Showing papers on "Philosophy of biology published in 2013"
TL;DR: It is suggested that evolutionary biology would be better served by a concept of reciprocal causation, in which causation is perceived to cycle through biological systems recursively, and that a newer evolutionary synthesis is unlikely to emerge without this change in thinking about causation.
Abstract: In 1961, Ernst Mayr published a highly influential article on the nature of causation in biology, in which he distinguished between proximate and ultimate causes Mayr argued that proximate causes (eg physiological factors) and ultimate causes (eg natural selection) addressed distinct ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions and were not competing alternatives That distinction retains explanatory value today However, the adoption of Mayr’s heuristic led to the widespread belief that ontogenetic processes are irrelevant to evolutionary questions, a belief that has (1) hindered progress within evolutionary biology, (2) forged divisions between evolutionary biology and adjacent disciplines and (3) obstructed several contemporary debates in biology Here we expand on our earlier (Laland et al in Science 334:1512–1516, 2011) argument that Mayr’s dichotomous formulation has now run its useful course, and that evolutionary biology would be better served by a concept of reciprocal causation, in which causation is perceived to cycle through biological systems recursively We further suggest that a newer evolutionary synthesis is unlikely to emerge without this change in thinking about causation
169 citations
TL;DR: The importance of a spatiotemporal sampling design, together with a multilevel ‘omic approach and a community analysis strategy (association networks and modeling) to examine and predict interacting microbial communities and their impact on the environment is highlighted.
Abstract: The development of culture-independent strategies to study microbial diversity and function has led to a revolution in microbial ecology, enabling us to address fundamental questions about the distribution of microbes and their influence on Earth’s biogeochemical cycles. This article discusses some of the progress that scientists have made with the use of so-called “omic” techniques (metagenomics, metatranscriptomics, and metaproteomics) and the limitations and major challenges these approaches are currently facing. These ‘omic methods have been used to describe the taxonomic structure of microbial communities in different environments and to discover new genes and enzymes of industrial and medical interest. However, microbial community structure varies in different spatial and temporal scales and none of the ‘omic techniques are individually able to elucidate the complex aspects of microbial communities and ecosystems. In this article we highlight the importance of a spatiotemporal sampling design, together with a multilevel ‘omic approach and a community analysis strategy (association networks and modeling) to examine and predict interacting microbial communities and their impact on the environment.
89 citations
TL;DR: The authors survey the most prominent empirical research on the physiological and cognitive capacities of nonhuman animals, focusing primarily on sentience, but looking also at a few other morally relevant capacities such as self-awareness, memory, and mindreading.
Abstract: I sketch briefly some of the more influential theories concerned with the moral status of nonhuman animals, highlighting their biological/physiological aspects. I then survey the most prominent empirical research on the physiological and cognitive capacities of nonhuman animals, focusing primarily on sentience, but looking also at a few other morally relevant capacities such as self-awareness, memory, and mindreading. Lastly, I discuss two examples of current animal welfare policy, namely, animals used in industrialized food production and in scientific research. I argue that even the most progressive current welfare policies lag behind, are ignorant of, or arbitrarily disregard the science on sentience and cognition.
70 citations
TL;DR: Weyl's philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science as mentioned in this paper was published in 1949 and translated by Olaf Helmer (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949, 2009).
Abstract: By Hermann Weyl. Translated by Olaf Helmer (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949, 2009), xvii +311 pp. $19.95/£27.95 paper.The reprinting of Hermann Weyl’s Philosophy of Mathematics and ...
66 citations
Book•
20 Dec 2013
TL;DR: This book discusses the evolution and natural selection of species and the Tree of Life, and discusses the role of language and culture in this selection.
Abstract: Preface ix CHAPTER ONE Philosophy and Biology 1 CHAPTER TWO Laws, Mechanisms, and Models 11 CHAPTER THREE Evolution and Natural Selection 28 CHAPTER FOUR Adaptation, Construction, Function 50 CHAPTER FIVE Individuals 66 CHAPTER SIX Genes 81 CHAPTER SEVEN Species and the Tree of Life 100 CHAPTER EIGHT Evolution and Social Behavior 120 CHAPTER NINE Information 144 References 159 Index 179
60 citations
TL;DR: It is argued that the use of biological theory for making claims about race inevitably amounts to a pernicious reification by analyzing three formal senses of “genetic variation,” viz., diversity, differentiation, and heterozygosity.
Abstract: It is illegitimate to read any ontology about “race” off of biological theory or data. Indeed, the technical meaning of “genetic variation” is fluid, and there is no single theoretical agreed-upon criterion for defining and distinguishing populations given a particular set of genetic variation data. By analyzing three formal senses of “genetic variation,” viz., diversity, differentiation, and heterozygosity, we argue that the use of biological theory for making claims about race inevitably amounts to a pernicious reification. Biological theory does not force the concept of “race” upon us; our social discourse, social ontology, and social expectations do. We become prisoners of our abstractions at our own hands, and at our own expense.
52 citations
Book•
01 Jan 2013
TL;DR: The Nature of Evolutionary Biology: at the borderlands between Historical and Experimental Science Massimo Pigliucci and Evolutionary Theory and the Epistemology of Science are discussed.
Abstract: Foreword Michael Ruse.- Philosophy of Biology and Biology Education: An Introduction Kostas Kampourakis.- What is life? Carol Cleland and Michael Zerella.- Biological Explanation Angela Potochnik.- What would Natural Laws in the Life Sciences be? Marc Lange.- The Nature of Evolutionary Biology: at the borderlands between Historical and Experimental Science Massimo Pigliucci.- Evolutionary Theory and the Epistemology of Science Kevin McCain & Brad Weslake.- Conceptual Change and the Rhetoric of Evolutionary Theory: 'Force Talk' as a case study and Challenge for Science Pedagogy David Depew.- Debating the Power and Scope of Adaptation Patrick Forber.- Biology and Religion: The Case for Evolution, Francisco Ayala.- The Implications of Evolutionary Biology for Religious Belief Denis Alexander.- Intelligent Design and the Nature of Science: Philosophical and Pedagogical Points, Ingo Brigandt.- Molecular Evolution, Michael Dietrich.- Educational Lessons from Evolutionary Properties of the Sexual Genome John Avise.- Non-genetic Inheritance and Evolution Tobias Uller.- Homology, Alessandro Minelli & Giuseppe Fusco.- Teaching Evolutionary Developmental Biology: Concepts, Problems and Controversy Alan Love.- Philosophical Issues in Ecology, James Justus.- Small Things, Big Consequences: Microbiological Perspectives on Biology Michael J. Duncan, Pierrick Bourrat, Jennifer DeBerardinis, & Maureen O' Malley.- Essentialism in Biology John Wilkins.- Biological Teleology: the Need for History James Lennox & Kostas Kampourakis.- Biology's Functional Perspective: Roles, Advantages and Organization Arno Wouters.- Understanding Biological Mechanisms: Using Illustrations from Circadian Rhythm Research William Bechtel.- Information in the Biological Sciences Alfredo Marcos and Robert Arp.- Systems Biology and Education Pierre Alain Braillard.- Putting Mendel in His Place: How Curriculum Reform in Genetics and Counterfactual History of Science Can Work Together Annie Jamieson & Gregory Radick.- Against "Genes For": Could an Inclusive Concept of Genetic Material Effectively Replace Gene Concepts? Richard Burian & Kostas Kampourakis.- Current Thinking about Nature and Nurture, David Moore.- Genomics and Society: Why "Discovery" Matters Lisa Gannett.- Philosophical Issues in Human Pluripotent Stem Cell Research Andrew Siegel.- Ethics in Biomedical Research and Practice Anya Plutynski.- Environmental Ethics Roberta Millstein.
46 citations
44 citations
TL;DR: Experimental philosophy is often presented as a new movement that avoids many of the difficulties that face traditional philosophy as discussed by the authors, and it is used as a way to avoid the difficulties of traditional philosophy.
Abstract: Experimental philosophy is often presented as a new movement that avoids many of the difficulties that face traditional philosophy. This article distin- guishes two views of experimental philosophy: a narrow view in which philoso- phers conduct empirical investigations of intuitions, and a broad view which says that experimental philosophy is just the colocation in the same body of (i) philo- sophical naturalism and (ii) the actual practice of cognitive science. These two positions are rarely clearly distinguished in the literature about experimental phi- losophy, both pro and con. The article argues, first, that the broader view is the only plausible one; discussions of experimental philosophy should recognize that the narrow view is a caricature of experimental philosophy as it is currently done. It then shows both how objections to experimental philosophy are transformed and how positive recommendations can be provided by adopting a broad concep- tion of experimental philosophy.
42 citations
01 Jan 2013
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a collection of essays by leading philosophers working on powers in relation to metaphysics, natural and social science, philosophy of mind and action, epistemology, ethics and social and political philosophy.
Abstract: The volume brings together for the first time original essays by leading philosophers working on powers in relation to metaphysics, philosophy of natural and social science, philosophy of mind and action, epistemology, ethics and social and political philosophy. In each area, the concern is to show how a commitment to real causal powers affects discussion at the level in question. In metaphysics, for example, realism about powers is now recognized as providing an alternative to orthodox accounts of causation, modality, properties and laws. Dispositional realist philosophers of science, meanwhile, argue that a powers ontology allows for a proper account of the nature of scientific explanation. In the philosophy of mind there is the suggestion that agency is best understood in terms of the distinctive powers of human beings. Those who take virtue theoretic approaches in epistemology and ethics have long been interested in the powers that allow for knowledge and/or moral excellence. In social and political philosophy, finally, powers theorists are interested in the powers of sociological phenomena such as collectivities, institutions, roles and/or social relations, but also in the conditions of possibility for the cultivation of the powers of individuals. The book will be of interest to philosophers working in any of these areas, as well as to historians of philosophy, political theorists and critical realists.
Book•
01 Feb 2013
TL;DR: A solution to get the problem off, have you found it? Really? What kind of solution do you resolve the problem? From what sources? Well, there are so many questions that we utter every day.
Abstract: A solution to get the problem off, have you found it? Really? What kind of solution do you resolve the problem? From what sources? Well, there are so many questions that we utter every day. No matter how you will get the solution, it will mean better. You can take the reference from some books. And the beyond mechanism putting life back into biology is one book that we really recommend you to read, to get more solutions in solving this problem.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide an account of theory structure as idealized theory presentations that are always incomplete (partial) and shaped by their conceptual content (material rather than formal organization).
Abstract: Using the context of controversies surrounding evolutionary developmental biology (EvoDevo) and the possibility of an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis, I provide an account of theory structure as idealized theory presentations that are always incomplete (partial) and shaped by their conceptual content (material rather than formal organization). These two characteristics are salient because the goals that organize and regulate scientific practice, including the activity of using a theory, are heterogeneous. This means that the same theory can be structured differently, in part because theory presentations (as idealizations) intentionally depart from different features known to be present in a theory. Since there are diverse and potentially incompatible theory structures derived from heterogeneous goals found in scientific practices, a question arises about the absence of a unifying theory structure in the background. The notion of a “theory facade” offers a fruitful perspective on this potentially unsettling result.
TL;DR: Grs and Karola Stotz as mentioned in this paper, 2013, 270 pp., £16.99 (paperback), ISBN 978-0-521-17390-2 Twentieth century biology has...
Abstract: Genetics and philosophy, by Paul Griffiths and Karola Stotz, Cambridge/New York, Cambridge University Press, 2013, 270 pp., £16.99 (paperback), ISBN 978-0-521-17390-2 Twentieth century biology has ...
TL;DR: Proposals for revising the gene concept so as to accommodate the increasingly known complexity of genomic architecture and dynamics can bring relevant contributions to genetics teaching, in particular, to a more critical treatment of genes and their role in living systems.
Abstract: It is widely acknowledged in the literature on philosophy of biology and, more recently, among biologists themselves that the gene concept is currently in crisis. This crisis concerns the so-called “classical molecular concept”, according to which a gene is a DNA segment encoding one functional product, which can be either a RNA molecule or a polypeptide. In this paper, we first describe three categories of anomalies that challenge this way of understanding genes. Then, we discuss proposals for revising the gene concept so as to accommodate the increasingly known complexity of genomic architecture and dynamics. Our intention is to provide an informative overview of recent proposals concerning how we should conceive of genes, which are probably not very familiar to many science educators and teachers, but can bring relevant contributions to genetics teaching, in particular, to a more critical treatment of genes and their role in living systems.
Book•
31 May 2013
TL;DR: Foti as mentioned in this paper traces Merleau-Ponty's ideas about how individuals express creative or artistic impulses through his three essays on aesthetics, his engagement with animality and the "new biology" in the second of his lecture courses on nature of 1957-58, and in his late ontology, articulated in 1964 in the fragmentary text of Le visible et l'invisible (The Visible and the Invisible).
Abstract: The French philosopher Renaud Barbaras remarked that late in Maurice Merleau-Ponty's career, "The phenomenology of perception fulfills itself as a philosophy of expression." In Tracing Expression in Merleau-Ponty: Aesthetics, Philosophy of Biology and Ontology , Veronique M. Foti addresses the guiding yet neglected theme of expression in Merleau-Ponty's thought. She traces Merleau-Ponty's ideas about how individuals express creative or artistic impulses through his three essays on aesthetics, his engagement with animality and the "new biology" in the second of his lecture courses on nature of 1957-58, and in his late ontology, articulated in 1964 in the fragmentary text of Le visible et l'invisible (The Visible and the Invisible) . With the exception of a discussion of Merleau-Ponty's 1945 essay "Cezanne's Doubt," Foti engages with Merleau-Ponty's late and final thought, with close attention to both his scientific and philosophical interlocutors, especially the continental rationalists. Expression shows itself, in Merleau-Ponty's thought, to be primordial, and this innate and fundamental nature of expression has implications for his understanding of artistic creation, science, and philosophy.
DOI•
24 Jul 2013
TL;DR: The history of science itself has a long history, often found as an introductory part of a scientist's writing, from Aristotle to Priestley as mentioned in this paper, but philosophers of science in the first half of the twentieth century largely ignored the growing historical discipline.
Abstract: The history of science itself has a long history, often found as an introductory part of a
scientist’s scientific writings (from Aristotle to Priestley). But only in the nineteenth
century, with William Whewell, did the history of science begin to find its own place
in academic life, a place not properly secured until the twentieth century, thanks
largely to the pioneering efforts of George Sarton. Although Whewell intended
history of science to furnish the materials against which a satisfactory philosophy of
science could be constructed, philosophers of science in the first half of the twentieth
century largely ignored the growing historical discipline.
The principal reason for this failure of philosophers to engage with the history of
science was the widespread acceptance of a distinction between a context of discovery
and a context of justification. The former concerns the circumstances and causes of
a scientific development while the latter concerns its justification. The former may
refer to historical and psychological data, but these are not relevant to the epistemic
assessment of a hypothesis, which will refer, for example, to an a priori standard,
such as Carnap’s inductive logic. Given this distinction, the normative function of
philosophy of science, concerned with the context of justification, could ignore the
factual historical domain of the context of discovery. This perspective was shared
even by those, such as Popper, who rejected many of the assumptions of logical
positivism.
TL;DR: It is argued that Mayr’s distinction is a false dichotomy, and obscures an important question about evolutionary change, and sheds light on some debates in evo-devo that Laland et al.
Abstract: Like Laland et al., I think Mayr’s distinction is problematic, but I identify a further problem with it. I argue that Mayr’s distinction is a false dichotomy, and obscures an important question about evolutionary change. I show how this question, once revealed, sheds light on some debates in evo-devo that Laland et al.’s analysis cannot, and suggest that it provides a different view about how future integration between biological disciplines might proceed.
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TL;DR: In this paper, a taxonomy of miscomputations is presented, underpinned by a conceptual analysis of the design and implementation of conventional computational systems at various levels of abstraction.
Abstract: The phenomenon of digital computation is explained (often differently) in computer science, computer engineering and more broadly in cognitive science. Although the semantics and implications of malfunctions have received attention in the philosophy of biology and philosophy of technology, errors in computational systems remain of interest only to computer science. Miscomputation has not gotten the philosophical attention it deserves. Our paper fills this gap by offering a taxonomy of miscomputations. This taxonomy is underpinned by a conceptual analysis of the design and implementation of conventional computational systems at various levels of abstraction. It shows that ‘malfunction’ as it is typically used in the philosophy of artefacts only represents one type of miscomputation.
TL;DR: It is argued that Darwinian evolutionary theory has a rhetorical dimension and that rhetorical criticism plays a role in how evolutionary science acquires knowledge and the success, limits, and failures of these theories.
Abstract: I argue that Darwinian evolutionary theory has a rhetorical dimension and that rhetorical criticism plays a role in how evolutionary science acquires knowledge. I define what I mean by rhetoric by considering Darwin’s Origin. I use the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis to show how rhetoric conceived as situated and addressed argumentation enters into evolutionary theorizing. Finally, I argue that rhetorical criticism helps judge the success, limits, and failures of these theories.
TL;DR: This view does not have to imply that Nature is something mysterious or sacred; nor does the vitalist have to attack experimentation on life in the name of some ‘vital force’ – which makes it less surprising to find a vivisectionist like Claude Bernard sounding so close to the vitalists.
Abstract: There is a familiar opposition between a ‘Scientific Revolution’ ethos and practice of experimentation, including experimentation on life, and a ‘vitalist’ reaction to this outlook. The former is often allied with different forms of mechanism – if all of Nature obeys mechanical laws, including living bodies, ‘iatromechanism’ should encounter no obstructions in investigating the particularities of animal-machines – or with more chimiatric theories of life and matter, as in the ‘Oxford Physiologists’. The latter reaction also comes in different, perhaps irreducibly heterogeneous forms, ranging from metaphysical and ethical objections to the destruction of life, as in Margaret Cavendish, to more epistemological objections against the usage of instruments, the ‘anatomical’ outlook and experimentation, e.g. in Locke and Sydenham. But I will mainly focus on a third anti-interventionist argument, which I call ‘vitalist’ since it is often articulated in the writings of the so-called Montpellier Vitalists, including their medical articles for the Encyclopedie. The vitalist argument against experimentation on life is subtly different from the metaphysical, ethical and epistemological arguments, although at times it may borrow from any of them. It expresses a Hippocratic sensibility – understood as an artifact of early modernity, not as some atemporal trait of medical thought – in which Life resists the experimenter, or conversely, for the experimenter to grasp something about Life, it will have to be without torturing or radically intervening in it. I suggest that this view does not have to imply that Nature is something mysterious or sacred; nor does the vitalist have to attack experimentation on life in the name of some ‘vital force’ – which makes it less surprising to find a vivisectionist like Claude Bernard sounding so close to the vitalists.
TL;DR: The role played by classificatory activities in generating theories has not been closely investigated within the philosophy of science as mentioned in this paper, but it has been recognized as involving a specific style of reasoning and doing research and as occasionally affecting the development of scientific theories.
Abstract: Scientific classification has long been recognized as involving a specific style of reasoning and doing research, and as occasionally affecting the development of scientific theories. However, the role played by classificatory activities in generating theories has not been closely investigated within the philosophy of science. I argue that classificatory systems can themselves become a form of theory, which I call classificatory theory, when they come to formalize and express the scientific significance of the elements being classified. This is particularly evident in some of the classification practices used in contemporary experimental biology, such as bio-ontologies used to classify genomic data and typologies used to classify “normal” stages of development in developmental biology. In this paper, I explore some characteristics of classificatory theories and ways in which they differ from other types of scientific theories and other components of scientific epistemology, such as models and background assumptions.
TL;DR: The authors argue that abandoning the concept of natural kinds would be premature, as it still can do important work in the philosophy of science and in philosophy more generally, and set something of an agenda for future research on the topic of natural kind in the (philosophy of the) life sciences.
Abstract: This article, which is intended both as a position paper in the philosophical debate on natural kinds and as the guest editorial to this thematic issue, takes up the challenge posed by Ian Hacking in his paper, “Natural Kinds: Rosy Dawn, Scholastic Twilight.” Whereas a straightforward interpretation of that paper suggests that according to Hacking the concept of natural kinds should be abandoned, both in the philosophy of science and in philosophy more generally, we suggest that an alternative and less fatalistic reading is also possible. We argue that abandoning the concept of natural kinds would be premature, as it still can do important work. Our concern is with the situation in the (philosophy of the) life sciences. Against the background of this concern we attempt to set something of an agenda for future research on the topic of natural kinds in the (philosophy of the) life sciences.
01 Jan 2013
TL;DR: In this article, the philosophy of computer science and artificial intelligence has been discussed in the context of the 2011 EPSA 2011 Symposium on the Philosophy of Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence.
Abstract: WENCESLAO J. GONZALEZ, Preface,-Teams A and D: The Philosophy of Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence.- JESSE ALAMA, REINHARD KAHLE, Computing with Mathematical Arguments.-DENNIS DIEKS, Is There a Unique Physical Entropy? Micro versus Macro.-LUCIANO FLORIDI, A Defence of the Principle of Information Closure against the Sceptical Objection.- ROBERTO GIUNTINI, HECTOR FREYTES, ANTONIO LEDDA, GIUSEPPE SERGIOLI, Probabilistic Logics in Quantum Computation.- ALEXEI GRINBAUM, Quantum Observer, Information Theory and Kolmogorov Complexity.- LEON HORSTEN, Mathematical Philosophy?.-ULRICHE POMPE, The Value of Computer Science for Brain Research.- SAM SANDERS, On Algorithm and Robustness in a Non-standard Sense.- FRANCISCO C. SANTOS, JORGE M. PACHECO, Behavioral Dynamics under Climate Change Dilemmas.- SONJA SMETS, Reasoning about Quantum Actions: A Logician's Perspective.- LESZEK WRONSKI, Branching Space-Times and Parallel Processing.- Team B: Philosophy of Systems Biology.-GABRIELE GRAMELSBERGER, Simulation and System Understanding.- TARJA KNUUTTILA, ANDREA LOETTGERS, Synthetic Biology as an Engineering Science? Analogical Reasoning, Synthetic Modeling, and Integration.- ANDERS STRAND, GRY OFTEDAL, Causation and Counterfactual Dependence in Robust Biological Systems.- MELINDA BONNIE FAGAN, Experimenting Communities in Stem Cell Biology: Exemplars and Interdisciplinarity.- WILLIAM BECHTEL, From Molecules to Networks: Adoption of Systems Approaches in Circadian Rhythm Research.- OLAF WOLKENHAUER, JAN-HENDRIK HOFMEYR, Interdisciplinarity as both Necessity and Hurdle for Progress in the Life Sciences.- Team C: The Sciences of the Artificial vs. the Cultural and Social Sciences.- AMPARO GOMEZ, Archaeology and Scientific Explanation: Naturalism, Interpretivism and 'A Third Way'.- DEMETRIS PORTIDES, Idealization in Economics Modeling.-ILKKA NIINILUOTO, On the Philosophy of Applied Social Sciences.-ARTO SIITONEN, The Status of Library Science: From Classification to Digitalization.- PAOLO GARBOLINO, The Scientification of Forensic Practice.-WENCESLAO J. GONZALEZ, The Sciences of Design as Sciences of Complexity: The Dynamic Trait.- SUBRATA DASGUPTA, Epistemic Complexity and the Sciences of the Artificial.- MARIA JOSE ARROJO, Communication Sciences as Sciences of the Artificial: The Analysis of the Digital Terrestrial Television.- Team E: The Philosophy of the Sciences that Received Philosophy of Science Neglected: Historical Perspective.- ELISABETH NEMETH, The Philosophy of the Other Austrian Economics.- VERONIKA HOFER, Philosophy of Biology in Early Logical Empiricism.-JULIE ZAHLE, Participant Observation and Objectivity in Anthropology.-JEAN-MARC DROUIN, Three Philosophical Approaches to Entomology.-ANASTASIOS BRENNER, FRANCOIS HENN, Chemistry and French Philosophy of Science. A Comparison of Historical and Contemporary Views.-CRISTINA CHIMISSO, The Life Sciences and French Philosophy of Science: Georges Canguilhem on Norms.-MASSIMO FERRARI, Neglected History: Giulio Preti, the Italian Philosophy of Science, and the Neo-Kantian Tradition.-THOMAS MORMANN, Topology as an Issue for History of Philosophy of Science.-GRAHAM STEVENS, Philosophy, Linguistics, and the Philosophy of Linguistics.- PSE Symposium at EPSA 2011: New Challenges to Philosophy of Science.- OLAV GJELSVIK, Philosophy as Interdisciplinary Research.-THEO KUIPERS, Philosophy of Design Research.-RAFFAELLA CAMPANER, Philosophy of Medicine and Model Design.- ROMAN FRIGG, SEAMUS BRADLEY, REASON L. MACHETE, LEONARD A. SMITH, Probabilistic Forecasting: Why Model Imperfection Is a Poison Pill.-DANIEL ANDLER, Dissensus in Science as a Fact and as a Norm.
TL;DR: It is postulate that the reason for this schism can be found in the differing focus of each controversy, a deep difference itself determined by distinct general styles of scientific research guiding each discourse.
Abstract: Two controversies exist regarding the appropriate characterization of hierarchical and adaptive evolution in natural populations. In biology, there is the Wright–Fisher controversy over the relative roles of random genetic drift, natural selection, population structure, and interdemic selection in adaptive evolution begun by Sewall Wright and Ronald Aylmer Fisher. There is also the Units of Selection debate, spanning both the biological and the philosophical literature and including the impassioned group-selection debate. Why do these two discourses exist separately, and interact relatively little? We postulate that the reason for this schism can be found in the differing focus of each controversy, a deep difference itself determined by distinct general styles of scientific research guiding each discourse. That is, the Wright–Fisher debate focuses on adaptive process, and tends to be instructed by the mathematical modeling style, while the focus of the Units of Selection controversy is adaptive product, and is typically guided by the function style. The differences between the two discourses can be usefully tracked by examining their interpretations of two contested strategies for theorizing hierarchical selection: horizontal and vertical averaging.
TL;DR: The Handicap Principle represents a central theory in the biological understanding of signaling as mentioned in this paper, and it has been used to explain the evolution and stability of honest communication in the human brain.
Abstract: The Handicap Principle represents a central theory in the biological understanding of signaling. This paper presents a number of alternative theories to the Handicap Principle and argues that some of these theories may provide a better explanation for the evolution and stability of honest communication.
TL;DR: A new statistical theory of normative functions that is capable of dealing with the notorious problem of epidemic and universal diseases is developed and is also more detailed than its predecessors and offers other important advantages over them.
Abstract: Several decades ago, Christopher Boorse formulated an influential statistical theory of normative biological functions but it has often been claimed that his theory suffers from insuperable problems such as an inability to handle cases of epidemic and universal diseases. This paper develops a new statistical theory of normative functions that is capable of dealing with the notorious problem of epidemic and universal diseases. The theory is also more detailed than its predecessors and offers other important advantages over them. It is argued here that statistical theories of biological functions should not be so quickly dismissed.