/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

Praise for the Third Edition: "This is one of the best books available. Its excellent organizational structure allows quick reference to specific models and its clear presentation . . . solidifies the understanding of the concepts being presented."IIE Transactions on Operations EngineeringThoroughly revised and expanded to reflect the latest developments in the field, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, Fourth Edition continues to present the basic statistical principles that are necessary to analyze the probabilistic nature of queues. Rather than presenting a narrow focus on the subject, this update illustrates the wide-reaching, fundamental concepts in queueing theory and its applications to diverse areas such as computer science, engineering, business, and operations research.This update takes a numerical approach to understanding and making probable estimations relating to queues, with a comprehensive outline of simple and more advanced queueing models. Newly featured topics of the Fourth Edition include:Retrial queuesApproximations for queueing networksNumerical inversion of transformsDetermining the appropriate number of servers to balance quality and cost of serviceEach chapter provides a self-contained presentation of key concepts and formulae, allowing readers to work with each section independently, while a summary table at the end of the book outlines the types of queues that have been discussed and their results. In addition, two new appendices have been added, discussing transforms and generating functions as well as the fundamentals of differential and difference equations. New examples are now included along with problems that incorporate QtsPlus software, which is freely available via the book's related Web site.With its accessible style and wealth of real-world examples, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, Fourth Edition is an ideal book for courses on queueing theory at the upper-undergraduate and graduate levels. It is also a valuable resource for researchers and practitioners who analyze congestion in the fields of telecommunications, transportation, aviation, and management science.

Fundamentals of Queueing Theory

Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International Comparison

Learning by observing the past decisions of others can help explain some otherwise puzzling phenomena about human behavior. For example, why do people tend to converge on similar behavior? Why is mass behavior prone to error and fads? The authors argue that the theory of observational learning, and particularly of informational cascades, has much to offer economics, business strategy, political science, and the study of criminal behavior.

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Learning from the behavior of others : conformity, fads, and informational cascades

Models of technology diffusion

Patent litigation reveals important information about the validity of the contested patent to other potential entrants. This paper explores the implications of such informational externalities for entry dynamics in the presence of multiple potential entrants. The nature of the entry game can be one of either waiting or preemption depending on the degree of patent protection. Therefore, the payoffs for the patentee and the initial imitator are discontinuous in the degree of patent protection. Furthermore, strengthening intellectual property rights is not necessarily desirable for the patentee. The analysis may also help explain the apparently puzzling practice of delaying patent suits. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Patent Litigation as an Information Transmission Mechanism

It is a widely adopted practice for firms to announce new products well in advance of actual market availability. The incentives for pre-announcements are stronger in markets with network effects because they can be used to induce the delay of consumers' purchases and forestall the build-up of rival products' installed bases. However, such announcements often are not fulfilled, raising antitrust concerns. We analyze the effects of product pre-announcements in the presence of network effects when firms are allowed to strategically make false announcements. We also discuss their implications for consumer welfare and anti-trust policy.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID847986_code1720.pdf?abstractid=847986&mirid=3

Strategic Product Pre-Announcements in Markets with Network Effects

Software security is a major concern for vendors, consumers, and regulators since attackers that exploit vulnerabilities can cause substantial damages. When vulnerabilities are discovered after the software has been sold to consumers, the firms face a dilemma. A policy of disclosing vulnerabilities and issuing updates protects only the consumers who install updates, while the disclosure itself facilitates reverse engineering of the vulnerability by hackers. The paper develops a setting that examines the economic incentives facing software vendors and users when software is subject to vulnerabilities. We consider a firm that sells software which is subject to potential security breaches. The firm needs to set the price of the software and state whether it intends to disclose vulnerabilities and issue updates. Consumers differ in their value of the software and the potential damage that hackers may inflict and need to decide whether to purchase the software as well as whether to install updates. Prices, market shares, and profits depend on the disclosure policy of the firm. The paper analyzes the market outcome and derives the conditions under which a firm would disclose vulnerabilities. It then examines the effect of a regulatory policy that requires mandatory disclosure of vulnerabilities. The paper discusses the incentives to invest in product security by investigating how a decline in the number of vulnerabilities and an increase in the probability that the firm will identify vulnerabilities ex-post (before hackers) affect disclosure policy, price and profits.

Network Security: Vulnerabilities and Disclosure Policy

We present a leverage theory of reputation building with co-branding. We show that under certain conditions, co-branding that links unknown Þrms in a new sector with established Þrms in a mature sector allows the unknown Þrms to signal a high product quality and establish their own reputation. We compare this situation with a benchmark in which both sectors are new and Þrms signal their quality only with prices. We investigate how this comparison is affected by the nature of the technology linking the two sectors and a cross-sector inference problem that consumers might face in identifying the true cause of product failure. We Þnd that co-branding facilitates the process in which a Þrm in the new sector to signal its product quality only if the co-branding sectors produce complementary inputs and consumers face a cross-sector inference problem. We apply our insight to economics of superstars, multinational Þrms and co-authorship.

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A leverage theory of reputation building with co-branding: Complementarity in reputation building

We analyze competition between interconnected networks when content is heterogeneous in
its sensitivity to delivery quality. In a two-sided market framework, we characterize the
equilibrium in a neutral network constrained to offer the same quality and assess the impact
of such a constraint vis-a-vis a non-neutral network where Internet service providers (ISPs)
are allowed to engage in second degree price discrimination with a menu of quality-price pairs.
We find that the merit of net neutrality regulation depends crucially on content providers'
business models. More generally, our analysis can be considered as a contribution to the
literature on second-degree price discrimination in two-sided platform markets.

Jay Pil Choi

Papers

Patent Litigation as an Information Transmission Mechanism

Strategic Product Pre-Announcements in Markets with Network Effects

Network Security: Vulnerabilities and Disclosure Policy

A leverage theory of reputation building with co-branding: Complementarity in reputation building

Internet Interconnection and Network Neutrality