Jay Pil Choi

TL;DR: In this article, the authors develop a leverage theory of tying in two-sided markets and analyze incentives for a monopolist to tie its monopolized product with another product in a twosided market, which can be more widely applied to any markets in which sales to consumers in one market can generate additional revenues that cannot be competed away due to nonnegative price constraints.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify two issues in Choi's [2010] paper on tying in two-sided markets published in this Journal, and provide solutions to both of them.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors develop a model of patent trolls to understand various litigation strategies employed by nonpracticing entities and discuss policy implications including legal fee shifting and the use of injunctive relief.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine how software vulnerabilities affect firms that sell software and consumers that purchase software and model three decisions of the firm: an upfront investment in the quality of the software to reduce potential vulnerabilities, a policy decision whether to announce vulnerabilities, and a price for the software.

TL;DR: In this paper, a patent portfolio acquisition game is considered in which a third party's patent portfolio is up for sale, and the patent holders acquire an enormous amount of related patents in diverse technology fields such that it becomes impractical to develop a new product that with certainty does not inadvertently infringe on other firms' patent portfolios.