Showing papers on "Philosophy of biology published in 2016"
TL;DR: It is suggested that the combination of an evolutionary and a physiological perspective will enable biologists and philosophers to supply an account of biological individuality that will be both more comprehensive and more in accordance with scientific practices.
Abstract: The definition of biological individuality is one of the most discussed topics in philosophy of biology, but current debate has focused almost exclusively on evolution-based accounts. Moreover, several participants in this debate consider the notions of a biological individual and an organism as equivalent. In this paper, I show that the debates would be considerably enriched and clarified if philosophers took into account two elements. First, physiological fields are crucial for the understanding of biological individuality. Second, the category of biological individuals should be divided into two subcategories: physiological individuals and evolutionary individuals, which suggests that the notions of organism and biological individual should not be used interchangeably. I suggest that the combination of an evolutionary and a physiological perspective will enable biologists and philosophers to supply an account of biological individuality that will be both more comprehensive and more in accordance with scientific practices.
82 citations
04 Oct 2016
65 citations
TL;DR: This introduction will examine the current philosophical landscape about biological individuality, and show how the contributions gathered in this special issue address these five objections.
Abstract: Biological individuality is a major topic of discussion in biology and philosophy of biology. Recently, several objections have been raised against traditional accounts of biological individuality, including the objections of monism (the tendency to focus on a single individuality criterion and/or a single biological field), theory-centrism (the tendency to discuss only theory-based individuation), ahistoricity (the tendency to neglect what biologists of the past and historians of biology have said about biological individuality), disciplinary isolationism (the tendency to isolate biological individuality from other scientific and philosophical domains that have investigated individuality), and the multiplication of conceptual uncertainties (the lack of a precise definition of “biological individual” and related terms). In this introduction, I will examine the current philosophical landscape about biological individuality, and show how the contributions gathered in this special issue address these five objections. Overall, the aim of this issue is to offer a more diverse, unifying, and scientifically informed conception of what a biological individual is.
53 citations
TL;DR: The paper discusses several attempts to locate the boundary between metabolic activity and ‘minimal cognition’ and looks at differences between the kinds of individuality present in unicellular life, multicellularLife in general, and animals of several kinds.
Abstract: The paper links discussions of two topics: biological individuality and the simplest forms of mentality. I discuss several attempts to locate the boundary between metabolic activity and ‘minimal cognition.’ I then look at differences between the kinds of individuality present in unicellular life, multicellular life in general, and animals of several kinds. Nervous systems, which are clearly relevant to cognition and subjectivity, also play an important role in the form of individuality seen in animals. The last part of the paper links these biological transitions to the evolutionary history of subjective experience.
52 citations
TL;DR: The recent recognition of the ubiquity of symbiosis has challenged the traditional notions of biological individuality and requires a shift in the metaphysics undergirding biology, in which a philosophy of the organism must be characterized by ecological dialectics “all-the-way-down.”
Abstract: Given immunity’s general role in the organism’s economy—both in terms of its internal environment as well as mediating its external relations—immune theory has expanded its traditional formulation of preserving individual autonomy to one that includes accounting for nutritional processes and symbiotic relationships that require immune tolerance. When such a full ecological alignment is adopted, the immune system becomes the mediator of both defensive and assimilative environmental intercourse, where a balance of immune rejection and tolerance governs the complex interactions of the organism’s ecological relationships. Accordingly, immunology, which historically had affiliated with the biology of individuals, now becomes a science concerned with the biology of communities. With this translocation, the ontological basis of the organism is undergoing a profound change. Indeed, the recent recognition of the ubiquity of symbiosis has challenged the traditional notions of biological individuality and requires a shift in the metaphysics undergirding biology, in which a philosophy of the organism must be characterized by ecological dialectics “all-the-way-down.”
40 citations
TL;DR: It is argued that the fine-grained causal relations that could constitute membership in a biological population are huge in number and many are manifested by degree, and thus population membership can be construe as being defined by massively multidimensional constructs, the differences between which are largely arbitrary.
Abstract: I defend a radical interpretation of biological populations—what I call population pluralism—which holds that there are many ways that a particular grouping of individuals can be related s...
36 citations
TL;DR: Well-defined causal models that underlie standard equations in evolutionary genetics are built, based on minimal and biologically plausible hypotheses about selection and reproduction, and generate statistics to predict evolutionary changes.
Abstract: The causal nature of evolution is one of the central topics in the philosophy of biology. It has been discussed whether equations used in evolutionary genetics point to some causal processes or are purely phenomenological patterns. To address this question the present paper builds well-defined causal models that underlie standard equations in evolutionary genetics. These models are based on minimal and biologically-plausible hypotheses about selection and reproduction, and generate statistics to predict evolutionary changes. The causal reconstruction of the evolutionary principles shows adaptive evolution as a genuine causal process, where fitness and selection are both causes of evolution.
33 citations
TL;DR: It is argued that models can provide factive scientific understanding of a phenomenon without providing an accurate representation of the (difference-making) features of their real-world target system(s).
Abstract: This paper analyzes two ways idealized biological models produce factive scientific understanding. I then argue that models can provide factive scientific understanding of a phenomenon without providing an accurate representation of the (difference-making) features of their real-world target system(s). My analysis of these cases also suggests that the debate over scientific realism needs to investigate the factive scientific understanding produced by scientists’ use of idealized models rather than the accuracy of scientific models themselves.
27 citations
TL;DR: This paper includes a brief overview of the concept of function, followed by in-depth discussion of its application to venom systems.
Abstract: The “function debate” in the philosophy of biology and the “venom debate” in the science of toxinology are conceptually related. Venom systems are complex multifunctional traits that have evolved independently numerous times throughout the animal kingdom. No single concept of function, amongst those popularly defended, appears adequate to describe these systems in all their evolutionary contexts and extant variations. As such, a pluralistic view of function, previously defended by some philosophers of biology, is most appropriate. Venom systems, like many other functional traits, exist in nature as points on a continuum and the boundaries between “venomous” and “non-venomous” species may not always be clearly defined. This paper includes a brief overview of the concept of function, followed by in-depth discussion of its application to venom systems. A sound understanding of function may aid in moving the venom debate forward. Similarly, consideration of a complex functional trait such as venom may be of interest to philosophers of biology.
TL;DR: It is argued that the creativity of natural selection is best understood in terms of selection initiating evolutionary change, and selection being responsible for the presence of the variation it acts upon, for example by directing the course of variation.
Abstract: This is the first of a two-part essay on the history of debates concerning the creativity of natural selection, from Darwin through the evolutionary synthesis and up to the present. Here I focus on the mid-late nineteenth century to the early twentieth, with special emphasis on early Darwinism and its critics, the self-styled "mutationists." The second part focuses on the evolutionary synthesis and some of its critics, especially the "neutralists" and "neo-mutationists." Like Stephen Gould, I consider the creativity of natural selection to be a key component of what has traditionally counted as "Darwinism." I argue that the creativity of natural selection is best understood in terms of (1) selection initiating evolutionary change, and (2) selection being responsible for the presence of the variation it acts upon, for example by directing the course of variation. I consider the respects in which both of these claims sound non-Darwinian, even though they have long been understood by supporters and critics alike to be virtually constitutive of Darwinism.
01 Jun 2016-Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences
TL;DR: This two-part essay argues that the origins of the typology/population dichotomy are considerably more complicated and more interesting than is commonly thought.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the conflict between the Debunking Thesis and the negative view of natural selection, and argue that moral philosophers who accept the debunking theory beg important questions in the philosophy of biology.
Abstract: Many moral philosophers accept the Debunking Thesis, according to which facts about natural selection provide debunking explanations for certain of our moral beliefs. I argue that philosophers who accept the Debunking Thesis beg important questions in the philosophy of biology. They assume that past selection can explain why you or I hold certain of the moral beliefs we do. A position advanced by many prominent philosophers of biology implies that this assumption is false. According to the Negative View, natural selection cannot explain the traits of individuals. Hence, facts about past selection cannot provide debunking explanations for any of our moral beliefs. The aim of this paper is to explore the conflict between the Debunking Thesis and the Negative View.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the scientific status of astrobiological studies, based on the view that every kind of life, Earth-based or not, should be considered in a cosmic context.
Abstract: The establishment of cosmology as a science provides a parallel to the building-up of the scientific status of astrobiology. The rise of astrobiological studies is explicitly based on a transdisciplinary approach that reminds of the Copernican Revolution, which eroded the basis of a closed Aristotelian worldview and reinforced the notion that the frontiers between disciplines are artificial. Given the intrinsic complexity of the astrobiological studies, with its multifactorial evidences and theoretical/experimental approaches, multi- and interdisciplinary perspectives are mandatory. Insulated expertise cannot grasp the vastness of the astrobiological issues. This need for integration among disciplines and research areas is antagonistic to excessive specialization and compartmentalization, allowing astrobiology to be qualified as a truly transdisciplinary enterprise. The present paper discusses the scientific status of astrobiological studies, based on the view that every kind of life, Earth-based or not, should be considered in a cosmic context. A confluence between ‘astro’ and ‘bio’ seeks the understanding of life as an emerging phenomenon in the universe. Thus, a new epistemological niche is opened, pointing to the development of a pluralistic vision for the philosophy of astrobiology.
01 Jan 2016
TL;DR: The oxford handbook of philosophy of biology is available in our book collection and an online access to it is set as public so you can download it instantly as mentioned in this paper. But it is difficult to find a good book with a cup of coffee in the afternoon, instead they are facing with some malicious bugs inside their laptop.
Abstract: Thank you for reading the oxford handbook of philosophy of biology. As you may know, people have search hundreds times for their favorite readings like this the oxford handbook of philosophy of biology, but end up in harmful downloads. Rather than enjoying a good book with a cup of coffee in the afternoon, instead they are facing with some malicious bugs inside their laptop. the oxford handbook of philosophy of biology is available in our book collection an online access to it is set as public so you can download it instantly. Our book servers hosts in multiple countries, allowing you to get the most less latency time to download any of our books like this one. Merely said, the the oxford handbook of philosophy of biology is universally compatible with any devices to read.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a Lewis-Skyrms signaling-game model of painful signaling, and use it to argue that the content of pain is predominantly imperative, and conclude that their model gives a productive framework within which to consider internal signaling.
Abstract: Recent work on signaling has mostly focused on communication between organisms. The Lewis–Skyrms framework should be equally applicable to intra-organismic signaling. We present a Lewis–Skyrms signaling-game model of painful signaling, and use it to argue that the content of pain is predominantly imperative. We address several objections to the account, concluding that our model gives a productive framework within which to consider internal signaling.
TL;DR: It is argued that any plausible solution to the problem of cross-generational traits shows that the organizational account just is a version of the etiological theory and that it does not provide any substantive advantage over standard etiological theories of function.
Abstract: The debate on the notion of function has been historically dominated by dispositional and etiological accounts, but recently a third contender has gained prominence: the organizational account. This original theory of function is intended to offer an alternative account based on the notion of self-maintaining system. However, there is a set of cases where organizational accounts seem to generate counterintuitive results. These cases involve cross-generational traits, that is, traits that do not contribute in any relevant way to the self-maintenance of the organism carrying them, but instead have very important effects on organisms that belong to the next generation. We argue that any plausible solution to the problem of cross-generational traits shows that the organizational account just is a version of the etiological theory and, furthermore, that it does not provide any substantive advantage over standard etiological theories of function.
TL;DR: The goal of this paper is to give an explication of the concept of ecological fitness by providing a reconstruction of the theory of natural selection in which this concept was framed, that is, based on the way the theory was put to use in Darwin's main texts.
Abstract: The concept of fitness has generated a lot of discussion in philosophy of biology. There is, however, relative agreement about the need to distinguish at least two uses of the term: ecological fitness on the one hand, and population genetics fitness on the other. The goal of this paper is to give an explication of the concept of ecological fitness by providing a reconstruction of the theory of natural selection in which this concept was framed, that is, based on the way the theory was put to use in Darwin's main texts. I will contend that this reconstruction enables us to account for the current use of the theory of natural selection. The framework presupposed in the analysis will be that of metatheoretical structuralism. This framework will provide both a better understanding of the nature of ecological fitness and a more complete reconstruction of the theory. In particular, it will provide what I think is a better way of understanding how the concept of fitness is applied through heterogeneous cases. One of the major advantages of my way of thinking about natural selection theory is that it would not have the peculiar metatheoretical status that it has in other available views. I will argue that in order to achieve these goals it is necessary to make several concepts explicit, concepts that are frequently omitted in usual reconstructions.
01 Oct 2016-Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences
TL;DR: This editorial introduction explains why scientists think viruses are philosophically important, and shows how they relate to classic questions of philosophy of biology and even general philosophy.
TL;DR: It is argued that evolutionary biology is not in the position to determine what the “ultimate” explanation of natural purpose is and that the crucial difference between Neo-Darwinian and Neo-Aristotelian approaches regards the question of whether or not reproduction deserves the status of an “Ultimate” aim of organisms.
Abstract: This paper examines the points of disagreement between Neo-Darwinian and recent Neo-Aristotelian discussions of the status of purposive language in biology. I discuss recent Neo-Darwinian “evolutionary” treatments and distinguish three ways to deal with the philosophical status of teleological language of purpose: teleological error theory, methodological teleology, and Darwinian teleological realism. I then show how “non-evolutionary” Neo-Aristotelian approaches in the work of Michael Thompson and Philippa Foot differ from these by offering a view of purposiveness grounded in life-cycle patterns, rather than in long-term evolutionary processes or natural selection. Finally, I argue that the crucial difference between Neo-Darwinian and Neo-Aristotelian approaches regards the question of whether or not reproduction deserves the status of an “ultimate” aim of organisms. I offer reasons to reject the concept of an “ultimate” aim in evolutionary biology and to reject the notion that reproduction serves a purpose. I argue that evolutionary biology is not in the position to determine what the “ultimate” explanation of natural purpose is.
01 Jan 2016
TL;DR: The allostatic model is analyzed in the light of the Canguilhemian theory, showing how the former contributed to the development of a critical epistemology immune to both naturalist essentialism and social constructivism.
Abstract: Physiologists and historians are still debating what conceptually differentiates each of the three major modern theories of regulation: the constancy of the milieu interieur, homeostasis and allostasis. Here I propose that these models incarnate two distinct regimes of politization of the life sciences. This perspective leads me to suggest that the historicization of physiological norms is intrinsic to the allostatic model, which thus divides it fundamentally from the two others. I analyze the allostatic model in the light of the Canguilhemian theory, showing how the former contributed to the development of a critical epistemology immune to both naturalist essentialism and social constructivism. With a unique clarity in the history of physiology, allostasis gives us a model of the convergence of historical epistemology and scientific practice. As such it played a key role in codifying the epistemological basis of certain current research programs that, in the fields of social epidemiology and feminist neuroscience, promote what we name here a critical physiology.
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TL;DR: This review follows a particular thread running through Griffith and Stotz’s “Genetics and Philosophy: an introduction”, which is the way that methods of investigation influence the way the concept of “gene” is defined, from nineteen century breeding experiments to twenty-first century big data bioinformatics.
Abstract: The word “gene” means different things to different people, and can even be used in multiple ways by the same individual. In this review, I follow a particular thread running through Griffith and Stotz’s “Genetics and Philosophy: an introduction”, which is the way that methods of investigation influence the way we define the concept of “gene”, from nineteen century breeding experiments to twenty-first century big data bioinformatics. These different views lead to a set of gene concepts, which only partially overlap each other, each of which picks up on a different part of gene behaviour, function or scientific utility. This plurality of concepts carries over to the use of the concept of “information” in biology, where the non-overlapping concepts can be connected to whether you view the genome as a blueprint for development, a response to environmental triggers, an engine of heritability, or a document of history.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that not only can the theoretical benefits offered by a process ontology be had without it, they cannot be sufficiently grounded without the metaphysical underpinning of the very mechanisms which processes purport to replace.
Abstract: Though the realm of biology has long been under the philosophical rule of the mechanistic magisterium, recent years have seen a surprisingly steady rise in the usurping prowess of process ontology. According to its proponents, theoretical advances in the contemporary science of evo-devo have afforded that ontology a particularly powerful claim to the throne: in that increasingly empirically confirmed discipline, emergently autonomous, higher-order entities are the reigning explanantia. If we are to accept the election of evo-devo as our best conceptualisation of the biological realm with metaphysical rigour, must we depose our mechanistic ontology for failing to properly “carve at the joints” of organisms? In this paper, I challenge the legitimacy of that claim: not only can the theoretical benefits offered by a process ontology be had without it, they cannot be sufficiently grounded without the metaphysical underpinning of the very mechanisms which processes purport to replace. The biological realm, I argue, remains one best understood as under the governance of mechanistic principles.
TL;DR: It is argued that the shift of attention from self-organization to self-assembly does not really challenge the boundary between chemistry and biology and is less on the reductionist side than most synthetic biologists.
Abstract: While self-organization has been an integral part of academic discussions about the distinctive features of living organisms, at least since Immanuel Kant's Critique of Judgement, the term 'self-assembly' has only been used for a few decades as it became a hot research topic with the emergence of nanotechnology. Could it be considered as an attempt at reducing vital organization to a sort of assembly line of molecules? Considering the context of research on self-assembly I argue that the shift of attention from self-organization to self-assembly does not really challenge the boundary between chemistry and biology. Self-assembly was first and foremost investigated in an engineering context as a strategy for manufacturing without human intervention and did not raise new perspectives on the emergence of vital organization itself. However self-assembly implies metaphysical assumptions that this paper tries to disentangle. It first describes the emergence of self-assembly as a research field in the context of materials science and nanotechnology. The second section outlines the metaphysical implications and will emphasize a sharp contrast between the ontology underlying two practices of self-assembly developed under the umbrella of synthetic biology. And unexpectedly, we shall see that chemists are less on the reductionist side than most synthetic biologists. Finally, the third section ventures some reflections on the kind of design involved in self-assembly practices.
TL;DR: The authors suggest that fitness and driftability are structuring causes of evolution and that fitness differences or driftability in causal explanations of evolutionary change can be seen as structural causes of the change.
Abstract: One contentious debate in the philosophy of biology is that between the statisticalists and causalists. The former understand core evolutionary concepts like fitness and selection to be mere statistical summaries of underlying causal processes. In this view, evolutionary changes cannot be causally explained by selection or fitness. The causalist side, on the other hand, holds that populations can change in response to selection—one can cite fitness differences or driftability in causal explanations of evolutionary change. But, on the causalist side, it is often not clear how, precisely, one should understand these causes. Thus, much more could be said about what sort of causes fitness and driftability are. In this paper, I borrow Dretske's distinction between structuring and triggering causes and I suggest that fitness and driftability are structuring causes of evolution.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors aim at answering the suggestion of several thinkers to redefine emergence and downward causation in terms of the broader Aristotelian view of causation, and further develop this interdisciplinary conversation to include theological implications of emergentism, analyzed in reference to Aquinas' understanding of divine action in the same fourfold division of causes.
Abstract: One of the main challenges of the nonreductionist approach to complex structures and phenomena in philosophy of biology is its defense of the plausibility of the theory of emergence and downward causation. The tension between remaining faithful to the rules of physicalism and physical causal closure, while defending the novelty and distinctiveness of emergents from their basal constituents, makes the argumentation of many proponents of emergentism lacking in coherency and precision. In this article I aim at answering the suggestion of several thinkers to redefine emergence and downward causation in terms of the broader Aristotelian view of causation. In addition, I further develop this interdisciplinary conversation to include theological implications of emergentism, analyzed in reference to Aquinas’ understanding of divine action in terms of the same fourfold division of causes—bringing thus natural science, philosophy, and theology into creative and fruitful dialogue.
05 Jul 2016
TL;DR: In this article, the authors highlight some of the main characteristics of a descriptive contextual approach to philosophy, in the sense that it centers not on the normative question of what philosophy should be, but on what philosophy is, has been, or may be.
Abstract: The present paper aims at highlighting some of the main characteristics of a descriptive contextual approach to philosophy. Descriptive, in the sense that it centers not on the (normative) question of what philosophy should be, but on what philosophy is, has been, or may be. And contextual, in the sense that it treats philosophy as human praxis situated in and interacting with certain social and historical settings. In order to develop such an account, we engage closely with Kuhn’s paradigm-centered contextual approach to science and examine, following Rorty, how it could be regarded in connection to philosophy. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of two concrete cases to which such an approach may be applied, the division between analytic and continental philosophy at the level of philosophical traditions, and the case of Wittgenstein’s life and thought at the level of individual philosophers.