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Jay Pil Choi

Researcher at Michigan State University

Publications -  141
Citations -  5764

Jay Pil Choi is an academic researcher from Michigan State University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Competition (economics) & Tying. The author has an hindex of 40, co-authored 136 publications receiving 5326 citations. Previous affiliations of Jay Pil Choi include Harvard University & Tilburg University.

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Vertical Foreclosure with the Choice of Input Specifications

TL;DR: In this article, an equilibrium model of vertical foreclosures with the choice of input specifications is developed, and conditions for equilibrium vertical foreclosure to occur and its welfare consequences are derived.
Posted Content

Asymmetric Neutrality Regulation and Innovation at the Edges: Fixed vs. Mobile Networks

TL;DR: In this article, the authors study how net neutrality regulations affect high-bandwidth content providers' investment incentives in quality of services (QoS) and find that the effects crucially depend on network capacity levels.
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The Economics of Repeated Extortion

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide a simple model of repeated extortion and show that the inability of corrupt government officials to commit to future demands does not distort entry decisions any further if technology is not a choice variable for the entrepreneurs.
Posted Content

Transfer Pricing and the Arm's Length Principle under Imperfect Competition

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze the incentives of a multinational enterprise to manipulate an internal transfer price to take advantage of corporate-tax differences across countries under both monopoly and oligopoly, and examine cost plus and comparable uncontrollable price as two alternative implementations of the so-called arm's length principle (ALP) to mitigate this problem.
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Tying and Innovation: A Dynamic Analysis of Tying Arrangements

TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyzed the effect of tying arrangements on R&D incentives in the tied goods market and showed that tying is a profitable strategy if the gains, via an increased share of dynamic rents in the linked goods market, exceed the losses that result from intensified price competition in the market.