Jay Pil Choi

TL;DR: In this paper, a dynamic version of the old leverage doctrine is proposed, and it is shown that when an incumbent monopolist faces the threat of entry in all complementary components, tying may make the prospects of successful entry less certain, discouraging rivals from investing and innovating.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyzed the effects of net neutrality regulation on investment incentives for Internet service providers (ISPs) and content providers (CPs), and their implications for social welfare.

TL;DR: The authors analyzes the effects of tying on market competition and social welfare in two-sided markets when economic agents can engage in multi-homing by participating in multiple platforms to reap maximal network benefits, showing that tying induces more consumers to multi-home and makes platform-specific exclusive content available to more consumers, which is beneficial to content providers.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a formal theory of planned obsolescence based on incompatible technologies in the presence of network externalities, and explore how a monopolist's ability to make the new product incompatible with the old version of a product constrains the optimal dynamic behavior of the monopolist.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors develop a simple framework for analyzing the links between corruption and the unofficial economy and their implications for the official economy and show that the entrepreneurs' option to flee to the underground economy constrains a corrupt official's ability to introduce distortions to the economy for private gains.