Showing papers on "Rationality published in 2017"

The Interplay between Intuition and Rationality in Strategic Decision Making: A Paradox Perspective

Abstract: Both intuition and rationality can play important roles in strategic decision making. However, a framework that specifically accounts for the interplay between intuition and rationality is still missing. This study addresses this gap by using a paradox lens and conceptualizes the intuition–rationality duality as a paradoxical tension. We draw on seven case studies of innovation projects to empirically derive a three-step process for managing this intuition–rationality tension through paradoxical thinking. Our empirical data suggest that management of the tension starts with preparing the ground for paradoxical thinking by creating managerial acceptance for the contradictory elements of rational and intuitive approaches to decision making. The process then continues by developing decision-making outcomes through the integration of intuitive and rational practices. Finally, the outcomes of paradoxical thinking are embedded into the organizational context. For each step of the model, we indicate a set of practices that, by leveraging intuitive or rational characteristics of decision making, practitioners can use to deal with this cognitive tension in the different steps of our model.

The Myth of Instrumental Rationality

Abstract: The paper distinguishes between instrumental reasons and instrumental rationality. It argues that instrumental reasons are not reasons to take the means to our ends. It further argues that there is no distinct form of instrumental reasoning or of instrumental rationality. In part the argument proceeds through a sympathetic examination of suggestions made by M. Bratman, J. Broome, and J. Wallace, though the accounts of instrumental rationality offered by the last two are criticised.

Strategy selection as rational metareasoning

Abstract: Many contemporary accounts of human reasoning assume that the mind is equipped with multiple heuristics that could be deployed to perform a given task. This raises the question of how the mind determines when to use which heuristic. To answer this question, we developed a rational model of strategy selection, based on the theory of rational metareasoning developed in the artificial intelligence literature. According to our model people learn to efficiently choose the strategy with the best cost-benefit tradeoff by learning a predictive model of each strategy's performance. We found that our model can provide a unifying explanation for classic findings from domains ranging from decision-making to arithmetic by capturing the variability of people's strategy choices, their dependence on task and context, and their development over time. Systematic model comparisons supported our theory, and 4 new experiments confirmed its distinctive predictions. Our findings suggest that people gradually learn to make increasingly more rational use of fallible heuristics. This perspective reconciles the 2 poles of the debate about human rationality by integrating heuristics and biases with learning and rationality. (PsycINFO Database Record

No Exception for Belief

Abstract: This paper defends a principle I call Equal Treatment, according to which the rationality of a belief is determined in precisely the same way as the rationality of any other state. For example, if wearing a raincoat is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value, then believing some proposition P is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value. This contrasts with the popular view that the rationality of belief is determined by evidential support. It also contrasts with the common idea that in the case of belief, there are two different incommensurable senses of rationality, one of which is distinctively epistemic. I present considerations that favor Equal Treatment over these two alternatives, reply to objections, and criticize some arguments for Evidentialism. I also show how Equal Treatment opens the door to a distinctive kind of response to skepticism.

On Extended Rationality

Abstract: The discussion highlights the need to distinguish between perceptions and the experiences implicated by perceptions, noting that Coliva’s framework makes perception irrelevant to justified belief, except for being the contingent means by which we are furnished with experiences that are the real source of justified belief. It then addresses two issues concerning the problem of cognitive locality. The problem concerns what enables us rationally to suppose that our perceptual experiences mostly put us in touch with reality. The issues addressed are: (1) whether, assuming that there is a problem of cognitive locality, Coliva’s Moderate position adequately addresses it; and (2) whether Coliva gives us enough to make sense of the claim, central to the Moderate position, that certain background presuppositions are constitutive of empirical rationality.

Adaptive Markets: Financial Evolution at the Speed of Thought

Abstract: A new, evolutionary explanation of markets and investor behavior Half of all Americans have money in the stock market, yet economists can't agree on whether investors and markets are rational and efficient, as modern financial theory assumes, or irrational and inefficient, as behavioral economists believe—and as financial bubbles, crashes, and crises suggest. This is one of the biggest debates in economics and the value or futility of investment management and financial regulation hang on the outcome. In this groundbreaking book, Andrew Lo cuts through this debate with a new framework, the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis, in which rationality and irrationality coexist. Drawing on psychology, evolutionary biology, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and other fields, Adaptive Markets shows that the theory of market efficiency isn't wrong but merely incomplete. When markets are unstable, investors react instinctively, creating inefficiencies for others to exploit. Lo's new paradigm explains how financial evolution shapes behavior and markets at the speed of thought—a fact revealed by swings between stability and crisis, profit and loss, and innovation and regulation. A fascinating intellectual journey filled with compelling stories, Adaptive Markets starts with the origins of market efficiency and its failures, turns to the foundations of investor behavior, and concludes with practical implications—including how hedge funds have become the Galapagos Islands of finance, what really happened in the 2008 meltdown, and how we might avoid future crises. An ambitious new answer to fundamental questions in economics, Adaptive Markets is essential reading for anyone who wants to know how markets really work.

The Knowledge We Have Lost in Information: The History of Information in Modern Economics

Abstract: Information is a central concept in economics, and The Knowledge We Have Lost in Information explores its treatment in modern economics. The study of information, far from offering enlightenment, resulted in all matter of confusion for economists and the public. Philip Mirowski and Edward Nik-Khah argue that the conventional wisdom suggesting "economic rationality" was the core of modern economics is incomplete. In this trenchant investigation, they demonstrate that the history of modern microeconomics is better organized as a history of the treatment of information. The book begins with a brief primer on information, and then shows how economists have responded over time to successive developments on the concept of information in the natural sciences. Mirowski and Nik-Khah detail various intellectual battles that were fought to define, analyze, and employ information in economics. As these debates developed, economists progressively moved away from pure agent conscious self-awareness as a non-negotiable desideratum of economic models toward a focus on markets and their design as information processors. This has led to a number of policies, foremost among them: auction design of resources like the electromagnetic spectrum crucial to modern communications. The Knowledge We Have Lost in Information provides insight into the interface between disputes within the economics discipline and the increasing role of information in contemporary society. Mirowski and Nik-Shah examine how this intersection contributed to the dominance of neoliberal approaches to economics, politics, and other realms.

Homo Diplomaticus: Mixed-Method Evidence of Variation in Strategic Rationality

Abstract: Psychology is traditionally used in political science to explain deviations from rationality. Lost in the debate between rationalists and their critics, however, is a sense of whether the kinds of strategic self-interested behavior predicted by these models has psychological microfoundations: what would homo economicus look like in the real world? We argue that strategic rationality varies across individuals and is characterized by a pro-self social-value orientation and a high level of epistemic motivation. Testing our argument in the context of international relations, we employ a laboratory bargaining game and integrate it with archival research on German foreign policy-making in the 1920s. We find in both contexts that even among those interested in maximizing only their own egoistic gains, those with greater epistemic motivation are better able to adapt to the strategic situation, particularly the distribution of power. Our results build a bridge between two approaches often considered to be antithetical to one another.

Decolonizing political ecology: ontology, technology and 'critical' enchantment

Abstract: Current debates about the Anthropocene have sparked renewed interest in the relationship between ecology, technology, and coloniality. How do humans relate to one another, to the living environment, and to their material or technological artifacts; and how are these relations structured by coloniality, defined not only as a material process of appropriation and subjugation, but also as an exclusionary hierarchy of knowing and being that still pervades contemporary life? While these questions have of course received attention in decolonial theory, they have also captured the interest of scholars who self-identify with the field of political ecology. However, it can be argued that political ecology still primarily adheres to research practices and paradigms that have been developed in the West, regardless of its diversity and dynamism as a field of research. It is therefore suggested that a rapprochement between decolonial theory and political ecology can open up new perspectives on current debates that are emerging around the concept of the Anthropocene. In particular, the article takes the recent interest in the ontological implications of the Anthropocene as a point of departure to bring the decolonial notion of 'border thinking' into a conversation with the so-called 'new materialism' in political ecology. While both approaches are not necessarily opposed to values grounded in rationality, they can be seen as attempts to rethink ontological divisions such as human/nature or subject/object based on 'enchanted' ways of knowing and being-in-the-world. Yet, although enchantment has the potential to counter inherently colonial practices of appropriation, commodification and objectification, it is argued that keeping a moderately critical distance to enchanted narratives is still recommended, not because of the alleged naivete of such narratives, but rather because enchantments may also function as and through technologies of power.

Heuristics in Professional Judgement: A Psycho-Social Rationality Model

Abstract: There is increasing attention to decision making in social work as we become more concerned about ‘risk’ and the most effective design of assessment tools to aid professional judgement. In order to develop practice, a better conceptual understanding is required of the cognitive processes in making these judgements. This paper explores the potential use of heuristic (small-scale, ‘rule-of-thumb’) models of cognitive judgement in social work, recognising that human beings (including social work professionals) cannot simultaneously process large numbers of factors with associated statistical weightings. This paper discusses heuristic models of professional judgement based on a proposed concept of psychosocial rationality. Such heuristic models would take account of the psychosocial environment in which the decision is being made as well as of the cognitive processes of the decision maker. The potential application to professional judgement in social work is discussed with reference to examples of various types of social work decision. Potential issues in developing and adopting this theoretical approach in practice are raised – including legal dimensions and potential bias - and the implications for social work research are discussed.

Herbert Simon’s bounded rationality: Its historical evolution in management and cross-fertilizing contribution

Abstract: Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the historical advancements attained on the bounded rationality concept in management research, considering the key influencing discoveries in related fields. Understanding the cross-fertilization that has occurred is the first step to go beyond the current knowledge on bounded rationality and to face its challenges. Design/methodology/approach The adopted method is historical. This research approach helps to explain the evolution of a widespread concept in a scientific field and, particularly, to identify the parallel influencing advancements made in related domains. Findings Investigation of the irrational forces of human reasoning is at the centre of today’s research agenda on rationality in organizations, claiming to be an extension of the original bounded rationality concept. In this regard, scholars should commit themselves to build a more holistic approach to the investigation of human rationality, conjointly applying socio-biological and behavioural perspectives to explain the real behaviour of people in organizations and society. This reconnection will also help to overcome the inner limits of some “fashion of the month” streams that have yet to demonstrate their contribution. Originality/value This is the first study that offers an overall historical evolution of the bounded rationality concept which considers both management research and developments in related fields. The historically educed lessons learned are at the basis of the concluding recommendations for future research.

Many faces of rationality: Implications of the great rationality debate for clinical decision-making

Abstract: Given that more than 30% of healthcare costs are wasted on inappropriate care, suboptimal care is increasingly connected to the quality of medical decisions. It has been argued that personal decisions are the leading cause of death, and 80% of healthcare expenditures result from physicians' decisions. Therefore, improving healthcare necessitates improving medical decisions, ie, making decisions (more) rational. Drawing on writings from The Great Rationality Debate from the fields of philosophy, economics, and psychology, we identify core ingredients of rationality commonly encountered across various theoretical models. Rationality is typically classified under umbrella of normative (addressing the question how people "should" or "ought to" make their decisions) and descriptive theories of decision-making (which portray how people actually make their decisions). Normative theories of rational thought of relevance to medicine include epistemic theories that direct practice of evidence-based medicine and expected utility theory, which provides the basis for widely used clinical decision analyses. Descriptive theories of rationality of direct relevance to medical decision-making include bounded rationality, argumentative theory of reasoning, adaptive rationality, dual processing model of rationality, regret-based rationality, pragmatic/substantive rationality, and meta-rationality. For the first time, we provide a review of wide range of theories and models of rationality. We showed that what is "rational" behaviour under one rationality theory may be irrational under the other theory. We also showed that context is of paramount importance to rationality and that no one model of rationality can possibly fit all contexts. We suggest that in context-poor situations, such as policy decision-making, normative theories based on expected utility informed by best research evidence may provide the optimal approach to medical decision-making, whereas in the context-rich circumstances other types of rationality, informed by human cognitive architecture and driven by intuition and emotions such as the aim to minimize regret, may provide better solution to the problem at hand. The choice of theory under which we operate is important as it determines both policy and our individual decision-making.

Due Deference: Cosmopolitan Social Identity and the Psychology of Legal Obligation in International Politics

Abstract: Why are some politicians guided by a sense of obligation toward international law but others are not? Why do some politicians have a social as opposed to an egoistic preference over compliance with international legal rules? Existing approaches largely assume that the structural features of the compliance environment shape preferences. As a result, they neglect the heterogeneity across decision makers' subjective beliefs in the legitimacy of international law, which is critical for explaining who exhibits a sense of obligation and has a non-egoistic preference for compliance. Drawing upon a large body of psychological research on social identity and influence, I argue that obligation toward international law has a behavioral foundation shaped by cosmopolitan social identity. Using data from an original survey of German politicians that includes two compliance experiments, I show that politicians with a high degree of cosmopolitanism are driven by a sense of legal obligation that results in a social preference for compliance while those low on cosmopolitanism lack the same sense of normative respect. Replicated in a second experimental study conducted with a convenience sample, my results indicate that strategic rationality in compliance applies, but only to a particular set of actors. By illuminating the psychological underpinnings of obligation toward international law, this study contributes to a richer understanding of compliance preferences and builds a bridge between instrumental and normative models.

Rationality, perception, and the all-seeing eye.

Abstract: Seeing-perception and vision-is implicitly the fundamental building block of the literature on rationality and cognition. Herbert Simon and Daniel Kahneman's arguments against the omniscience of economic agents-and the concept of bounded rationality-depend critically on a particular view of the nature of perception and vision. We propose that this framework of rationality merely replaces economic omniscience with perceptual omniscience. We show how the cognitive and social sciences feature a pervasive but problematic meta-assumption that is characterized by an "all-seeing eye." We raise concerns about this assumption and discuss different ways in which the all-seeing eye manifests itself in existing research on (bounded) rationality. We first consider the centrality of vision and perception in Simon's pioneering work. We then point to Kahneman's work-particularly his article "Maps of Bounded Rationality"-to illustrate the pervasiveness of an all-seeing view of perception, as manifested in the extensive use of visual examples and illusions. Similar assumptions about perception can be found across a large literature in the cognitive sciences. The central problem is the present emphasis on inverse optics-the objective nature of objects and environments, e.g., size, contrast, and color. This framework ignores the nature of the organism and perceiver. We argue instead that reality is constructed and expressed, and we discuss the species-specificity of perception, as well as perception as a user interface. We draw on vision science as well as the arts to develop an alternative understanding of rationality in the cognitive and social sciences. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our arguments for the rationality and decision-making literature in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, along with suggesting some ways forward.

Power/knowledge/resistance: Foucault and epistemic injustice

Abstract: Michel Foucault could well be considered a theorist of epistemic injustice avant la lettre. For Foucault, the dangers and historical effects of forms of rationality consist primarily in their entanglements with relations of social power, relations that subject individuals in both senses of the term: constitute them as subjects in and through their subjection to prevailing regimes of 'power/knowledge'. As Foucault emphasizes, his aim is to offer a "rational critique of rationality"; such a project, far from equating rationality or knowledge with power, attempts to study their relation. This chapter provides an excellent vantage point on the resources that Foucault's work offers for theorizing resistance to epistemic injustice. Foucault's analysis of power is a rich, subtle, and complex account that has proven to be tremendously productive for work in philosophy, the humanities, and the social sciences in the decades since his death.

To Think and Act Differently : Foucault’s Four Reciprocal Objections to Habermas’ Theory

Abstract: Jurgen Habermas and other critics raised four objections to Michel Foucault’s work up to 1977. These are Foucault studies underlying practices rather than what agents say and do and thereby generates a kind of presentism; his approach is unreasonable because it violates universal validity claims; it is context-bound rather than context-transcending; and he does not account for the normative dimension of his analysis. According to Foucault, he and Habermas work within a general problematisation of the present comprised of, first, philosophical reflection on and analysis of the apparent limits of thought and action in the present and, second, reflection on and analysis of the forms of reflection one practises and their relation to the present. The ‘forms of rationality’ include Habermas’ ‘relations of communication’; the dimension of ‘signs, communication, reciprocity, and the production of meaning’. Conversely, rational ethical argumentation, associated with the third validity claim, is always context-dependent and non-universal.

Market Killing: What the Free Market does and what social scientists can do about it

Abstract: Cultural Compliance: Media: Cultural Studies and Social Science Greg Philo and David Miller Contributions and Commentaries: Disciplinary dead-ends and alternative theory 1. What is wrong with science and rationality? Noam Chomsky 2. Life after the science wars? Hilary Rose 3. Film Theory and bogus theory Derek Bouse 4. Free market feminism, New Labour and the cultural meaning of the TV blonde Angela McRobbie 5. The 'Public', the 'Popular' and media studies John Corner 6. The emperor's new theoretical clothes, or geography without origami Chris Hamnett 7. Political economy Andrew Gamble Theory and practice 8. Media research and the audit culture Philip Schlesinger 9. Corporate culture and the academic left Barbara Epstein 10. Privatisation: Claims, outcomes and explanations Jean Shaoul 11. Media regulation in the era of market liberalism James Curran 12. Alternatives in the media age Danny Schechter 13. Political frustrations in the post-modern fog Hilary Wainwright Index

Evolution of cybernetics: philosophical and methodological analysis

Abstract: Purpose The aim of this paper is to elaborate the connection between the evolution of cybernetics and the development of scientific rationality (classical, non-classical, post-non-classical) and to emphasize the relevance of the formation of post-non-classical cybernetics for self-developing reflexive-active environment (the third-order cybernetics). Design/methodology/approach This paper includes interdisciplinary analysis of the evolution of cybernetics and possible directions of its development. Findings A connection between the types of scientific rationality (classical, non-classical and post-non-classical) and the stages of the development cybernetics is presented. Classical rationality is first-order cybernetics dealing with observed systems (an external observer). Non-classical rationality is second-order cybernetics dealing with observing systems (built-in observer). Post-non-classical rationality is third-order cybernetics dealing with the self-developing reflexive-active environment (distributed observer). Research limitations/implications This is an initial theoretical conceptualization, which needs a broader assessment and case studies. Practical implications This proposed direction for the analysis of cybernetics opens new approaches to social control on the basis of the subject-focused models and integration of traditional cybernetic tools. Social implications Third-order cybernetics will promote the development of civil society. Direct democracy receives new tools for development. Originality/value The value of this research is in the interdisciplinary analysis of the cybernetics evolution and in new possible directions for its development.

Atheism and Unbelief among Indian Scientists: Towards an Anthropology of Atheism(s)

Abstract: Taking into account the specific contexts and cultural specificities lends different meanings to categories like ‘atheists’, ‘agnostics’ and ‘materialists’, this ethnographic discussion of scientists shows the limitations of Western atheism to capture the everyday life of Indian scientists. The article argues that Indian atheism(s) need not be, nor is it actually, identical with the brands of Western atheism. By trusting ethnographic data, we see that atheistic scientists called themselves atheists even while accepting that their lifestyle is very much a part of tradition and religion. For them, following the lifestyle of a religion is not antithetical to atheism. The study of atheism and rationality should not be just a simple-minded attempt to find Western parallels. We need to acknowledge the locations while studying atheism(s) and unbelief.

Rhetoric in Policy Making: Between Logos, Ethos, and Pathos

Abstract: How can we develop a better understanding of the public policy process, its actors, modes of decision making, outcomes and consequences? This question lies at the heart of contemporary public policy research. Different schools of thought in policy research give different answers to this question. Whereas neopositivist approaches embrace the rationality model of policy making and attempt to provide unequivocal, value-free answers to major questions, argumentative policy analysis rejects the focus of policy studies being the application of scientifi c techniques and rationality, instead moving language and the process of utilizing, mobilizing and weighing arguments and signs in the interpretation and praxis of policy making and analysis into its center.

Questioning the no-touch discourse in physical education from a children's rights perspective

Abstract: In this paper we question the rationality of ‘no–touch policies’ and offer an alternative approach to the matter of physical contact between teachers and students in the context of physical educati ...

The swashbuckling anthropologist: Henrich on The Secret of Our Success

Abstract: In The Secret of Our Success, Joseph Henrich claims that human beings are unique—different from all other animals—because we engage in cumulative cultural evolution. It is the technological and social products of cumulative cultural evolution, not the intrinsic rationality or ‘smartness’ of individual humans, that enable us to live in a huge range of different habitats, and to dominate most of the creatures who share those habitats with us. We are sympathetic to this general view, the latest expression of the ‘California school’s’ view of cultural evolution, and impressed by the lively and interesting way that Henrich handles evidence from anthropology, economics, and many fields of biology. However, because we think it is time for cultural evolutionists to get down to details, this essay review raises questions about Henrich’s analysis of both the cognitive processes and the selection processes that contribute to cumulative cultural evolution. In the former case, we argue that cultural evolutionists need to make more extensive use of cognitive science, and to consider the evidence that mechanisms of cultural learning are products as well as processes of cultural evolution. In the latter case, we ask whether the California school is really serious about selection, or whether it is offering a merely ‘kinetic’ view of cultural evolution, and, assuming the former, outline four potential models of cultural selection that it would be helpful to distinguish more clearly.