J
Jay Pil Choi
Researcher at Michigan State University
Publications - 141
Citations - 5764
Jay Pil Choi is an academic researcher from Michigan State University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Competition (economics) & Tying. The author has an hindex of 40, co-authored 136 publications receiving 5326 citations. Previous affiliations of Jay Pil Choi include Harvard University & Tilburg University.
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Monitoring, cross subsidies, and universal banking☆
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors formalize the idea that a financial conglomerate may utilize commercial banking activities to cross-subsidize investment banking through bundled offers, which has an adverse effect on commercial banks' monitoring incentives, encouraging the pursuit of private rents by entrepreneurs.
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Optimal certification policy, entry, and investment in the presence of public signals
Jay Pil Choi,Arijit Mukherjee +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the optimal disclosure policy of a certification intermediary in an environment where the seller's decision on entry and investment in product quality are endogenous and the buyers observe an additional public signal on quality.
Posted Content
The Dynamics of Corruption with the Ratchet Effect
TL;DR: In this article, a simple model of corruption dynamics with the ratchet effect is presented, where corrupt officials have ex-post the incentive to price discriminate entrepreneurs based on the entry decisions made in an earlier period.
Posted Content
Antitrust Analysis of Mergers with Bundling in Complementary Markets: Implications for Pricing, Innovation, and Compatibility Choice
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a simple model to analyze the effects of mergers in complementary system markets when the merged firm is able to engage in bundling, and analyzed the impact of (mixed) bundling on pricing decisions for existing generations of products.
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An equilibrium model of investment-reducing vertical integration
TL;DR: In this paper, a simple equilibrium model of investment-reducing vertical integration is presented, which also shows that anticompetitive vertical integration can arise in equilibrium without making the troublesome assumption of price commitment by the integrating firms.