/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

Praise for the Third Edition: "This is one of the best books available. Its excellent organizational structure allows quick reference to specific models and its clear presentation . . . solidifies the understanding of the concepts being presented."IIE Transactions on Operations EngineeringThoroughly revised and expanded to reflect the latest developments in the field, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, Fourth Edition continues to present the basic statistical principles that are necessary to analyze the probabilistic nature of queues. Rather than presenting a narrow focus on the subject, this update illustrates the wide-reaching, fundamental concepts in queueing theory and its applications to diverse areas such as computer science, engineering, business, and operations research.This update takes a numerical approach to understanding and making probable estimations relating to queues, with a comprehensive outline of simple and more advanced queueing models. Newly featured topics of the Fourth Edition include:Retrial queuesApproximations for queueing networksNumerical inversion of transformsDetermining the appropriate number of servers to balance quality and cost of serviceEach chapter provides a self-contained presentation of key concepts and formulae, allowing readers to work with each section independently, while a summary table at the end of the book outlines the types of queues that have been discussed and their results. In addition, two new appendices have been added, discussing transforms and generating functions as well as the fundamentals of differential and difference equations. New examples are now included along with problems that incorporate QtsPlus software, which is freely available via the book's related Web site.With its accessible style and wealth of real-world examples, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, Fourth Edition is an ideal book for courses on queueing theory at the upper-undergraduate and graduate levels. It is also a valuable resource for researchers and practitioners who analyze congestion in the fields of telecommunications, transportation, aviation, and management science.

Fundamentals of Queueing Theory

Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International Comparison

Learning by observing the past decisions of others can help explain some otherwise puzzling phenomena about human behavior. For example, why do people tend to converge on similar behavior? Why is mass behavior prone to error and fads? The authors argue that the theory of observational learning, and particularly of informational cascades, has much to offer economics, business strategy, political science, and the study of criminal behavior.

/pdf/learning-from-the-behavior-of-others-conformity-fads-and-2b6fi36pyc.pdf

Learning from the behavior of others : conformity, fads, and informational cascades

Models of technology diffusion

This paper analyzes patent pools and their effects on innovation incentives. It is shown that the pro-competitive effects of patent pools for complementary patents naturally extend for dynamic innovation incentives. However, this simple conclusion may not hold if we entertain the possibility that patents are probabilistic and can be invalidated in court. In such a case, the licensing fees reflect the strength of patents. Patent pools of complementary patents can be used to discourage litigation by depriving potential licensees of the ability to selectively challenge patents and making them committed to a proposition of all-or-nothing in patent litigation. We show that if patents are sufficiently weak, patent pools with complementary patents reduce social welfare as they charge higher licensing fees and chill subsequent innovation incentives.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2344689_code459177.pdf?abstractid=2344689&mirid=1&type=2

Patent Pools, Litigation and Innovation

This paper provides a new perspective on the validity of the so-called "leverage theory". In a model of preemptive innovation in "systems" markets, I examine the effect of bundling on R&D incentives. I find that bundling provides a channel through which monopoly "slack" in one component market can be shifted to another, with the effect of mitigating rent dissipation in the systems market. Bundling can be profitable if this beneficial effect of reduced rent dissipation outweighs the negative effect of intensified price competition. After demonstrating the private optimality of bundling, its welfare implications are considered. There is a discrepancy between the market outcome and the socially optimal outcome which can be explained in terms of externalities conferred on consumers' surplus and the rival firm's profits due to bundling. Finally, the results can be reinterpreted to analyze the relationship between compatibility decisions and R&D incentives in mix-and-match models.

Preemptive R&D, Rent Dissipation and the 'Leverage Theory'

We investigate the relationship between market structure and platforms'incentives to adopt technological innovations in two-sided markets, where platforms may find it optimal to charge zero price on the consumer side and to extract surplus on the ad- vertising side. We consider innovations that a¤ect the two sides in an opposite way. We compare private incentives with social incentives and find that the bias in tech- nology adoption depends crucially on whether the non-negative pricing constraint binds or not. Our results provide a rationale for a tougher competition policy to curb concentration if competition authorities put more weight on consumer surplus in welfare calculations.

Two-Sided Platforms and Biases in Technology Adoption

This article analyzes a technology adoption process in which the effect of informational spillover interacts with network externalities. The interplay of informational externalities and payoff interdependency induces risk-averse and clustering behavior in the technology-adoption process. The analysis differs from the herd behavior literature in focusing on how the herd behavior of subsequent users influences the initial adoption decision. Moreover, herd behavior in this article stems from each agent's desire to inhibit the revelation of new information that can be used in a way detrimental to her, rather than from each agent's effort to free-ride on information contained in the decisions made by predecessors.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Herd behavior, the "Penguin effect", and the suppression of informational diffusion: An analysis of informational externalities and payoff interdependency

Multinationals often serve foreign markets by exporting as well as by investing directly in foreign production facilities. We argue that if the multinational competes in an oligopolistic market characterized by strategic complements then there are strategic reasons to use two production facilities - committing to a second source allows the firm to keep average cost low while increasing its marginal cost. The increase in marginal cost softens product market competition resulting in higher profits. We argue that this theory also has implications for the "make or buy" literature in production management and the literature on second sourcing in industrial organization.

Jay Pil Choi

Papers

Patent Pools, Litigation and Innovation

Preemptive R&D, Rent Dissipation and the 'Leverage Theory'

Two-Sided Platforms and Biases in Technology Adoption

Herd behavior, the "Penguin effect", and the suppression of informational diffusion: An analysis of informational externalities and payoff interdependency

Strategic Second Sourcing by Multinationals