/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

Praise for the Third Edition: "This is one of the best books available. Its excellent organizational structure allows quick reference to specific models and its clear presentation . . . solidifies the understanding of the concepts being presented."IIE Transactions on Operations EngineeringThoroughly revised and expanded to reflect the latest developments in the field, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, Fourth Edition continues to present the basic statistical principles that are necessary to analyze the probabilistic nature of queues. Rather than presenting a narrow focus on the subject, this update illustrates the wide-reaching, fundamental concepts in queueing theory and its applications to diverse areas such as computer science, engineering, business, and operations research.This update takes a numerical approach to understanding and making probable estimations relating to queues, with a comprehensive outline of simple and more advanced queueing models. Newly featured topics of the Fourth Edition include:Retrial queuesApproximations for queueing networksNumerical inversion of transformsDetermining the appropriate number of servers to balance quality and cost of serviceEach chapter provides a self-contained presentation of key concepts and formulae, allowing readers to work with each section independently, while a summary table at the end of the book outlines the types of queues that have been discussed and their results. In addition, two new appendices have been added, discussing transforms and generating functions as well as the fundamentals of differential and difference equations. New examples are now included along with problems that incorporate QtsPlus software, which is freely available via the book's related Web site.With its accessible style and wealth of real-world examples, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, Fourth Edition is an ideal book for courses on queueing theory at the upper-undergraduate and graduate levels. It is also a valuable resource for researchers and practitioners who analyze congestion in the fields of telecommunications, transportation, aviation, and management science.

Fundamentals of Queueing Theory

Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International Comparison

Learning by observing the past decisions of others can help explain some otherwise puzzling phenomena about human behavior. For example, why do people tend to converge on similar behavior? Why is mass behavior prone to error and fads? The authors argue that the theory of observational learning, and particularly of informational cascades, has much to offer economics, business strategy, political science, and the study of criminal behavior.

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Learning from the behavior of others : conformity, fads, and informational cascades

Models of technology diffusion

In this article, I explore the problem of sequential and irreversible technology choice in the presence of network externalities when the technologies stochastically evolve over time. Early potential users are shown to adopt an irreversible technology too early compared to the social optimum. The effect of increasing the uncertainty of the technologies on an early potential user's decision is analyzed. I find that the sponsor of new emerging technology might choose a research strategy that is too safe. I also study the consequences of allowing side payments between generations of consumers and demonstrate that an ex post optimal standardization policy can impair ex ante social welfare.

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Irreversible choice of uncertain technologies with network externalities

https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8JM2J2G/download

Market Structure and the Timing of Technology Adoption with Network Externalities

https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8VQ394P/download

Optimal tariffs and the choice of technology Discriminatory tariffs vs. the ‘Most Favored Nation’ clause

Broadcast competition and advertising with free entry: Subscription vs. free-to-air

We provide a theoretical model of privacy in which data collection requires consumers' consent and consumers are fully aware of the consequences of such consent Nonetheless, excessive collection of personal information arises in the monopoly market equilibrium which results in excessive loss of privacy compared to the social optimum In a fragmented market with a continuum of firms, no individual website has incentives to collect and monetize users' personal data in the presence of scale economies in data analytics However, the emergence of data brokerage industry can restore these incentives Our results have important policy implications for the ongoing debate regarding online privacy protection: excessive loss of privacy emerges even with costless reading and perfect understanding of all privacy policies We support the view that privacy is a public good and propose alternative policy remedies beyond the current informed-consent approach

/pdf/privacy-and-personal-data-collection-with-information-3bq48rdv66.pdf

Jay Pil Choi

Papers

Irreversible choice of uncertain technologies with network externalities

Market Structure and the Timing of Technology Adoption with Network Externalities

Optimal tariffs and the choice of technology Discriminatory tariffs vs. the ‘Most Favored Nation’ clause

Broadcast competition and advertising with free entry: Subscription vs. free-to-air

Privacy and Personal Data Collection with Information Externalities