Showing papers on "Voting behavior published in 1991"

What Do Campaign Contributions Buy? Deciphering Causal Effects of Money and Votes

Abstract: In the 1987-1988 election cycle, political action committees (PACs) spent $176.6 million on candidates who competed for a seat in the House of Representatives. What do PACs buy when contributing this money? If campaign contributions are rational allocations of a contributor's income, campaign expenditures could increase both the probability that the contributor's preferred candidate is elected, and the likelihood that, if elected, the candidate will vote in the interest of the contributor. Most studies do not find that incumbents' expenditures have a significant positive effect on the number of votes incumbents receive [11; 14; 15; 17; 29]. The evidence that contributions influence congressional votes is mixed. Most studies find weak or no support for this hypothesis. For example, Kau, Rubin and Keenan [17] find that contributions from businesses mattered in only two of the eight votes they analyzed. Others argue that campaign expenditures play no important role in the voting decision of congressmen [5; 9; 12; 31]. The lack of finding of significant effects of money on votes has been explained with the need for "better models to explain campaign contributions" [5]. However, the theoretical developments of, for example, Ben-Zion and Eyton [4], Bental and Ben-Zion [3], and Baron [2], have not been incorporated in the empirical analysis of the effect of campaign contributions on the voting behavior of legislators. Empirical models that test this relationship must allow for the endogeneity of campaign contributions, for the dichotomous nature of the dependent vote variable and the nonnegativity constraint of campaign contributions. Most empirical work in this area utilize models that do not incorporate these restrictions. In this study, I plan to incorporate these aspects of the data generating process into a more detailed model of the effects of campaign contributions on congressional votes. Of all the reported empirical studies on this issue, only Chappell [5] uses a model which can properly assess the impact of money on votes. Chappell finds that campaign contributions do not affect votes in Congress when his more detailed econometric technique is used. The best test of the theory results if votes have a clear economic payoff to contributors, benefits of the votes are concentrated and costs are

An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories

Abstract: Do polls simply measure intended voter behavior or can they affect it and, thus, change election outcomes? Do candidate ballot positions or the results of previous elections affect voter behavior? We conduct several series of experimental, three-candidate elections and use the data to provide answers to these questions. In these elections, we pay subjects conditionally on election outcomes to create electorate with publicly known preferences. A majority (but less than two-thirds) of the voters are split in their preferences between two similar candidates, while a minority (but plurality) favor a third, dissimilar candidate. If all voters vote sincerely, the third candidate--a Condorcet loser--would win the elections. We find that pre-election polls significantly reduce the frequency with which the Condorcet loser wins. Further, the winning candidate is usually the majority candidate who is listed first on the poll and election ballots. The evidence also shows that a shared history enable majority voters to coordinate on one of their favored candidates in sequences of identical elections. With polls, majority-preferred candidates often alternated as election winners.

Time Binding and Theory Building in Personal Attribute Models of Supreme Court Voting Behavior, 1916-88

Abstract: We discuss the circumstances under which analysts may expect statistical models to be time and content bound and suggest that conclusions that personal attributes models are powerful only for the postwar U.S. Supreme Court justices are premature. We present a personal attributes theory of liberalism in the U.S. Supreme Court for the past seven decades that includes political, social cleavage, family origins, and career socialization variables. We apply it to the behavior of the 46 justices serving from 1916 through 1988 (i.e., through Anthony Kennedy). Our theory-based models provide appealing and statistically robust explanations of the justices' behavior across the 72 years.

Ecological regression and voting rights.

Abstract: Ecological regression is a statistical mainstay in litigation brought under the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The technique is discussed in the context of a suit against the County of Los Angeles that came to trial in 1990. Ecological regression depends on very strong assumptions about political behavior. The authors identify these assumptions and show that they are not supported by the data. Also described is an alternative neighborhood model which is a priori more plausible and fits the facts better. The neighborhood model leads to quite different conclusions about voting behavior. (EXCERPT)

U.S. Foreign Aid and U.N. Voting: Did Reagan's Linkage Strategy Buy Deference or Defiance?

Abstract: The Reagan administration's 1986 policy initiative linking the allocation of U.S. foreign aid to recipient voting behavior in the U.N. General Assembly is evaluated. Aid levels and voting patterns are examined prior to and after the implementation of the declared bargaining policy. To maximize validity, the data are subjected to a variety of statistical treatments, including construction of a cross-lagged path model. None of the results emerging from these treatments produced statistical evidence that a relationship was present. The data demonstrate that the strategy did not produce the effects envisioned by its framers: The policy fell short of its goal of eliciting compliance behavior through threats of economic sanctions. Contending reasons for the strategy's failure are advanced in a concluding interpretation.

The Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes: Comment

Abstract: The purposes of this comment are to present evidence that casts doubt on several of the conclusions of Susan Belden's recent paper in this journal (1989) and to suggest directions for future research in this area. To begin, there is skepticism that dissenting votes, at least as Belden measures them, can be unbiased indicators of policy preferences. In addition, Belden partially recognizes but does not fully specify three influences on Federal Open Market Gommittee (FOMC) member voting that are prominently featured in the literature. These influences are (1) FOMC member training background and career experience, (2) state-of-the-economy measures, and (3) partisanship measures. Each of these factors alone may help to explain one of Belden's three major findings. First, the training backgrounds and career experiences of bank presidents may help to explain Belden's affirmation of their penchant to dissent from FOMC directives on the side of monetary tightness. Second, the state of the economy may help to explain Belden's finding of a decline in dissent voting when Arthur Burns was Chairman of the Federal Reserve. Third, differences between the party of the President and the partisan composition of the Board of Governors may help to explain Belden's discovery of shifts in ease and tightness dissent voting behavior under different chairmen. Since this comment will indicate how these influences qualify Belden's Elndings, it will at the same time suggest fruitful directions for the research agenda in this area.

How to vote, whether to vote: Strategies for voting and abstaining on congressional roll calls

Abstract: This paper develops and tests a theory of voting and abstaining on Congressional roll calls. The theoretical model assumes that the voting behavior of legislators is oriented toward reelection, and that constituents vote retrospectively. Among the predictions of the theory are that supporters of a program are more likely to abstain than opponents, that conflicted legislators are more likely to vote on the losing side (but will abstain when the vote is very close), and that indifferent legislators will abstain when votes are not close but trade their votes when the outcome is uncertain. The empirical test is based on a series of votes on appropriations for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor from 1975 to 1982. We estimate a nested logit model of, first, the probability of voting for Clinch River, and second, the probability of abstaining from the vote, conditional on preferences regarding the program. All of the empirical results are consistent with the theoretical predictions, and most are statistically significant by conventional standards. The implication is that the abstention decision, as well as yes or no votes, can be purposive, and that the pattern of abstentions is not random among supporters and opponents.

Representative voter theorems

Abstract: The representative voter is an individual whose strict preference for any alternative x over any alternative y implies 1) x strictly defeats y by majority rule, if there are an odd number of voters, and 2) x weakly defeats y otherwise. This result holds for the median voter if x is his ideal point or if preferences satisfy a generalized symmetry property, but not in general. We examine a formal condition that guarantees the existence of a representative voter and an economic model in which this condition holds. We also indicate a method for estimating representative voting behavior that is justified when a representative voter exists, and compare this with a method for deriving median voting behavior from an estimated demand curve.

A Longitudinal Analysis of Competing Explanations for the Transformation of Southern Congressional Politics

Abstract: This study analyzes the voting behavior of southern members of the House during the Ninety-first through One-hundredth Congresses. We build upon the literature regarding constituency influence and congressional voting to account for more liberal voting records on civil rights measures by southern Democratic incumbents. Our primary hypothesis is that long-term Democratic incumbents have altered their voting patterns due in part to the mobilization and empowerment of the southern black electorate. Additionally, we explore competing accounts for this trend which focus upon generational replacement and party succession. Finally, we discuss the implications of our research for theories of representative government as well as concerns about electoral politics in the American South.

Does the Decision to Retire Increase the Amount of Political Shirking

Abstract: This article tests the hypothesis that removing the reelection constraint on congres-sional representatives will alter their voting behavior. This article uses 1977 and 1978 congressional voting records to determine residuals that are taken as a proxy for shirking. The contribution of this article is to test the hypothesis by implementing timing variables to indicate when the decision to retire occurs. Despite many different tests of the hypothesis, there is no evidence that removing the reelection constraint actually causes a change in representatives' voting behavior when they do vote.

Voter behavior under STV-PR: Solving the puzzle of the Irish party system

Abstract: This paper examines voter preferences when voters are allowed to rank order large numbers of candidates both within and between different parties (STV-PR). How voters complete such a ballot has consequences both for models of voting behaviour and also for patterns of party competition. More concretely, although such a system should promote a great deal of candidate centered voting behaviour, this does not, in fact, seem to occur for the case we examine. While Irish voters do seem to exhibit multiple party loyalties they are, nevertheless, party and not candidate specific loyalties. The consequences of this for both a Michigan account of party loyalty and also standard interpretations of Irish party competition are discussed.

Polling effects in election campaigns

Abstract: The effects of polls on public opinion and voting behavior have begun to attract considerable attention. However, aside from experimental studies and research on exit polls, the impact of preelection polls has not received adequate analysis. This paper investigates whether exposure to polls released during the campaign influences voter choices and how the electoral context of referendum versus candidate elections makes a difference in terms of polling effects. These questions were addressed in a cross-election comparison of the 1980 presidential campaign and a 1986 state referendum on the right-to-life issue. Basically, I found significant effects during the referendum, but weak effects in the presidential general election.

Political Socialization and Schooling Effects among Israeli Adolescents.

Abstract: Democratic societies assign schools a prominent role in the development of citizenship competences. However, empirical evidence concerning schooling effects on the development of political orientations of children and adolescents is far from unequivocal. Surveys of adults show a clear relationship between educational attainment and a variety of citizenship orientations and behaviors such as support of democratic values, political participation, voting behavior, and being politically informed.' Paradoxically, however, overall school-related variables, such as civic curriculum and teachers' qualifications, yield only moderate, immediate, and longrun effects on youngsters' citizenship orientations.2 This paradox has often been attributed to the primacy of family influences and absence of an adequate level of psychological maturation during childhood and adolescence.3

The role of economic issues in elections: The case of the 1988 Chilean presidential referendum

Abstract: In this paper we tested the hypothesis that the performance of the economy is a determinant factor in the voter's preferences. The results obtained enable us to corroborate this notion, since the model has a high predictive value, and the behavior of the economy, both in terms of level of activity as well as in its changes, comes up consistently as a determinant factor of voting behavior. These results are also consistent with those obtained through Chilean polls in which it has been ascertained that economic events, particularly in the case of those who favored the anti-Pinochet option NO, were of utmost importance in the voters' decisions. The results also confirm the idea that, in Chile, women tend to give economic issues a lesser weight in their political preferences. An implied additional insight is that voters are relatively sophisticated when it comes to interpreting the available information. The most significant economic variables are that of average unemployment throughout the last three years prior to the election, while the variable associated to changes in unemployment over the last year is of lesser consequence. It follows that voters have a “good memory” and willingly write off economic trends which could be deemed as pre-electionary in nature. This entails that, even though economic variables are a key factor in voter's preferences and electoral results, there is no possibility for governments to manipulate these variables and benefit from opportunistic behaviors.

The Influence of Ideology on Congressional Voting

Abstract: I. INTRODUCTION The question of what determines congressional voting on legislation has inspired a number of recent empirical analyses. All are in agreement that congressional voting on specific bills is correlated with the economic self-interest of the representative's constituents and a measure of the representative's ideology as indicated by his broader voting record. However, the interpretation of the empirical results regarding the influence of ideology has generated more debate than consensus in the current literature. Kau and Rubin [1979] find evidence that a congressman's ideology influences his voting, but also find evidence for an alternative, but not mutually exclusive, hypothesis that a congressman's rating by ideological groups reflects membership in a logrolling coalition. Kalt and Zupan [1984] argue that although a representative's votes are likely to reflect the economic interests and the ideology of his constituents, the weak incentive for the constituent (principal) to monitor the voting behavior of his representative (agent) gives the representative the opportunity to "shirk" or vote according to his personal ideology rather than his constituents'. Both Nelson and Silberberg [1987] and McArthur and Marks [1988] find that the degree of shirking increases as the opportunity cost of shirking decreases. In contrast to the above findings, Peltzman [1984] argues that ideological voting by congressmen need not necessarily reflect shirking, but instead may be a way for the representative to cheaply provide his constituents with information about his general position on issues. What appears to be shirking allowed by an imperfect principal-agent relationship may instead be signaling designed to at least partially overcome the imperfect nature of the relationship. Lott [1987] extends Peltzman's signaling argument by hypothesizing that if politicians are viewed by constituents as "search" goods rather than "experience" goods, then they will have an incentive to establish a "political brand name" by establishing a consistent ideological voting record. Dougan and Munger's [1989] approach is similar to Lott's. They argue that politicians with strongly held views that match those of their constituents make ideal representatives because they are less likely to vote against their constituents' interests when pressured by special interest groups. An incumbent therefore has an incentive to invest in "reputational capital" by maintaining the consistency over time of his broader voting record because this reputational capital generates quasi-rents in electoral competition with candidates who possess less of it. Neither Lott nor Dougan and Munger find evidence of shirking in their analyses of congressmen's broader voting records as measured by ideological groups' ratings. Dougan and Munger also develop a "variable intensity of commitment" version of the reputational capital hypothesis. This version contends that voters with unambiguously liberal or conservative ideologies may prefer a candidate whose voting record indicates that his views are more extreme than their own. Such a zealous candidate, voters believe, is even less likely to be influenced by special interest groups. A congressman serving an unambiguously liberal or conservative constituency therefore has an incentive to establish and maintain an extremely ideological overall voting record. In contrast, a congressman serving a constituency with centrist ideological preferences has an incentive to establish an overall voting record that matches his constituency's ideological leanings. The systematic deviation of a congressman's voting record from his constituents' preferences, when near either extreme of the ideological spectrum, is not inconsistent with a faithful principal-agent relationship. One cannot help but be struck by the observation that those researchers finding evidence consistent with shirking studied voting on specific legislation, whereas those researchers finding no evidence of shirking studied representatives' broader voting records as measured by ideological ratings. …

What Happened to Political Development

Abstract: The subject matter of economic development and political development intersects over a broad front. Economic policy is made by incumbent politicians in the context of political institutions. The analysis of the economic impact of alternative policies is the stock in trade of the economist. The choice of the alternative policies that are subjected to economic analysis is influenced by the agendas of political parties and interests. The subject matter of political science includes the political decision process by which policies are adopted and implemented. It also includes the social consequences and the public response to policy. There is a deep fault line that divides scholarship in the two fields. Each field tends to treat the knowledge it draws on from the other as implicit rather than explicit. It seems apparent that the implicit theorizing by economists about political development and of political scientists about economic development should be replaced by more specific attempts to develop an integrated theory of political and economic development. Political scientists and economists loosely grouped within the collective choice school of political economy have advanced our understanding of the proceses by which economic resources are translated into political resources and political resources are translated into economic resources.' But a similar convergence of theory and analysis has not yet been achieved among students of political and economic development. This article represents an attempt to assess what development economists could learn from theory and research in the field of political development to advance knowledge and policy in the field of economic development. I proceed by first reviewing the contributions of several development economists who have attempted to give explicit attention to the political preconditions or conditions for economic development. I then review the evolution of thought in the field of political development. This leads me to a discussion of the central problem

International Contexts for Political Education

Abstract: This article argues that schools are political as well as educational institutions. It examines the nature of political learning in three different contexts — political indoctrination, political socialisation and political education. It provides international examples of the ways in which political learning takes place in all three contexts and suggests that genuinely open and democratic political education is not very common, often even in those countries that term themselves democracies. Taught courses of politics in three different national and ideological contexts are compared to illustrate the distinction between political socialisation and political education.

The Gender Gap and Women's Political Influence

Abstract: A gender gap of six to eight percentage points differentiated the vote of women from that of men throughout the presidential elections of the 1980s. Women's greater preference for Democratic candidates, coupled with an increased rate of voting relative to men, has increased women's influence on electoral politics for the first time since the suffrage period. Despite the fact that women's voting behavior does not correspond to many criteria of group politics, the large numbers of women voters are beginning to have an impact on the nature of campaign discourse and election issues. These changes were particularly apparent in the 1988 Republican campaign to win the undecided women voters.

Predictors of strike voting behavior: The case of university faculty

Abstract: This study examines the impact of demographic characteristics, job variables, and attitudinal factors on the strike voting behavior of faculty members at a Canadian university. The results show that married faculty members and those from single-income households were more inclined to vote against the strike. Regarding the attitudinal factors, faculty members who were satisfied with existing research facilities and were loyal to the Faculty Association were likely to favor the strike, whereas faculty who were satisfied with working conditions and with the university administration were opposed to the strike. Beliefs about unions, however, did not appear to have an influence on voting behavior.

A Multivariate Comparison of Elderly African Americans and Caucasians Voting Behavior: How Do Social, Health, Psychological, and Political Variables Effect Their Voting?

Abstract: No study until now has examined the impact of the physical and psychological condition on voter turnout among elderly African Americans and Caucasians. Utilizing data from a national survey (Aging in the Eighties) and using multiple logistic regression, the present study examines the impact of health rating and life satisfaction as well as other socio-psychological characteristics on voting turnout among elderly Caucasian and African Americans. The results provide some empirical evidence that the pattern of election participation can be significantly influenced by the self-assessment of health and life satisfaction. For elderly Caucasians self-assessment of health is significantly related to voting behavior, whereas among elderly African Americans life satisfaction shows significant impact on turnout. Elderly African Americans who identified their personal political philosophy as "liberal" were more likely to vote, while among elderly Caucasians, those who identified their personal political philosophy as "conservative" were more likely to vote. In addition, SES, age, and organizational activity proved to have significantly independent impact on elderly Caucasian turnout, whereas among elderly African Americans, education was detected as a significant predictor.

Political participation behaviors of nurse-midwives

Abstract: Political participation, which is promoted by nurse-midwifery leaders, is a widely studied topic in this country. Yet, there is little data that describes political participation among health care providers such as nurse-midwives. The descriptive findings presented here are from a national survey of a random sample of members of the American College of Nurse-Midwives. The data indicate that nurse-midwives are inclined to be liberal and Democrats and they believe that individuals such as themselves can influence governmental activities. As in the general population of the country, the electoral act of voting is the predominant political activity. Nurse-midwives are more apt to demonstrate nonelectoral political behaviors in regard to women's issues. Overall, there is a general assumption that the representatives of the ACNM membership maintain the responsibility for political action.

Doing Political Science: An Introduction To Political Analysis

Abstract: The point of departure explaining political phenomena - the case of turnout in national elections research schools in political science how research schools structure research and produce conflicting visions of politics how we know when we know - testing claims to knowledge in political science what we mean when we call political science a science - ambiguity and certainty in the pursuit of knowledge.

Predicting the Likelihood to Vote in Pre‐Election Polls

Abstract: A problem of particular interest in pre-election polls is to predict the likelihood that a sampled individual, whether respondent or non-respondent, will vote. This can be especially difficult in state and local elections since voter turnout is low compared to national elections. We study this problem by means of validated pre-election polls of registered voters in a US city which were conducted for the 1988 Presidential and 1989 Virginia State Gubernatorial elections. Results indicate that respondents and 'refusals' are significantly more likely to vote than non-respondents who cannot be contacted, and that a respondent's self-described likelihood to vote is the best indicator that he will. A logit model is used to predict the likelihood that a registered voter will vote in the State election based on voting status in the Presidential election, age and sex. The presence of the variable sex in the model is explained by the high profile of the abortion issue in the campaign. 1 Background A problem of particular interest in pre-election polls is to predict the likelihood that a sampled individual will vote. Answers to questions aimed at assessing a respondent's likelihood to vote are used to determine what respondent base to use to predict the election outcome. Perry (1973, 1979) concluded that the answer to the question 'are you registered' is the best predictor followed by the respondent's self-described likelihood to vote. Bolstein (1989) obtained results consistent with this in a study restricted to registered voters. It is also of interest to study the likelihood of non-respondents to vote, both by type of non-respondent and in comparison with respondents. This can be important in projecting election results if the non-respondents have different voting patterns. In his study, Bolstein (1989) found no difference in the likelihood to vote among the respondents and those who refused to be interviewed, and that the likelihood to vote was significantly greater in these 'contact' groups than in the 'call-rule exhausted' group, and significantly greater in the combined 'refusal' and 'call-rule exhausted' groups than in the 'unavailable at time of interview' group. The problem of predicting whether an individual will vote can be especially difficult in state and local elections since voter turnout is low compared with national elections. The work of Traugott & Tucker (1984), in which they concluded that past voting behavior is a strong predictor of whether or not an individual will vote, suggests that modeling current voting status (will or will not vote in upcoming election) in terms of past voting status might be especially useful in predicting whether or not non-respondents will vote. In this paper we use a logit model to represent voting status in the 1989 Virginia Gubernatorial election as a function of voting status in the 1988 Presidential election, sex and age. The latter two variables are available on voter registration lists and hence are known for non- respondents as well as respondents. It is no surprise that age is a factor in voting status since it is well-known that voting is a habitual characteristic that requires time to take hold. Thus, Bolstein (1989) found that registered voters under 30 were significantly less likely to vote than those 30 or older in the 1988 election. In a study of spousal voter turnout in the 1984 election based on Current Population Survey data, Straits (1990) also found that the odds of voting increases with age. On the other hand, sex is a factor in our

The Economics of Woman Suffrage

Abstract: THE Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution, granting suffrage to women, had the unusual characteristic of sharing political power Yet the literature on suffrage, which does not include a study within the framework of an economic model, ignores the impact on passage of the potential end to a gender monopoly on political decision making Ratification in 1920 by the requisite thirty-six states represented the culmination of organized efforts covering at least fifty years The suffrage movement of these years placed considerable weight on the alcoholic beverage industry as a deterrent to the extension of voting rights to women An account of suffrage coauthored by one of the movement's major leaders observed: "Had there been no prohibition movement in the United States, the women would have been enfranchised two generations before they were Had that movement not won its victory, they would have struggled on for another generation"' The politics of suffrage can be studied over three dimensions: extension at the state level, congressional action on a suffrage amendment, and state ratification of the congressional action In this article, I concentrate on the second dimension Only twelve jurisdictions had granted some form of statewide suffrage by the first House vote in 1915 While neither the first nor the third dimension was obtained perfunctorily, study of the second dimension permits examination of the role of the alcoholic beverage industry because congressional votes came before and after congressional action on national prohibition I test a model of voting behavior in the Stigler-Peltzman framework of legislative enactment resulting from the interaction of interest groups who

Public sector employee voter participation and salaries

Abstract: The hypothesis advanced by Downs (1957) that rational, utility-maximizing citizens would calculate the benefits and costs of voting in deciding whether to vote often has been employed to argue that voter participation rates among government employees should exceed that of comparable private sector individuals. The basic rationale for that prediction was laid out by Downs (1957: 254) who argued that "those who stand the most to gain are the men who earn their incomes there." Higher voter participation rates for government employees coupled with an implied preference for the expansion of the public sector has also played a role in efforts to explain the growth of government (Borcherding, Bush and Spann, 1977; and Bush and Denzau, 1977). In addition to benefiting from the supply of public goods and services, as do all voters, government employees are seen as benefiting from the expansion of government through an increase in their salaries. In this paper, the issue of voter participation rates for government employees is reexamined. Current Population Survey (CPS) data tapes containing information on individual voter behavior for the 1984 and 1986 national elections are used to estimate a qualitative choice model.1 Consistent with previous findings, the results presented indicate that government employees, as a group, are more likely to vote than are private sector workers with similar socioeconomic and demographic characteristics (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). Unlike previous studies, however, we distinguish between federal and state and local employees. This distinction is important. Building on the Downsian hypothesis that the cost and benefits of voting matter, the arguments offered in the following section lead to the prediction that the probability of voting should be lower for federal employees than for state and local. The empirical

Women's Movements in America: Their Successes, Disappointments, and Aspirations

Abstract: Women's Movements: An Overview Suffrage, Voting Behavior, and Political Opinions Women in the Work Place Personal Status: Marriage, Family, Divorce Conclusion

Analyzing Committee Power: A Critique

Abstract: In "The Analysis of Committee Power: An Application to Senate Voting on the Minimum Wage," Keith Krehbiel and Douglas Rivers (1988) offer a technique for assessing committee power empirically. My purpose in this paper is to critique their application of that technique to the minimum wage case. Any analysis based on roll call data is necessarily based on assumptions about behavior and agenda formation processes. This critique illustrates some considerations that efforts to apply the technique of Krehbiel and Rivers, or any effort to draw inferences about preferences from voting behavior, must take into account. Prima facie, alternative assumptions about senators' voting behavior and beliefs during the minimum wage debate seem equally plausible, but are shown to lead to different conclusions about committee power. Ultimately, however, I find the conclusions of Krehbiel and Rivers to be robust-my revised analysis also fails to support the committee power hypothesis.