C
Cass R. Sunstein
Researcher at Harvard University
Publications - 826
Citations - 63363
Cass R. Sunstein is an academic researcher from Harvard University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Supreme court & Politics. The author has an hindex of 117, co-authored 787 publications receiving 57639 citations. Previous affiliations of Cass R. Sunstein include Brigham Young University & Indiana University.
Papers
More filters
Posted Content
Chevron Step Zero
TL;DR: The most famous case in administrative law, Chevron USA v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, has come to be seen as a counter-Marbury, or even a McCulloch v Maryland, for the administrative state as mentioned in this paper.
Journal ArticleDOI
Disclosure: Psychology Changes Everything
TL;DR: In this article, the effects of laws and regulations that require public disclosure of information have been examined in situations characterized by misaligned incentives and asymmetric information between, for example, a buyer and seller or an advisor and advisee.
Journal ArticleDOI
Standing for Animals
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the question of whether animals have legal rights to protect animal rights and show that the real issues involve problems of enforcement and scope, and propose a solution to the problem of animal rights enforcement.
Book
Risk and Reason
TL;DR: Risk and Reason as mentioned in this paper explores the sources of these problems and explores what can be done about them and offers sound proposals for social reform, and explains how a more sensible system of risk regulation, embodied in the idea of a 'cost-benefit state', could save many thousands of lives and many billions of dollars too - and protect the environment in the process.
Journal ArticleDOI
Are Juries Less Erratic than Individuals? Deliberation, Polarization, and Punitive Damages
TL;DR: This paper reported the results of a study of over 500 mock juries composed of over 3000 jury eligible citizens and found that juries did not produce less erratic and more predictable punitive damage awards than individuals, but actually made the problem worse, by making large awards much larger and small awards smaller still, even for the same case.