancellor of the ANU between 1953 and 1960.

Should the Bank of England Be Independent

Abstract: since monetary policy was effectively determined by the actions of the Bundesbank. Now, with the UK's with drawal from the EMS and no immediate prospect of any return, the question has again returned to the policy agenda. In fact, the arguments used to justify such a delegation of responsibility are closely related to those originally associated with the decision to join the EMS itself; that monetary policy should be controlled by an authority with a strong aversion to inflation and a repu tation for sticking to its announced policy. It has been argued that an independent Bank of England would offer precisely these advantages without compromising the domestic (ie UK) objectives which were overridden by the Bundesbank.

Approaches to Software Fault Tolerance

Abstract: A personal and rather discursive account is given of the background to the start of work in the early 1970s at Newcastle on software fault tolerance, and of how work has developed to encompass forward as well as backward error recovery, and parallel and distributed software as well as sequential programs. A major theme of the paper is that of the links between this work and that carried out elsewhere in connection with the topic of objectoriented programming, in particular on concepts such as generic classes and functions, exception-handling, delegation and reflection.

Delegation in International Monetary Policy Games

Abstract: In this paper we show that the delegation of monetary policy to an independent and more conservative central banker is an optimal policy in an international context with monetary spillovers between countries, even in the absence of time inconsistency (credibility) issues. We also study the welfare implications of delegating monetary policy and extend our analysis to incorporate the coordination of monetary policies.

Delegation decision making: development of a teaching strategy.

Abstract: The ability of registered nurses to delegate nursing care to lesser-skilled nurses has become an important component of nursing practice. However, neither education programs nor clinical experience has prepared staff nurses to function in the delegation-decision role. A tool developed to meet this need is the Nursing Assessment Decision Grid. With its use, registered nurses learn to analyze the nursing tasks and patient problems inherent in patient vignettes and then gauge which level of nurse can safely carry out the patient care required.

Delegation: a critical skill for the orthopaedic nurse.

Abstract: Delegation is a learned skill that is critical for the orthopaedic staff nurse today. The evolution of assistive personnel and the health care delivery system is introduced, along with who unlicensed assistive personnel are and distinctions between delegation and assignment. The scope of nursing practice is discussed in relation to nurse practice acts, standards, position statements, and evaluation of practice. Several models, including the nursing process, present criteria for delegation. Barriers to delegation involve characteristics of the staff nurse, issues of supervision, and reverse delegation. Benefits are noted that will encourage the orthopaedic nurse to delegate legally and effectively in an effort to work efficiently and to empower colleagues.

Executive Order 12884: Delegation of Functions Under the Freedom Support Act and Related Provisions of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act

Abstract: By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the FREEDOM Support Act (Public Law 102– 511) (the ‘‘Act’’), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (the ‘‘Foreign Assistance Act’’), the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1993 (Public Law 102–391), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows: Section 1. Secretary of State. (a) There are delegated to the Secretary of State the functions conferred upon the President by: (1) section 907 of the Act; (2) paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of section 498A(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act; (3) paragraph (1) of section 498A(C) of the Foreign Assistance Act and the requirement to make reports under that section regarding determinations under that paragraph; and (4) section 599B of Public Law 102–391. (b) The Secretary of State may at any time exercise any function delegated to the Coordinator under this order or other wise assigned to the Coordinator. Sec. 2. Coordinator. There are delegated to the Coordinator designated in accordance with section 102 of the Act the functions conferred upon the President by: (a) section 104 of the Act, and the Coordinator is authorized to assign responsibility for particular aspects of the reports described in that section to the heads of appropriate agencies; (b) section 301 of the Act, insofar as it relates to determinations and directives; (c) section 498A(a), section 498B(c), and section 498B(g) of the Foreign Assistance Act; and (d) paragraph (2) of section 498A(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act and the requirement to make reports under that section regarding determinations under that paragraph. Sec. 3. International Development Cooperation Agency. There are delegated to the United States International Development Cooperation Agency the functions conferred upon the President by: (a) sections 301(a) and 307 of the Act, except insofar as provided otherwise in section 2(b) of this order; (b) section 498 and section 498C(b)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act; (c) paragraph (3) of section 498A(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act and the requirement to make reports under that section regarding determinations under that paragraph; (d) subsection (d) under the heading ‘‘Assistance for the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union’’ contained in Title II of Public Law 102–391; and (e) section 592 of Public Law 102–391, except to the extent otherwise provided in section 5(b) of this order. Sec. 4. Secretary of Agriculture. There are delegated to the Secretary of Agriculture the functions conferred upon the President by section 807(d) of the Act. Sec. 5. Other Agencies. The functions conferred upon the President by: (a) sections 498B(h) and 498B(i) of the Foreign Assistance Act are delegated to the head of the agency that is responsible for administering the particular program or activity with respect to which the authority is to be exercised; and (b) the third proviso in section 592 of Public Law 102–391 are delegated to the head of each agency that is responsible for administering relevant programs or activities. Sec. 6. General. (a) the functions described in sections 3, 4, and 5 of this order shall be exercised subject to the authority of the Coordinator under section 102(a) of the Act or otherwise. (b) As used in this order, the word ‘‘function’’ includes any duty, obligations, power, authority, responsibility, right, privilege, discretion, or activity. (c) Functions delegated under this order shall be construed as excluded from the functions delegated under section 1–102(a) of Executive Order No. 12163, as amended. (d) Any officer to whom functions are delegated or otherwise assigned under this order may, to the extent consistent with law,

Management with Delegation

Abstract: Cake products (yellow, white and devil's food) as produced by commercial bakers for wholesale and retail markets and characterized by significantly prolonged shelf-life are produced by replacing 10 to 35% of the sugar and fat content of standard dough formulations for such bakery products with lactose. Specifically, lactose is used to replace 10 to 35% of the sugar or corn sugar content (sucrose, dextrose) or fat content (shortening), or both, in such standard formulations containing as a norm, 24 to 32% sugar and 8 to 13% fat. Shelf-life of the improved cake products, which is related to the tenderness or "freshness" of the baked products, is prolonged 100 to 400%, or longer, as compared to the shelf-life of standard formulation cakes of the same type. Substantially increased volumes and external appearance scores are also obtained in comparison with said standard formulatin products.

The development of transforming leaders: training the “coaching enabler” in delegation and empowerment through the jonico window

Abstract: Uses the familiar Johari window. This device usefully illustrates the importance of feedback and sharing in the development of interpersonal relationships. The Jonico window, by contrast, illustrates the manager′s use of delegation and empowerment in the development and motivation of subordinates. Describes how it can be used as a powerful tool in leadership training for managers. The benefits of delegation and empowerment, as illustrated in the window, encourage managers to lead as “enablers” – making full use of their people′s capability. It can also be used to encourage managers to go beyond their people′s current capability and lead as “coaching enablers”. Their leadership then becomes transforming as they use the Pygmalion effect to stretch and grow their people. Using self‐assessment questionnaires, managers can compare their profile with that of an ideal coaching enabler. The profile also shows the extent to which they tend to fall short by behaving in one or other of three aberrant ways: nervous d...

The Trident Case and the Evolutionary Theory of F. A. Hayek

Abstract: The processes of reasoning which common law judges employ in rationalizing departures from established principles of law, came into sharp focus in the case of Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd.' In that case, the High Court of Australia decided, by a majority, that a person who was not a party to an insurance policy had the right to be indemnified by the insurer under that policy. More importantly, three of the seven judges held that the long established doctrines of privity and consideration should not be applied to the third party claim, thereby recognizing exceptions to the two rules. Decisions which seek to change established law always raise the question of the legitimacy of judicial 'lawmaking'. The positivist response generally takes the form of the assertion that judges have delegated legislative power. In Austinian theory, their decisions are tacitly ratified by legislative inaction and/or by the enforcement of judgments by the coercive power of the sovereign. According to Kelsen, judicial laws are validated by norms authorizing their creation. According to Hart, judges are authorized to make law by the rules of recognition. In each case, the judge's legislative power appears to be restrained only by the terms of the delegation. No doubt, these terms impose severe limitations on the legislative discretion of judges. Thus, a judge has no general legislative power but may make law only in relation to the point at issue before him. A judge also must not decide against the legislative will. A law made by a judge is always subject to vitiation by the political legislature. However, besides these constraints, positivist theory places no limit on the legislative discretion of judges. It