James R. Barth

TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide new data and measures of bank regulatory and supervisory policies in 180 countries from 1999 to 2011, including information on permissible bank activities, capital requirements, the powers of official supervisory agencies, information disclosure requirements, external governance mechanisms, deposit insurance, barriers to entry, and loan provisioning.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present new and official survey information on bank regulations in 142 countries and make comparisons with two earlier surveys, which do not suggest that countries have primarily reformed their bank regulations for the better over the last decade.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors report cross-country data on commercial bank regulation and ownership in more than 60 countries and evaluate the links between different regulatory/ownership practices in those countries and both financial sector performance and banking system stability.

TL;DR: Barth et al. as mentioned in this paper assess two broad and competing theories of government regulation: the helping-hand approach, according to which governments regulate to correct market failures, and the grasping-hand view, which regulates to support political constituency, and assess the effect of an extensive array of regulatory and supervisory policies on the development and fragility of the banking sector.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the effects of both borrower and lender competition as well as information sharing via credit bureaus/registries on corruption in bank lending, and found strong evidence that both banking competition and information sharing reduce lending corruption, and that information sharing also helps enhance the positive effect of competition.