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Showing papers on "Great Rationality Debate published in 2013"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The weak rationality principle is not an empirical statement but a heuristic rule for how to proceed in social sciences as discussed by the authors, and it is a necessary ingredient of any 'understanding' social science in the Weberian sense.
Abstract: The weak rationality principle is not an empirical statement but a heuristic rule for how to proceed in social sciences. It is a necessary ingredient of any 'understanding' social science in the Weberian sense. In this paper, first this principle and its role in economic theorizing are discussed. It is also explained why it makes sense to use a micro-foundation and, therefore, to employ the rationality assumption in economic models. Then, we discuss whether the anomalies of individual behaviour as highlighted in modern behavioural economics impair the applicability of the weak rationality principle. This is not the case. We conclude with some remarks on handling the problems of 'free will' as well as 'weakness of the will' within the economic approach.

68 citations


BookDOI
04 Sep 2013

53 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors describe the dual process models as a potentially unifying approach of both heuristics and biases programs and their promising research potential for management research, concluding with the description of dual process model.

47 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a theory of rational commitment is proposed to solve the symmetry problem for wide scope rational requirements, and it is shown that the concept is one we already appeal to in common sense discourse, and is necessary for vindicating comparative judgments of rationality.
Abstract: In this paper I present an original and relatively conciliatory solution to one of the central contemporary debates in the theory of rationality, the debate about the proper formulation of rational requirements. I begin by offering my own version of the “symmetry problem” for wide scope rational requirements, and I show how this problem necessitates the introduction of a normative concept other than the traditional notions of reason and requirement. I then sketch a theory of rational commitment, showing how this notion solves the symmetry problem as I’ve presented it. I also show that the concept of rational commitment is one we already appeal to in common sense discourse, and that it is necessary for vindicating comparative judgments of rationality.

21 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argue that the rationality behind strategic decisions, which is characterized as expressive, social, or instrumental rational, has to be aligned with the argumentation field of the decision, characterized as subjective, intersubjective, or objective.
Abstract: This study argues that the rationality behind strategic decisions, which is characterized as expressive, social, or instrumental rational, has to be aligned with the argumentation field of the decision, which is characterized as subjective, intersubjective, or objective. A multiple case study illustrates this proposition while exploring rationality in the mainly instrumental rational debate on the expansion of Heathrow, the social rational debate on extension of Gurkha rights and the expressive rational debate on the hijab in Britain. Stakeholder arguments that realize good alignment with the related argumentation field have a substantial influence on strategic decisions. Managers and policy makers who do not realize this field fit well have to adapt their decisions, or cannot execute them. The cases illustrate the effects of this alignment strategy, in argumentation that mirrors the rationality of opponents, and in a strategy that reframes the assumed fit between the rationality and the related argumenta...

13 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A growing body of studies suggests that neurological and mental abnormalities foster conformity to norms of rationality that are widely endorsed in economics and psychology, whereas normality stands in the way of rationality thus defined.

12 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that, contrary to New Atheism's claim, religion does not violate standards of rationality, provided that rationality is understood in a non-positivist way.
Abstract: The article argues that, contrary to New Atheism's claim, religion does not eo ipso violate standards of rationality, provided that rationality is understood in a non-positivist way. To illustrate, the first section analyzes examples of religious argument across world religions (Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism, Islam), while the second section introduces basic key features of a minimum concept of rationality (person-relatedness, structure-relatedness, communicability, generality, differentiatedness) implied by the previous examples. The third section offers a semiotic frame theory broad enough to allow for different types of rationality and to this end uses Charles Peirce's analytical system of ten semiotic trichotomies, which presupposes that all living processes, especially human ones (including feeling and acting), can be analyzed along the line of “sign,” “object,” and “interpretant.” The fourth, fifth, and sixth sections argue that rationality is primarily ascribable to so-called normal...

10 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors discuss the relationship between instrumental and critical rationality and show how we can reconcile our critical rationality with the possibility of social science if we invoke Popper's conception of limited rationality and his indeterminism.
Abstract: Social science employs teleological explanations which depend upon the rationality principle, according to which people exhibit instrumental rationality. Popper points out that people also exhibit critical rationali- ty, the tendency to stand back from, and to question or criticise, their views. I explain how our critical ra- tionality impugns the explanatory value of the rationality principle and thereby threatens the very possibility of social science. I discuss the relationship between instrumental and critical rationality and show how we can reconcile our critical rationality with the possibility of social science if we invoke Popper's conception of limited rationality and his indeterminism.

6 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This editorial elucidates the underlying theoretical assumptions that drive the debate on whether or not young children's action perception and production is rational and summarizes the papers and their contributions to the theoretical debate.

6 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors identified three types of rationality in the movement of modernity: enlightenment rationality, science rationality, and technological rationality and considered that the transformation from Enlightenment rationality to technological rationality in modern society will answer for the emergence of technological problems partially.
Abstract: As the necessary result of the modernity movement, the technological problems not only reflect the conflict between technology and nature, but also reveal the inherent contradiction of the modernity culture. This study aims at providing a new explanation of modernity crisis partly caused by technology from the perspective of the evolution of rationality. As one of the core cultural ideas of modernity, rationality is both the source and the driving force of modernity. There does not exist absolutely pure rationality, and what really exists can only be a social and historical rationality situated in certain context. This paper identified three types of rationality in the movement of modernity: enlightenment rationality, science rationality, and technological rationality. The author considers that the transformation from Enlightenment rationality to technological rationality and the domination of technological rationality in modern society will answer for the emergence of technological problems partially.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors presents two complementary understandings of rationality, and criticizes those who deny the continuing relevance of rationality as a cultural value as well as those who attach exaggerated importance to it, and proposes two complementary explanations of rationality.
Abstract: The author presents two complementary understandings of rationality. He criticizes those who deny the continuing relevance of rationality as a cultural value as well as those who attach exaggerated importance to it.

Book ChapterDOI
28 Oct 2013-Contexts
TL;DR: This work conceptually outline a high-level algorithmic approach for a Heuristic Driven Theory Projection-based system for simulating context-dependent human-style rational behavior and elaborate on the close connections, but also on the significant differences, of this approach to notions of "ecological rationality".
Abstract: At times, human behavior seems erratic and irrational. Therefore, when modeling human decision-making, it seems reasonable to take the remarkable abilities of humans into account with respect to rational behavior, but also their apparent deviations from the normative standards of rationality shining up in certain rationality tasks. Based on well-known challenges for human rationality, together with results from psychological studies on decision-making and from previous work in the field of computational modeling of analogy-making, I argue that the analysis and modeling of rational belief and behavior should also consider context-related cognitive mechanisms like analogy-making and coherence maximization of the background theory. Subsequently, I conceptually outline a high-level algorithmic approach for a Heuristic Driven Theory Projection-based system for simulating context-dependent human-style rational behavior. Finally, I show and elaborate on the close connections, but also on the significant differences, of this approach to notions of "ecological rationality".

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors suggest innovation, value and uncertainty are three cornerstones at the core of entrepreneurship and look at the rationality structures that relate to these cornerstones in order to establish what constitutes entrepreneurial cognition.
Abstract: Current entrepreneurship research is concerned with the path between opportunity and artifact. As a result entrepreneurial literatures have become wide in their application and engaged with multidisciplinary discussions that have been both advantageous and disadvantageous in our understanding of entrepreneurship and where it fits into cognition and rationality. We suggest innovation, value and uncertainty are three cornerstones at the core of entrepreneurship. We then look at the rationality structures that relate to these cornerstones in order to establish what constitutes entrepreneurial cognition. We use these areas to add two new rationality types to Simon's administrative and Spender’s creative/design person to build four rationality types. The two new rationality types are necessary as these allow distinction between entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial bounded rationalities.


01 Aug 2013
TL;DR: In this paper, the author discusses rationality as a sociological category in the light of Weber's principle of freedom from evaluation, which is understood as the need to free scientific categories from subjective evaluation due to personal biases of researchers.
Abstract: This paper discusses rationality as a sociological category in the light of Weber's principle of freedom from evaluation. This principle is understood as the need to free scientific categories from subjective evaluation due to personal biases of researchers. The author shows the problematic character of the existing approaches to understanding rationality, reveals their judgmental nature. Then, on the basis of postnonclassical (universum) sociological approach, the author formulates the general definition of rationality as cognitive self-reference of social systems. This understanding of rationality is to a great extent free from subjective interpretations due to the fact that not some specific content of reality is stated to be a characteristic of rationality, as it was done in most popular approaches to defining rationality, rather, it is claimed to be the way of expressing this content-a verbal-reflective form. This characteristic has a uniquely identifiable qualitative certainty, which makes it possible to fixate its presence in the studied object.

Journal Article
TL;DR: ChristChristie as mentioned in this paper introduces experimental methodology in economics and briefly reviews selected well-established and replicated results in two-person anonymous personal exchange and impersonal market experiments that demonstrate integral human rationality, and inform us as to which paths or policies are more likely to lead to integral human development.
Abstract: Benedict XVI in Caritas in Veritate calls for integral human development; integral meaning that of the whole person. There has developed a field of experimental economics within the discipline of economics that has been vigorously and rigorously testing the postulates of a narrowly defined homo economicus and challenging economics from within. Vernon Smith’s pioneering work on experimental economics and his insight on two types of rationality, constructivist and ecological, can be synthesized into integral human rationality that pursues not only material wellbeing but also nonmaterial, for example, social, emotional, and moral. This article introduces experimental methodology in economics and briefly reviews selected well-established and replicated results in two-person anonymous personal exchange and impersonal market experiments that demonstrate integral human rationality. The methodology and regularities established through experimental economics can be used to further our understanding of integral human rationality and inform us as to which paths or policies are more likely to lead to integral human development. Angelina N. Christie, "From Experimental Economics toward Integral Human Rationality", Journal of Markets and Morality 16, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 37-51