Showing papers on "Truth condition published in 2017"

" ought" and the perspective of the agent

Abstract: I MAGINE A DOCTOR WHO IS FACED with a patient's disease that she knows will lead to death unless treated shortly. (1) Two possible treatments are available: A and B. After careful consideration of the available evidence, the doctor concludes that treatment A will cure the patient, and B will kill him. Unbeknownst to her, however, in fact treatment B is the cure, while A will lead to the patient's death. What ought the doctor to do: give A or give B? Let us call facts about a person's beliefs, knowledge or evidence facts about that person's perspective. We may then ask more generally: Does what an agent ought to do depend on the agent's perspective, or is it perspective independent? Objectivists about "ought," such as G. E. Moore and J. J. Thomson, claim that "ought" is independent of the agent's perspective. (2) Hence, they would hold that the doctor ought to give treatment B--the one that in fact cures the patient. Perspectivists like H. A. Prichard and W. D. Ross, on the other hand, believe that "ought" depends on the perspective of the agent--a view that is sometimes spelled out in terms of the agent's actual beliefs, and sometimes in terms of the evidence available to the agent. (3) Both of these versions of perspectivism hold that the doctor ought to give A, not B. Others again try to solve the puzzle by distinguishing different senses of "ought." (4) According to them, all that we can say is that the doctor ought to give A, relative to her perspective, and that she ought to give B, relative to all the facts. I am willing to concede that it might be useful to speak of what an agent ought to do relative to certain considerations, and that different qualified notions of "ought" might be important in their own right. Nevertheless, I believe that there is a substantial question at issue between objectivists and perspectivists when it comes to what might be called the "overall ought" of practical deliberation. This is the concept involved in the deliberative question, "What ought I to do?" (or "What should I do?") and deliberative conclusions of the form, "I ought to [phi])" (or "I should [phi]"). (I take "ought" and "should" to be equivalent, but for simplicity's sake, I will mostly use "ought" in what follows.) Practical conclusions of this sort are supposed to guide rational decision-making and action directly. In other words, the "ought" at issue is the one that is appealed to in the common idea that it is irrational, or akratic, not to intend what one believes one ought to do. (5) Now, in order to make a rational decision guided by a belief that one ought to do something, one needs a univocal concept of "ought" that figures in such beliefs. It is perfectly consistent to believe, "I ought to [phi]), relative to X," and, "I ought not to [phi]), relative to Y," but one cannot rationally intend both to [phi] and not to [phi]). There must be one sense of "ought," the belief in which is the relevant one for decision-making. We need to be able to judge, "I ought to [phi], full stop." At any rate, this is what I shall assume in the following discussion. The concept that is (inter alia) used in such deliberative conclusions is sometimes called the "practical ought." (6) I think it is natural to consider the practical "ought" as the central, unqualified sense of "ought" and regard all other "oughts" as qualified senses. (7) This claim, however, will not function as a substantial assumption of the argument. This paper is about the question of whether the practical "ought" depends on perspective, and I will refer to this concept by using the word "ought" without qualification only for the sake of convenience. Against this background, we can understand objectivists and perspectivists as disagreeing about the question as to which of the qualified senses of "ought" that are relativized to a certain body of propositions (such as the body of all true propositions, all believed propositions or the propositions that constitute the agent's evidence) provides the correct truth conditions for the practical "ought": Objectivism: A ought to [phi] if, and only if, A ought to [phi] relative to all facts. …

The copredication argument

Abstract: The standard view of truth-conditional semantics is that it is world-involving in the sense that a theory that specifies truth conditions eo ipso is a theory that specifies the way the world must be if the target sentences are to be true. It would appear to follow that the semantic properties of expressions, such as nominals, specify the very worldly objects that make true or false the sentences that host the nominals. Chomsky and others have raised a fundamental complaint against this thought: perfectly quotidian nominals, such as London or book, may occur copredicatively as a single argument of categorically mismatched predicates, which prima facie preclude a coherent uniform construal of the nominal argument. The argument has hitherto been presented via examples that challenge the standard view. My aim here is to present the argument explicitly, defend it against some likely counterclaims, and resolve what might appear to be a decisive consideration against the conclusion of the argument, viz.,...

The Meaning of Generics

Abstract: This article discusses recent theories of the meaning of generics. The discussion is centred on how the theories differ in their approach to addressing the primary difficulty in providing a theory of generic meaning: The notoriously complex ways in which the truth conditions of generics seem to vary. In addition, the article summarizes considerations for and against each theory.

The Semantics and Ontology of The Average American

Abstract: The received wisdom is that truth-conditional semantics presupposes and entails certain externalist ontological commitments. The idea is simple enough: if a semantic theory specifies (compositional) truth conditions, then, for any given sentence that is true, the theory will specify the very conditions that hold such that the sentence is true. Presumably, such conditions are exactly ways the world might be that make our truths true and our falsehoods false. Semantics is world-involving merely by dint of being truth-involving. A general worry for this picture, no matter how otherwise tempting it might be, is the occurrence of referentially defective words and expressions, ones that appear properly to contribute to the truth conditions of sentences that may be variously true or false but which do not appear to have referents we should otherwise sanction. Chomsky and others have claimed that, far from being outliers, a class of peculiar cases, referentially defective expressions are the absolute norm, utterly ubiquitous. The focus of the following will be the apparently referentially defective expression the average American. I shall first spell out the problem it poses and upon that basis suggest a general two-tier approach to natural language semantics, under which the interpretation of syntax (the first tier) is not world-involving, but another level of interpretation is; this second tier of interpretation, however, is not specifically linguistic. Secondly, the most thorough analysis of ‘the average+N’ kind of construction will be presented due to Kennedy and Stanley (2009), whose aim is to defend the orthodoxy; that is, such an expression may be given a clear semantic analysis that renders it non-defective. Thirdly, a number of severe problems for the analysis will be presented. Fourthly, an alternative account of the peculiar properties of the construction will be offered in line with the two-tier proposal previously suggested. The account preserves the defectiveness of the average American, but renders it unproblematic from a theoretical perspective.

Are Propositions Essentially Representational

Abstract: Jeffrey King argues that nothing has truth conditions except by being taken to be true or false by rational agents. But – for good reason – King claims that propositions possess truth conditions essentially and intrinsically. I will argue that King cannot have both: if the truth conditions of a proposition depend on the reactions of rational agents, then the possession of truth conditions can't follow from the intrinsic nature or existence of the proposition. This leaves two options. Either, nothing can do the job that motivates positing propositions. Or, there is no need to explain what bestows a truth condition on a proposition.

The History and Prehistory of Natural-Language Semantics

Abstract: I show some of the ways in which the trajectory of work during the recent history of natural-language semantics has been shaped by its prehistory, by which I mean the period when the formal methods of semantics developed for the purposes of studying formal languages. Due to their primarily mathematical and philosophical aims, the key prehistoric figures—I focus on Frege, Carnap, and Tarski—idealized away from aspects of sentence meaning other than truth conditions. After Davidson and Montague transformed semantics from a set of tools for doing philosophy and mathematics into an empirical discipline in its own right, a long and gradual process of lifting these idealizations began, with the result that a sentence’s meaning is now often thought of not as its truth condition but as its communicative potential.

Nominalization, Specification, and Investigation

Abstract: Author(s): Lawrence, Richard Wyley | Advisor(s): MacFarlane, John; Mancosu, Paolo | Abstract: What does it mean for something to be an /object/, in the broad sense inwhich numbers, persons, physical substances, and reasons all play therole of objects in our language and thought? I argue for anepistemological answer to this question in this dissertation. Thesethings are objects simply in the sense that they are answers toquestions: they are the sort of thing we search for and specify duringinvestigation or inquiry. They share this epistemological role, but donot necessarily belong to any common ontological category.I argue for this conclusion by developing the concept of an/investigation/, and describing the meaning of nouns like `number' interms of investigations. An investigation is an activity structured bya particular question. For example, consider an elementary algebraproblem: what is the number x such that x^2 - 6x + 9 = 0?Beginning from this question, one carries out an investigation bysearching for and giving its answer: x = 3. On the view I develop,nouns like `number' signify the /kind/ of question an investigationaddresses, since they express the range of its possible answers.`Number' corresponds to a `how many?' question; `person' corresponds to`who?'; `substance' to one sense of `what?'; `reason' to one sense of`why?'; and so on.I make use of this idea, which has its roots in Aristotle's/Categories/, to solve a puzzle about what these nouns mean. As Fregepointed out in the /Foundations of Arithmetic/, it seems to beimpossible for (1) The number of Jupiter's moons is four.to be true while (2) Jupiter has four moons.is false, or vice versa. These sentences are just two different ways ofexpressing the same thought. But on a standard analysis, it is puzzlinghow that can be so. Every contentful expression in (1) has an analogue in(2), except for the noun `number'. If the thought is the same whether ornot it is expressed using `number', what does that noun contribute? Isthe concept it expresses wholly empty? That can't be right: `number' isa meaningful expression, and its presence in (1) seems to make thatsentence /about/ numbers, in addition to Jupiter and its moons. So whydoesn't it make a difference to the truth conditions of the sentence?The equivalence between these two sentences is famous, but it is hardlya unique example. To say that Galileo discovered Jupiter's moons isjust to say that the /person/ who discovered them was Galileo.Likewise, to say that Jupiter spins rapidly because it is gaseous isjust to say that the /reason/ it spins rapidly is that it is gaseous.So the same puzzle that arises for `number' also arises for `person',`reason', and other nouns of philosophical interest. If they aresignificant, what contribution do they make?Because the problem is general, I pursue a general solution. Thesentences which introduce the nouns in these examples are known as/specificational/ sentences, because the second part specifies what thefirst part describes. In (1), for example, `four' specifies the number ofJupiter's moons. I argue that we should analyze specificationalsentences as pairing questions with their answers. At a semantic level,a sentence like (1) is analogous to a short dialogue: "How many moons doesJupiter have? Four." This analysis is empirically well supported, andit unifies the theoretical insights behind other approaches. Mostimportantly, it solves the puzzle. According to this analysis, (1)asserts no more or less than the answer it gives, which could also begiven by (2); that is why they are equivalent. But it differs from (2) byexplicitly marking this assertion as an answer to the `how many?'question expressed by `the number of Jupiter's moons'. That is why thetwo sentences address different subject matters and have different uses.In order to formulate this analysis in a contemporary logical framework,I apply the concept of an investigation in the setting ofgame-theoretical semantics for first-order logic. I argue thatquantifier moves in semantic games consist of investigations. Astraightforward first-order representation of the truth conditions ofspecificational sentences then suffices to explicate the question-answeranalysis. In the semantic games which characterize the truth conditionsof a specificational sentence, players carry out investigationsstructured by the question expressed in the first part of the sentence.When they can conclude those investigations by giving the answerexpressed in the second part, the sentence is true.The game semantics characterizes objects by their role ininvestigations: objects are whatever players can search for and specifyas values for quantified variables in the investigations that constitutequantifier moves in the game. This semantics thus captures the sense inwhich objects are answers to questions. I use this account to offer anew interpretation of Frege's claim that numbers are objects. His claimis not about the syntax of number words in natural language, but aboutthe epistemological role of numbers: numbers are the sort of thing wecan search for and specify in scientific investigations, as sentenceslike (1) reveal.

Semantics and Pragmatics of Referentially Transparent and Referentially Opaque Belief Ascription Sentences

Abstract: This essay takes a critical look at Jonathan Berg’s theory of direct belief Berg’s analysis of the concept of direct belief is considered insightful, but doubts are raised concerning his generalization of the purely extensional truth conditional semantics of direct belief ascription sentences to the truth conditional semantics of all belief ascription sentences Difficulties are posed that Berg does not discuss, but that are implied by the proposal that the truth conditional semantics of belief ascription sentences generally are those of direct belief ascription sentences, and that once mentioned must enter into an evaluation of the proposition that by implication all beliefs are direct Another line of objection concerns Berg’s second main thesis that the pragmatics as distinct from the semantics of belief ascription sentences can explain away apparent substitution failure validity breakdowns in belief ascription sentences as inappropriate utterances according to rules of roughly Gricean conversational implicature, rather than correspondence or non-correspondence with the facts about such things as what it is that people actually believe These two parts of Berg’s argument, that the truth conditional semantics of all belief ascription sentences are those exclusively of direct belief ascription sentences, and that apparent substitution failure is effectively salva propria rather than salva veritate, are explored within the general framework of Berg’s thought experiment, eventually arriving at diametrically opposed conclusions, reflecting on what we believe comic book character Lois Lane believes and does not believe about Superman, and what she believes and does not believe about Clark Kent

Same Same But Different: An Alphabetically Innocent Compositional Predicate Logic

Abstract: Compositionality is at the heart of model theoretical semantics, and the most common way of doing truth value semantics for natural language (NL) is to translate a fragment of NL into some extensions of classical predicate logic. Yet, somewhat ironically and strangely enough, predicate logic itself is not compositional, because the truth conditions for quantification as usually stated are not a function of the denotations of its parts but depend on value assignments for variables. That this kind of dependence on value assignments leads to non-compositionality is well-known and will be demonstrated explicitly in section 1.3. One could, as is also well-known, remedy this awkwardness by considering not truth values as denotations of formulas but sets of value assignments for variables. As we will show in 1.4, such a semantics is compositional, but now an additional problem emerges, namely the lack of alphabetical “innocence” (or “invariance”) in that the denotation of P(x) is different from that of P(y) although the formulas are mere alphabetic variants of each other.1 This new problem is related to what Fine (2007), p. 7, calls the “antinomy of the variable”:

Figurative speech: pointing a poisoned arrow at the heart of semantics

Abstract: I argue that figurative speech, and irony in particular, presents a deep challenge to the orthodox view about sentence content. The standard view is that sentence contents are, at their core, propositional contents: truth-conditional contents. Moreover, the only component of a sentence’s content that embeds in compound sentences, like belief reports or conditionals, is the propositional content. I argue that a careful analysis of irony shows this view cannot be maintained. Irony is a purely pragmatic form of content that embeds in compound sentences. The standard view cannot account for this fact. I sketch out a speech-act theoretic framework that can. But in accepting this alternative framework we are giving up on the whole idea of an autonomous semantics.

The Dilemma Imposed on the Realist by Putnam's and Kripkensteinian Argument

Abstract: In this article, I have two aims. Firstly, I argue that Hilary Putnam's model theoretic indeterminacy argument against external realism and Saul Kripke's so-called Kripkensteinian argument against semantic realism have the same dialectical structure and the same conclusion---both force the opponent to face the same dilemma. Namely: either adopt meaning minimalism or postulate unobservable semantic facts (robust realism). Secondly, I analyze more closely the first horn of the dilemma---meaning minimalism. This is the position according to which there are no truth conditions for meaning-ascriptions. It has been suggested that this position is incoherent. However, I argue that there is a coherent option available for the meaning minimalist. As Crispin Wright has proposed, a coherent meaning minimalist has to adopt a structured truth-predicate with at least two levels: one is a minimal or a deflationary truth-predicate for a semantic discourse and the other, more substantial or objective truth-predicate for discourses like natural sciences. Subsequently, this leads to a position close to Huw Price's global expressivism. Thus, the ultimate dilemma that Putnam's and the Kripkensteinian argument establish is the following choice: either meaning minimalism with a structured two-level truth-predicate or robust realism regarding meaning.

From truth conditions to processes: how to model the processing difficulty of quantified sentences based on semantic theory

Abstract: The present dissertation is concerned with the processing difficulty of quantified sentences and how it can be modeled based on semantic theory. Processing difficulty of quantified sentences is assessed using psycholinguistic methods such as systematically collecting truthvalue judgments or recording eye movements during reading. Predictions are derived from semantic theory via parsimonious processing assumptions, taking into account automata theory, signal detection theory and computational complexity. Chapter 1 provides introductory discussion and overview. Chapter 2 introduces basic theoretical concepts that are used throughout the rest of the dissertation. In chapter 3, processing difficulty is approached on an abstract level. The difficulty of the truth evaluation of reciprocal sentences with generalized quantifiers as antecedents is classified using computational complexity theory. This is independent of the actual algorithms or procedures that are used to evaluate the sentences. One production and one sentence-picture verification experiment are reported which tested whether cognitive capacities are limited to those functions that are computationally tractable. The results indicate that intractable interpretations occur in language comprehension but also that their verification rapidly exceeds cognitive capacities in case the verification problem cannot be solved using simple heuristics. Chapter 4 discusses two common approaches to model the canonical verification procedures associated with quantificational sentences. The first is based on the semantic automata model which conceives of quantifiers as decision problems and characterizes the computational resources that are needed to solve them. The second approach is based on the interface transparency thesis, which stipulates a transparent interface between semantic representations and the realization of verification procedures in the general cognitive architecture. Both approaches are evaluated against experimental data. Chapter 5 focuses on a test case that is challenging for both of these approaches. In particular, increased processing difficulty of more than n as compared to fewer than n is investigated. A processing model is proposed which integrates insights from formal semantics with models from cognitive psychology. This model can be seen as im-

On how verification tasks are related to verification procedures: a reply to Kotek et al.

Abstract: Kotek et al. (Nat Lang Semant 23: 119–156, 2015) argue on the basis of novel experimental evidence that sentences like ‘Most of the dots are blue’ are ambiguous, i.e. have two distinct truth conditions. Kotek et al. furthermore suggest that when their results are taken together with those of earlier work by Lidz et al. (Nat Lang Semant 19: 227–256, 2011), the overall picture that emerges casts doubt on the conclusions that Lidz et al. drew from their earlier results. We disagree with this characterization of the relationship between the two studies. Our main aim in this reply is to clarify the relationship as we see it. In our view, Kotek et al.’s central claims are simply logically independent of those of Lidz et al.: the former concern which truth condition(s) a certain kind of sentence has, while the latter concern the procedures that speakers choose for the purposes of determining whether a particular truth condition is satisfied in various scenes. The appearance of a conflict between the two studies stems from inattention to the distinction between questions about truth conditions and questions about verification procedures.

Temporal Alethic Dyadic Deontic Logic and the Contrary-to-Duty Obligation Paradox

Abstract: A contrary-to-duty obligation (sometimes called a reparational duty) is a conditional obligation where the condition is forbidden, e.g. “if you have hurt your friend, you should apologise”, “if he is guilty, he should confess”, and “if she will not keep her promise to you, she ought to call you”. It has proven very difficult to find plausible formalisations of such obligations in most deontic systems. In this paper, we will introduce and explore a set of temporal alethic dyadic deontic systems, i.e., systems that include temporal, alethic and dyadic deontic operators. We will then show how it is possible to use our formal apparatus to symbolise contrary-to-duty obligations and to solve the so-called contrary-to-duty (obligation) paradox, a problem well known in deontic logic. We will argue that this response to the puzzle has many attractive features. Semantic tableaux are used to characterise our systems proof theoretically and a kind of possible world semantics, inspired by the so-called T× W semantics, to characterise them semantically. Our models contain several different accessibility relations and a preference relation between possible worlds, which are used in the definitions of the truth conditions for the various operators. Soundness results are obtained for every tableau system and completeness results for a subclass of them.

The Role of the Speaker in Roger Bacon and William of Ockham’s Supposition Theories: A Contrast

Abstract: While supposition theory is perhaps the closest thing medieval logicians have to a formal approach to semantics, it grants speakers a role. This role varies in importance from one logician to another. If we were to place the different positions on an axis stretching from the most semantic to the most pragmatic, William of Ockham and Roger Bacon would likely occupy the two extremes. On the semantic side, we would find William of Ockham and his apparent willingness to propose a system that seeks to determine sentences’ truth conditions as formally as possible. On the pragmatic side and a few decades before Ockham, we would find Roger Bacon and his attempt to translate supposition theory into an intensional semantics of signification, so that the central importance of speakers is better described. This paper will rely on Claude Panaccio’s work on Ockham’s semantics and attempt to show that, in spite of the considerable differences that oppose the two theories, they share some fundamental ideas about the speakers’ involvement in the semantic processes.

Tense in Cleft Constructions

Abstract: Author(s): O'Leary, Maura Christine | Advisor(s): Sharvit, Yael | Abstract: This work seeks to add further depth to our knowledge of cleft constructions by examining the tense of the matrix copula. There are numerous accounts describing the semantics of clefts, but none of these have integrated the matrix tense, meaning that any current theory of cleft constructions would claim that ‘It was John that died.’ and ‘It is John that died.’ have the same formal meaning, despite the fact that there are situations in which one can be uttered but the other cannot.This work proposes that the matrix tense overtly marks the topic time of the utterance (see Klein 1994), and that the cleft clause (e.g. ‘that died.’) is interpreted relative to that time. For instance, a past matrix tense communicates that the topic time precedes the utterance time. The property specified in the cleft clause ‘that died’ is therefore true for all individuals who died at some t prior to the topic time, rather than prior to the utterance time. These truth conditions are added to the cleft operator proposed by B�ring a Križ (2013).

Semantics for Counterpossibles

Abstract: The object of this paper is to examine two approaches to giving non-vacuous truth conditions for counterpossibles, counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. I first develop modifications of a Lewis-style sphere semantics with impossible worlds. I argue that this approach sanctions intuitively invalid inferences and is supported by philosophically problematic foundations. I then develop modifications of certain ceteris paribus conditional logics with impossible worlds. Tableaux are given for each of these in an appendix and soundness and completeness results are proved. While certain of the latter systems are shown to have similar problems to logics from the first approach, at least one relatively weak system appears to offer an adequate uniform semantics for counterpossibles and counterfactuals.

Occasion-Sensitive Semantics

Abstract: In this paper we provide a formal model for occasion-sensitive semantics motivated by so called ‘Travis cases’ (Travis 1978, 2000, 2008, 2009). We suggest that understanding of an utterance of \( \varphi \) (knowing its truth conditions) can be modelled as a twofold partitioning of worlds in logical space, where the initial partition is induced by the context-invariant meaning of the sentence uttered and the latter on the basis of context-dependent goals. Our model uses only a single parameter to capture occasion-sensitivity of sentences: practical goals.

Ramsey's Pragmatic Approach to Truth and Belief

Abstract: In spite of his tragically short life, Ramsey made extensive contributions in the fields of mathematics, logic, economics and philosophy. In this article we focus on Ramsey's investigations into the notions of belief and judgement, their truth conditions and probability theory. We show that the central role given by Ramsey to belief and action together with his pragmatism allows for a new interpretation of the theories of truth and probability, paving the way for a modern decision theory.

Wittgenstein on Representability and Possibility

Abstract: It is a central commitment of the Tractatus that “it is impossible to judge a nonsense” (§5.5422). This essay seeks to understand the ground of this commitment in Wittgenstein’s thought. To this end, various interpretations of the Tractatus on ‘the relation between language and reality’ are considered, with each view assessed for the understanding it provides of the stance against nonsense. Having rejected as inadequate various realist readings, and then also an idealist reading, the essay recommends a view on which language and reality are internally bound together in the notion of truth. Where a fact is precisely a truth condition, and so something to be represented, a proposition (a judgment) is precisely the representation of such a fact, the representation of a truth condition.

Modal Truthmakers, Truth Conditions, and Analyses: or, How to Avoid the Humphrey Objection

Abstract: Truthmakers, truth conditions, and analyses are closely related, but distinct in rather important ways. A failure to properly appreciate their differences has led to some confusion regarding the role that possible worlds ought to play with respect to modality. Those philosophers who initially proposed the existence of possible worlds were understood as providing an analysis of modality. More recently, many have interpreted them as providing modal truthmakers. But, possible worlds are (at best) only suited to serve as truth conditions for modal truths (or so I will argue). My goals are as follows: First, to dispel this confusion by detailing the differences between these three concepts. Second, to apply the lesson learned to the famous Humphrey objection against possible worlds. While this objection, if successful, does undermine Lewisian modal realism, it only partially undermines ersatzism, and leaves available a route by which ersatzers may avoid the objection altogether.

Truth and Falsity Attributions and Truth-Conditional Semantics in Private Languages

Abstract: I continue to explore the language of Crusoe 5, an isolated rule-follower. I show that his language, just like our language, can sustain the use of truth and falsity attributions. That is, it is useful to Crusoe 5, just as it is useful to us, to be able to say that certain groups of statements (or utterances) are true or false. Furthermore, if Crusoe 5 is so inclined, he can develop a truth-conditional semantics for his own language. This is the case even though the sentences of his language are not all underwritten by correspondence facts. These points apply to the natural languages we speak as well.

Linguistic Understanding and Knowledge of Truth-Conditions

Abstract: What do you know when you know what a sentence means? According to some theories, understanding a sentence is, in part, knowing its truth-conditions. Dorit Bar-On, Claire Horisk, and William Lycan have defended such theories on the grounds of an “epistemic determination argument” (“EDA”). That argument turns on the ideas (a) that understanding a sentence, along with knowledge of the non-linguistic facts, suffices to know its truth-value, and (b) that being able to determine a sentence’s truth-value given knowledge of the non-linguistic facts is knowing its truth-conditions. I argue that the EDA withstands the objections recently raised by Daniel Cohnitz and Jaan Kangilaski, but fails for other reasons. It equivocates between a fine-grained and a coarse grained conception of “facts.”