Probability Distributions.- Linear Models for Regression.- Linear Models for Classification.- Neural Networks.- Kernel Methods.- Sparse Kernel Machines.- Graphical Models.- Mixture Models and EM.- Approximate Inference.- Sampling Methods.- Continuous Latent Variables.- Sequential Data.- Combining Models.

Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning

Improving the design and implementation of evidence-based practice depends on successful behaviour change interventions. This requires an appropriate method for characterising interventions and linking them to an analysis of the targeted behaviour. There exists a plethora of frameworks of behaviour change interventions, but it is not clear how well they serve this purpose. This paper evaluates these frameworks, and develops and evaluates a new framework aimed at overcoming their limitations. A systematic search of electronic databases and consultation with behaviour change experts were used to identify frameworks of behaviour change interventions. These were evaluated according to three criteria: comprehensiveness, coherence, and a clear link to an overarching model of behaviour. A new framework was developed to meet these criteria. The reliability with which it could be applied was examined in two domains of behaviour change: tobacco control and obesity. Nineteen frameworks were identified covering nine intervention functions and seven policy categories that could enable those interventions. None of the frameworks reviewed covered the full range of intervention functions or policies, and only a minority met the criteria of coherence or linkage to a model of behaviour. At the centre of a proposed new framework is a 'behaviour system' involving three essential conditions: capability, opportunity, and motivation (what we term the 'COM-B system'). This forms the hub of a 'behaviour change wheel' (BCW) around which are positioned the nine intervention functions aimed at addressing deficits in one or more of these conditions; around this are placed seven categories of policy that could enable those interventions to occur. The BCW was used reliably to characterise interventions within the English Department of Health's 2010 tobacco control strategy and the National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence's guidance on reducing obesity. Interventions and policies to change behaviour can be usefully characterised by means of a BCW comprising: a 'behaviour system' at the hub, encircled by intervention functions and then by policy categories. Research is needed to establish how far the BCW can lead to more efficient design of effective interventions.

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The behaviour change wheel: a new method for characterising and designing behaviour change interventions.

Norms have never been absent from the study of international politics, but the sweeping “ideational turn” in the 1980s and 1990s brought them back as a central theoretical concern in the field. Much theorizing about norms has focused on how they create social structure, standards of appropriateness, and stability in international politics. Recent empirical research on norms, in contrast, has examined their role in creating political change, but change processes have been less well-theorized. We induce from this research a variety of theoretical arguments and testable hypotheses about the role of norms in political change. We argue that norms evolve in a three-stage “life cycle” of emergence, “norm cascades,” and internalization, and that each stage is governed by different motives, mechanisms, and behavioral logics. We also highlight the rational and strategic nature of many social construction processes and argue that theoretical progress will only be made by placing attention on the connections between norms and rationality rather than by opposing the two.

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International Norm Dynamics and Political Change

Virtually all current theories of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. They assume that people assess the desirability and likelihood of possible outcomes of choice alternatives and integrate this information through some type of expectation-based calculus to arrive at decision. The authors propose an alternative theoretical perspective, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, that highlights the role of affect experienced at the moment of decision making. Drawing on research from clinical, physiological, and other subfield of psychology, they show that emotional reactions to risky situations often drive behavior. The risk-as-feelings hypothesis is shown to explain a wide range of phenomena that have resisted interpretation in cognitive-consequentialist terms.

Risk as Feelings

Early studies of intuitive judgment and decision making conducted with the late Amos Tversky are reviewed in the context of two related concepts: an analysis of accessibility, the ease with which thoughts come to mind; a distinction between effortless intuition and deliberate reasoning. Intuitive thoughts, like percepts, are highly accessible. Determinants and consequences of accessibility help explain the central results of prospect theory, framing effects, the heuristic process of attribute substitution, and the characteristic biases that result from the substitution of nonextensional for extensional attributes. Variations in the accessibility of rules explain the occasional corrections of intuitive judgments. The study of biases is compatible with a view of intuitive thinking and decision making as generally skilled and successful.

https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/JudgementAndChoice.MappingBoundedRationality.DKahneman2003.pdf

A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality.

Recent scientific innovations, and proposed legislation, have raised questions about the nature of the constitutional right to reproductive freedom, and in particular about whether there is a constitutional “right to clone” This essay urges that as a matter of substantive due process, rationality review is probably appropriate, and that restrictions on both reproductive and therapeutic cloning would and should survive constitutional scrutiny At the same time, many of the arguments for banning both forms of cloning are based on ignorance, myths, and speculation It is extremely important to distinguish between reproductive and nonreproductive cloning, and it is equally important to distinguish among the various rationales for banning each Some of those rationales have some, but others, including some of the most influential, are exceedingly weak As currently interpreted, the Constitution protects a range of rights involving marriage, bodily integrity, and reproduction Does the Constitution guarantee the right to clone? The question is not as fanciful as it might appear Cloning is a possible method for “reproduction” For some people, cloning would undoubtedly be the preferred choice Among this group, some would choose cloning on the ground that it is the only way to produce children with some genetic connection to them For such people, the potential value of cloning should not be understated And because reproduction is involved, the individual right to choose might well be thought to fall within the doctrinal protection given by Roe v Wade and other cases At the same time, it is not clear that the government can offer constitutionally adequate grounds for interfering with a presumptively protected right Some of the most common justifications seem ignorant or speculative, and others could be taken care of through narrower means, falling short of a flat ban on cloning Indeed, the justifications for banning cloning might well seem, at first glance, to be weaker than the justifications for banning abortion, which involves the intentional destruction of what many people consider innocent human life If government cannot ban the intentional destruction of * Karl N Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and Department of Political Science, University of Chicago This essay is a written version of the keynote luncheon address for the Hastings Law Journal symposium on human cloning, held in January 2002 1 See John Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning, 76 Tex L Rev 1371, 1441-42 (1998) 2 410 US 113 (1973) 3 See, eg, Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v Baird, 405 US 438 (1972); Carey v Population Servs 431 US 113 (1973)

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Is there a constitutional right to clone

A number of judge-made doctrines attempt to promote international comity by reducing possible tensions between the United States and foreign sovereigns. For example, courts usually interpret ambiguous statutes to conform to international law and understand them not to apply outside of the nation’s territorial boundaries. The international comity doctrines are best understood as a product of a judicial judgment that in particular contexts the costs of deference to foreign interests are lower than the benefits to American interests. Sometimes Congress balances these considerations and incorporates its judgment in a statute, but usually it does not. In such cases, executive interpretations should be permitted to trump the comity doctrines, as long as those interpretations are reasonable. This conclusion is supported both by considerations of institutional competence and by the distinctive position of the President in the domain of foreign affairs. It follows that if the executive wants to interpret ambiguous statutes to conflict with international law or to apply extraterritorially, it should be permitted to do so. The analysis of the interpretive power of the executive can be justified by reference to the Chevron doctrine in administrative law, which similarly calls for deference to executive interpretation of statutory ambiguities. Sometimes the Chevron doctrine literally applies to executive interpretations; sometimes it operates as a valuable analogy. At the same time, the Chevron principle is qualified by doctrines requiring a clear congressional statement, especially when constitutionally sensitive rights are involved. These claims have many implications for legal issues raised by the war on terror, including those explored in the Hamdi and Hamdan cases. authors. Eric A. Posner is Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Cass R. Sunstein is Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago. Thanks to Curt Bradley, Jacob Gersen, Jack Goldsmith, Anup Malani, Matthew Stephenson, David Strauss, and participants at a workshop at the University of Chicago Law School for helpful comments; to Stacey Nathan for excellent research assistance; and to Derek Jinks and Neal Katyal for their stimulating critique. POSNER_SUNSTEIN_3-09-07_POST-OP 4/16/2007 2:58:44 PM chevronizing foreign relations law 1171 article contents

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Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law

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Doing without Speed Limits

Many consumers would be willing to pay something to reduce the suffering of animals used as food. The problem is that existing markets do not disclose the relevant treatment of animals, even though that treatment would trouble many consumers. Steps should be taken to promote disclosure, so as to fortify market processes and to promote democratic discussion of the treatment of animals. In the context of animal welfare, a serious problem is that people’s practices ensure outcomes that defy their existing moral commitments. A disclosure regime could improve animal welfare without making it necessary to resolve the most deeply contested questions in this domain. I. Of Theories and Practices To all appearances, disputes over animal rights produce an extraordinary amount of polarization and acrimony. Some people believe that those who defend animal rights are zealots, showing an inexplicable willingness to sacrifice important human interests for the sake of rats, pigs, and salmon. Judge Richard Posner, for example, refers to “the siren song of animal rights,” while Richard Epstein complains that recognition of an “animal right to bodily integrity . . . will not happen, and it should not happen.” Others believe that those who ridicule animal rights are morally obtuse, replicating some of the cruelty and abuse of sexism, slavery, and even the Holocaust. Gary Francione, a ♦ Many thanks are due to the McCormick Companions’ Fund for its support of the Chicago Project on Animal Treatment Principles, out of which this paper arises. Excellent research assistance was provided by Salma Bakht, Susie Cowen, Laura Lallos, Vicki Lovei, Arden Rowell, and Ben Sirota. * Associate Clinical Professor of Law and Director, Chicago Project on Animal Treatment Principles, University of Chicago Law School ** Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political Science, University of Chicago. 1 See Richard A. Posner, “Animal Rights: Legal, Philosophical, and Pragmatic Perspectives,” in Animal Rights: Current Controversies and New Directions 74 (Cass R. Sunstein and Martha C. Nussbaum eds. 2004). 2 Richard A. Epstein, “Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of Rights,” in id. at 157.

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Animal Rights Without Controversy

/pdf/on-property-and-constitutionalism-comparative-n8m9b7m7kd.pdf

On Property and Constitutionalism Comparative Constitutionalism: Theoretical Perspectives on the Role of Constitutions in the Interplay between Identity and Diversity

Cass R. Sunstein

Papers

Is there a constitutional right to clone

Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law

Doing without Speed Limits

Animal Rights Without Controversy

On Property and Constitutionalism Comparative Constitutionalism: Theoretical Perspectives on the Role of Constitutions in the Interplay between Identity and Diversity