Showing papers on "Deterrence theory published in 1992"
TL;DR: The authors reformulates Jervis's spiral and deterrence models and argues that they overlook types of adversaries, including most importantly insecure greedy states, and that shifts in the adversary's balance of domestic power offer an alternative to individual learning as the basic way in which political consequences are generated.
Abstract: Analyses of military strategy often overlook its political consequences—its effect on the adversary's basic goals and understanding of the defender's resolve. As a result, they prescribe the wrong type of military policy and reduce states' security. This article explores how a variety of factors interact to produce political consequences. These factors include the type of adversary (specifically, its motives for expansion); the type of military strategy the defender adopts (offensive or defensive and unilateral or bilateral); the source of the adversary's misperceptions; and the process through which political consequences are generated. The article reformulates Jervis's spiral and deterrence models and argues that they overlook types of adversaries, including most importantly insecure greedy states; that shifts in the adversary's balance of domestic power offer an alternative to individual learning as the basic way in which political consequences are generated; that national-level failures of evaluation provide an alternative source of exaggerated insecurity; and that these differences can require the defender to follow different policies. Final sections explore military options for managing political consequences and implications for U.S. security policy.
125 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a holistic conceptual framework within which various research topics related to discrimination may be interrelated and evaluated, and critically analyzes extant research relating to central components in the framework.
Abstract: This paper presents a holistic conceptual framework within which various research topics related to discrimination may be interrelated and evaluated. It then critically analyzes extant research relating to central components in the framework: the detection of discrimination, causes of discrimination, consequences of discrimination, and policy initiatives related to fighting discrimination both directly by deterrence and indirectly by attacking segregation and the prejudices it spawns. A great deal is known about the nature of private acts of housing discrimination, but little about which policies are most effective in combating such discrimination. On the other hand, relatively little is known about the extent of housing discrimination perpetrated by local governments and public agencies and about both differential treatment and disparate impact forms of discrimination in mortgage and related (appraisal, insurance) markets.
110 citations
TL;DR: The empirical evidence on democracy and war involvement indicates two quite robust findings as mentioned in this paper : First, democracies do not differ from other regimes in their degree of war involvement, and war is extremely rare between democracies.
Abstract: The empirical evidence on democracy and war involvement indicates two quite robust findings. First, democracies do not differ from other regimes in their degree of war involvement. Second, war is extremely rare between democracies. So, the pacifying impact of democracy is restricted to relations between democracies. This finding is at odds with some of my previous empirical work (Weede, 1983, 1989), where only extended deterrence by superpower alliance and subordination of other states under superpowers have been treated as pacifying conditions. In this article, the previous design and data are used again, but a `peace among democracies' proposition replaces the earlier `peace by subordination (under some superpower)' proposition. By and large, this substitution can better explain why some dyads go to war, but most dyads generally do not. Although there has been no war between democracies in the 1962-80 period analyzed here, it is not easily possible to establish the significance of this relationship. Mov...
107 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a multimarket perspective is proposed to identify potential entrants as existing firms in related markets, and a new framework is used to analyze entry strategies and entry deterrence.
Abstract: The multimarket perspective identifies potential entrants as existing firms in related markets. The paper uses this new framework to analyze entry strategies and entry deterrence. Successful entry-permitting and entry-deterring strategies require understanding of the feedbacks from the entry market to the home market and vice versa. The multimarket perspective integrates literature on industrial organization and strategic management.
44 citations
18 May 1992
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that war termination deserves equal billing with other aspects of the campaign planning process and should be guided by a set of principles or guidelines which, like; other dimensions of that process, are best considered earlier rather than later.
Abstract: : Our current operational doctrines display a serious blind spot with regard to the issue of conflict termination. How should the operational commander translate the political or military objectives of a conflict into war termination conditions to be achieved as the product of a campaign? This essay argues that war termination deserves equal billing with other aspects of the campaign planning process and should be guided by a set of principles or guidelines which, like; other dimensions of that process, are best considered earlier rather than later. Based on a review of existing theory and recent historical illustrations, it suggests three requirement which war termination doctrine must address: operational doctrine should tell us something about how to define military conditions in a manner that relates those conditions to strategic aims ; it should facilitate a military contribution to the bargaining process inherent in the terminal phases of a war; and it should help to guide the transition from hostilities back toward a state of peace.
37 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors re-examine the question of how much misperception by foreign policy decision-makers is consistent with rationality, in light of new developments in game theory.
Abstract: Authors of several case studies of international conflict have claimed that the frequency with which statesmen are surprised by the way other governments respond to challenges is inconsistent with rational deterrence theory. Some have contended that the behavior of decision-makers is better explained by theories of cognitive or even affective psychology. The main issue raised by these critics is decision-makers' use of the information available to them, especially information about the commitments of other governments, and their incentive to protect their reputations by carrying out their threats. Only recently, however, have game-theoretic techniques been developed which permit the formalization of theories of deterrence that incorporate incomplete information, learning and the development of reputations. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the question of how much misperception by foreign policy decision-makers is consistent with rationality, in light of these new developments in game theory.
34 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: The authors showed that the probability of a horizontal merger being anticompetitive is higher in Canada than in the U.S. and that there simply isn't much to deter a significant number of potentially collusive mergers.
Abstract: While the U.S. has pursued a vigorous antitrust policy towards horizontal mergers over the past four decades, mergers in Canada have until recently been permitted to take place in a virtually unrestricted antitrust environment. The absence of an antitrust overhang in Canada presents an interesting opportunity to test the conjecture that the rigid market share and concentration criteria of the U.S. policy effectively deters a significant number of potentially collusive mergers. The effective deterrence hypothesis implies that the probability of a horizontal merger being anticompetitive is higher in Canada than in the U.S.. However, parameters in cross-sectional regressions reject the market power hypothesis on samples of both U.S. and Canadian mergers. Judging from the Canadian evidence, there simply isn't much to deter.
27 citations
TL;DR: The role of rational choice in deterrence is a controversial subject among students of international politics as discussed by the authors, especially regarding application to the nuclear power domain, and there is great disagreement about its application in the nuclear domain.
Abstract: One of the most controversial subjects among students of international politics is the role of rational choice in deterrence. Disagreement is especially intense regarding application to the nuclear...
17 citations
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01 Aug 1992
TL;DR: In this paper, the tables are turned: Japan Appeases Russia, 1939-41, and the Chinese Communist Party and the Comintern agreed to negotiate from weakness to strength.
Abstract: Preface - Negotiation from Weakness to Negotiation from Strength, 1933-34 - Deterrence and Attempted Detente, 1934-36 - The Chinese Communist Party and the Comintern - The Sino-Japanese War and Soviet Aid to China, 1937 - Frontier Fighting: Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, 1938-39 - The Tables are Turned: Japan Appeases Russia, 1939-41 - Conclusion - Index
16 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1992
TL;DR: Credibility and deterrence the Pearl Harbor reaction covert misadventure, failed summitry the road to Kabul US reputation and Soviet expansion as discussed by the authors, failed summit, and failed summit.
Abstract: Credibility and deterrence the Pearl Harbor reaction covert misadventure, failed summitry the road to Kabul US reputation and Soviet expansion.
15 citations
TL;DR: The future of deterrence in the new strategic environment of the 1990s can be predicted in detail, but some important defining characteristics can be identified with high confidence as mentioned in this paper, such as the solo status of the United States as a superpower, increasing regional disorder and cultural political disharmony, erosion of the residual alliances of the cold war era, by a process of U.S. geostrategic withdrawal from Eurasia, by an absence of change in the basic terms of statecraft and strategy, and by the maturing of information-age military capabilities in the hands of the
Abstract: What is the future of deterrence in the new strategic environment of the 1990s? The future cannot be predicted in detail, but some important defining characteristics can be identified with high confidence. The new strategic environment is being shaped by the solo status of the United States as a superpower, by an increasing regional disorder and cultural‐political disharmony, by the erosion of the residual alliances of the cold war era, by a process of U.S. geostrategic withdrawal from Eurasia, by an absence of change in the basic terms of statecraft and strategy, and by the maturing of information‐age military capabilities in the hands of the United States. The U.S. policy demand for deterrent effectiveness will be high in the new era, though such effectiveness will be more difficult to achieve vis‐a‐vis regional rogue states than it was in the relationship with yesterday's USSR. The value of deterrence by denial rather than punishment will be both more feasible and more credible than before. No...
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13 Oct 1992
TL;DR: In this article, the deadlock of nuclear strategy and the development of common deterrence are discussed. But the main focus is on the future of the nuclear age and not the present day.
Abstract: Introduction - Peace and War - Nuclear Danger and the Development of Reciprocal Restraint - The Deadlock of Nuclear Strategy - The Development of Common Deterrence - Will the Nuclear Age Last? - The Nuclear Revolution and Global Pacification - Bibliography - Index
01 Apr 1992
TL;DR: In this article, an examination of the environmental damage that occurred during the Persian Gulf War provides a legal framework to conclude that the existing international legal order clearly proscribes environmental damage and that there is no institutionalized mechanism at the international level to facilitate individual and State accountability for even the most flagrant violations of the law.
Abstract: : An examination of the environmental damage that occurred during the Persian Gulf War provides a legal framework to conclude that the existing international legal order clearly proscribes environmental damage that is not justified by military necessity during armed conflict. It is equally clear, however, that there is no institutionalized mechanism at the international level to strengthen deterrence by facilitating individual and State accountability for even the most flagrant violations of the law. This thesis proposes two things: a system to strengthen the ability of the international community to take action, and a stronger role for the United States until the world community develops a more effective system of redress.
01 Jan 1992
TL;DR: The role and effect of nuclear weapons in the emergent international system is discussed in this paper, where the authors consider the post-cold war world and the role and impact of nuclear forces.
Abstract: The end of the Cold War poses new and exciting, if somewhat daunting, challenges for analysts of international relations. Not the least of these concerns is the role and effect of nuclear weapons in the emergent international system. During the Cold War years nuclear weapons were a key element, not only in defining the superpower relationship, but also in determining major elements of the international system; in the post-Cold War world, however, the role and impact of nuclear weapons are far less clear. This is particularly the case in Europe, which was the crucial theater of the Cold War and also the region in which the transition to new relationships and structures has been most dramatic. Now that the apparatus of extended deterrence is being dismantled, it is important to consider what, if anything, will be put in its place.
TL;DR: In this paper, Carle et al. discuss the strategic implications of chemical weapons proliferation, Brad Roberts war with Iran and the lessons of the war with Iraq: implications for future defense policies, Shahram Chubin arms control and the proliferation of high technology weapons in the Near East and South Asia - an Iraqi view, Nazim T.Mushtak.
Abstract: Part 1 Introduction to the problem section: weapons technology and regional stability, W. Seth Carus arms trade and the proliferation of new military technologies, Yuri Pinchukov the strategic implications of chemical weapons proliferation, Brad Roberts mayhem or deterrence? regional and global security from non-proliferation to post-proliferation, Christopher Carle. Part 2 Arab-Israel: quality vs quantity - the Arab perspective of the arms race in the Middle East, Abdel Monem Said Aly security and arms control in the Middle East - an Israeli perspective, Shai Feldman. Part 3 Gulf: Iran and the lessons of the war with Iraq: implications for future defense policies, Shahram Chubin arms control and the proliferation of high technology weapons in the Near East and South Asia - an Iraqi view, Nazim T.Mushtak. Part 4 India-Pakistan: arms control and the proliferation of high technology weapons in South Asia and near East - a view from India, Jasjit Singh arms control and the proliferation of high technology weapons in South Asia and near East - a view from Pakistan, Ross Masood Hussain. Part 5 Arms control section: untangling the priorities - weapons, vehicles and the objectives of arms control, Ian Smart arms control goals in the Middle East and South Asia, goals, methods, and limitations, Geoffrey Kep and Shelly A.Stahl stemming the proliferation of ballistic missiles - an assessment of arms control options, Janne E.Nolan chemical and biological weapons and regional arms control, Brad Roberts controlling weapons of mass destruction in South Asia - an American perspective, Stephen P.Cohen Soviet policy toward arms transfers to the Middle East, Andrei Shoumikhin conclusion, Geoffrey Kempt and Shelley A.Stahl.
12 Mar 1992
TL;DR: Spector as mentioned in this paper examines proliferation trends and proposes a predominately diplomatic strategy for containing the problem of nuclear proliferation, and identifies three waves of proliferation: the first is the five states with declared weapons and doctrine-the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, and China; the second includes a less visible group that developed a covert capability, without testing weapons or declaring a doctrine of deterrence-for example, Israel, India, and probably Pakistan; and, a third wave of would-be proliferators includes radical states like Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea.
Abstract: : The most prominent shift in the National Military Strategy is from the global Soviet threat to a new focus on regional contingencies No threat looms larger in these contingencies than the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles This study examines proliferation trends and proposes a predominately diplomatic strategy for containing the problem Dr Spector identifies three waves of proliferation: the first is the five states with declared weapons and doctrine-the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, and China; the second includes a less visible group that developed a covert capability, without testing weapons or declaring a doctrine of deterrence-for example, Israel, India, and probably Pakistan; and, a third wave of would-be proliferators includes radical states like Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea Spector's political approach is based on the common interest of wave one and two states to prevent further proliferation Political-economic incentives have already worked in the cases of Brazil, Argentina, Taiwan, and South Africa - states which appear to have abandoned their nuclear weapons programs Spector does not rule out the option of military force Force, especially under international sanctions, can be a powerful tool to back diplomatic efforts Use of force, however, remains a last resort
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01 Jan 1992
TL;DR: The role of hegemonies and alliances in non-nuclear security has been discussed in this article, with a focus on the role of the hegemanies and the alliances.
Abstract: Introduction, Regina Cowen Karp beyond nuclearism, Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler towards non-nuclear security - costs, benefits, prerequisites, Erwin Hackel legal issues concerning the feasibility of nuclear weapon elimination, Julie Dahlitz thinking about no nuclear weapons - technical and strategic constraints on transitions and end-points, Paul C. White, et al verification of nuclear weapon elimination, Patricia M. Lewis nuclear weapon elimination - fissile material and warheads, Frank von Hippel nuclear proliferation and the elimination of nuclear weapons, Lynn Eden and George Quester the role of hegemonies and alliances, Harald Muller minimum deterrence and nuclear abolition, Nicholas J. Wheeler.
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01 Jan 1992
TL;DR: A requiem for Marxism perestroika and the quest for peace Johnson's problem a three party model of world conflict notes on economic warfare do zones of deterrence exist? economic warfare between the superpowers toward a negative arms race as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: A requiem for Marxism perestroika and the quest for peace Johnson's problem a three party model of world conflict notes on economic warfare do zones of deterrence exist? economic warfare between the superpowers toward a negative arms race a general model of economic and military war economic causation in the breakdown of military equilibrium macroeconomic warfare.
01 Sep 1992
TL;DR: A framework for analyzing the performance of systems for verifying compliance with arms-control treaty constraints is developed and it is shown how to evaluate the desirability of the treaty constraints themselves.
Abstract: Centered around the notion of deterrence, a framework for analyzing the performance of systems for verifying compliance with arms-control treaty constraints is developed. Using the same models, it is also shown how to evaluate the desirability of the treaty constraints themselves. This analysis forms a relatively unified treatment of both topics, one that permits the joint optimization of both treaty limits and verification mechanisms. The specific application discussed is underground nuclear testing, but because of the generality of the analysis one can apply it to other arms-control contexts as well. >
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30 May 1992
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the role of force and policy in the future of the United States and its nuclear deterrent strategy, including the Gulf crisis of 1991 and the end of a marriage.
Abstract: Introduction NATO and Nuclear Escalation: End of a Marriage? Coercive Strategy and the Gulf Crisis of 1991 Clausewitz and Contemporary Strategy: Deterrence, Escalation and Friction Punishment and Denial in Nuclear Deterrence Strategy Conclusion: Force and Policy in the Future Selected Bibliography Index
01 May 1992
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the era of deterrence through the threat of retaliation is ending and argue for a shift from the residual forces from the offensive era into those appropriate for a multipolar world.
Abstract: : The era of deterrence through the threat of retaliation is ending. Strategic defense opens new options for deep reductions without loss of stability, which could be a guide for shifting from the residual forces from the offensive era into those appropriate for a multipolar world. There are strong arguments for retiring missiles under the cover of missile defenses and returning to fewer but more capable aircraft for strategic roles. Developing the technologies for theater and strategic defenses could largely eliminate the incentive for the development of missiles by the third world and shift their efforts into more stabilizing areas.
TL;DR: Ballistic missiles were the highest visibility weapon of the gulf crisis and war and they were used to strike at the UN coalition and to attempt to bring Israel into the war as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Ballistic missiles were the highest visibility weapon of the gulf crisis and war. Prior to hostilities, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein issued fierce threats about how he would employ such systems, if Iraq were attacked. Later, after war had broken out, Saddam used his missiles to strike at the UN coalition and to attempt to bring Israel into the war. While much of Saddam's missile strategy was unsuccessful, some of his actions hinted at the potential effectiveness of these weapons. As a result, other Middle Eastern nations have shown increased interest in acquiring more and better ballistic missiles. Ironically, a last‐minute settlement of the gulf crisis would have had even more severe proliferation consequences because of the central role of ballistic missiles in Iraq's deterrence strategy.
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01 Jan 1992
TL;DR: In this article, 15 experts explore answers to the questions posed by the practice of arms control, representing the views of both early and late arms control theories, and offer opinions on topics such as alternative deterrence postures and regulation of peaceful competition.
Abstract: Brings together 15 experts to explore answers to the questions posed by the practice of arms control. Representing the views of both early and late arms control theories, the authors offer opinions on topics such as alternative deterrence postures and regulation of peaceful competition.
TL;DR: Cimbala and Waldman as discussed by the authors discussed the political aspects of war termination, including the changing role of nuclear weapons in conflict termination, and the role of the military in war termination.
Abstract: Preface Introduction: the Political Aspects of War Termination by Stephen J. Cimbala Deterrence after the Cold War by William C. Martel New Soviet Thinking on Conflict Initiation, Control and Termination by Raymond L. Garthoff Terminating an American-Soviet War by Sidney R. Waldman The Changing Role of Nuclear Weapons in Conflict Termination by Leon Sloss Conflict Termination and Intrawar Deterrence: Implications for U.S. and Soviet States by Stephen J. Cimbala Behavioral Factors in Terminating Superpower War by Paul K. Davis Institutional Factors in War Termination by Paul Bracken War Termination: The Maritime Component by James J. Tritten How Civil Wars End: Preliminary Results from a Comparative Project by Roy C. Licklider Nuclear Deterrence and Political Hostility by George H. Quester Conclusion by Stephen J. Cimbala and Sidney R. Waldman Selected Bibliography Index
01 Jan 1992
TL;DR: In the 1990s, epochal changes occurred at a blinding speed, transforming Europe even beyond the monumental upheavals of 1989-1990 as mentioned in this paper, which raised the prospect of a hopeful future but this period also saw disturbing events, including a bitter civil war in Yugoslavia, fighting in Georgia & Azerbaijan, mounting tensions between Russia & Ukraine, and signs of fissures in both NATO and the European Community.
Abstract: : Research for this Report was begun on October 3, 1990, the day Germany unified. Final writing was completed on February 1, 1992, the day President Bush and Russian President Yeltsin met at Camp David to call for a new era of partnership. Both dates are auspicious, for during the intervening months, epochal changes occurred at a blinding speed, transforming Europe even beyond the monumental upheavals of 1989-1990. A major war was fought in the Persian Gulf, the Soviet state was dissolved, and a new Commonwealth of Independent States was declared. These changes raised the prospect of a hopeful future, but this period also saw disturbing events, including a bitter civil war in Yugoslavia, fighting in Georgia & Azerbaijan, mounting tensions between Russia & Ukraine, and signs of fissures in both NATO and the European Community. During this period, the much-heralded post-Cold War era was launched, and it got off to a shaky start toward an uncertain future. These contradictory trends, unfolding so dramatically in such a short period of time, raise profound questions about Europe's future. Is Europe headed toward an era of enduring peace, or is it drifting toward fragmentation and chaos, which would create entirely new and worrisome dangers? And what about the nearby Middle East and Persian Gulf? The disturbing fact that these questions are difficult to answer underscores the need to think hard and clearly about the future US military presence in Europe. Because the threat of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war has passed into history, the large US posture maintained to underwrite containment and deterrence during the Cold War can now be reduced appreciably. Yet the US forces that remain in Europe will have an important effect on developments within the Western alliance and on European security affairs as a whole. Because uncertainty and possible turbulence lie ahead in Europe and nearby regions, the size and nature of the US posture are an important choice that must be made wisely.
TL;DR: The traditional U.S. ‐Soviet model of deterrence established during the cold war will be inadequate as the United States confronts a potentially diverse set of unfamiliar opponents as discussed by the authors, and an appropriate assumption about the goals, values, and character of the likely opponent will no longer be appropriate, and an effective policy of deterrence in the post-cold war period will be more challenging intellectually.
Abstract: The demise of the Soviet Union and the planned reduction of strategic offensive forces have led many to conclude that maintaining an effective policy of deterrence will be less burdensome in the future. That may be correct financially—in the sense that the U.S. strategic offensive nuclear force structure necessary to support deterrence probably will not need to be as robust in the future as it is now. Creation of an effective policy of deterrence in the post‐cold war period, however, will be more challenging intellectually, and the roles that deterrence will have to play will be more demanding as the U. S. military retrenchment from abroad and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continue apace. The traditional U. S. ‐Soviet model of deterrence established during the cold war will be inadequate as the United States confronts a potentially diverse set of unfamiliar opponents. Standard assumptions about the goals, values, and character of the likely opponent will no longer be appropriate, and an...
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01 Jan 1992
TL;DR: Goldfischer et al. as discussed by the authors proposed a nuclear policy for the 21st century based on United States and Soviet perspectives: the current debate - an introduction, David Goldfischer and Thomas W. Stafford convergence of the nuclear arms reduction and nonproliferation agendas, Frank von Hippel future tasks and levels of Soviet strategic and tactical nuclear forces, Sergei Kortunov blurring the line - the merging of nuclear and conventional strategic systems and its implications for strategy, politics and arms control.
Abstract: Part 1 Nuclear policy for the 21st century - United States and Soviet perspectives: the current debate - an introduction, David Goldfischer and Thomas W. Graham nuclear strategy after the Cold War, Jan M. Lodal strategic forces in the 21st century, Larry D. Welch strategic offensive forces for the 21st century, Michele A. Flournoy and Michael F. Stafford convergence of the nuclear arms reduction and nonproliferation agendas, Frank von Hippel future tasks and levels of Soviet strategic and tactical nuclear forces, Sergei Kortunov blurring the line - the merging of nuclear and conventional strategic systems and its implications for strategy, politics and arms control, Alexei G. Arbatov. Part 2 Deterrence and arms control in a multipolar nuclear world: nuclear weapons and arms control in Europe, Ronald Mason nuclear weapons and arms control - a French perspective, Benoit F. Morel arms control, military strategy and nuclear proliferation, T.W. Graham and Alden F. Mullins, Jr strategic defense, arms control and proliferation after the Cold War, D. Goldfischer.