Institution
Georgetown University Law Center
About: Georgetown University Law Center is a based out in . It is known for research contribution in the topics: Supreme court & Public health. The organization has 585 authors who have published 2488 publications receiving 36650 citations. The organization is also known as: Georgetown Law & GULC.
Topics: Supreme court, Public health, Global health, Health policy, Human rights
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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16 Jul 2018
TL;DR: Initial results from the world's first ISP-scale field trial of a refraction networking system demonstrate that TapDance can be practically realized at ISP scale with good performance and at a reasonable cost, potentially paving the way for long-term, large-scale deployments of TapD dance or other refraction network schemes in the future.
Abstract: In this talk, we will report initial results from the world's first ISP-scale field trial of a refraction networking system. Refraction networking is a next-generation censorship circumvention approach that locates proxy functionality in the middle of the network, at participating ISPs or other network operators. We built a high-performance implementation of the TapDance refraction networking scheme and deployed it on four ISP uplinks with an aggregate bandwidth of 100 Gbps. Over one week of operation, our deployment served more than 50,000 real users. The experience demonstrates that TapDance can be practically realized at ISP scale with good performance and at a reasonable cost, potentially paving the way for long-term, large-scale deployments of TapDance or other refraction networking schemes in the future. We will close by discussing interactions between refraction networking and emerging web standards.
15 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that due to increased global competition for securities transactions, coordination among securities regulators often comprises a "battle of the sexes" game where regulators are not necessarily incentivized to adopt the other's regime.
Abstract: International securities regulation has arrived at the forefront of the country's debate on financial market reform. The global economic crisis has exposed the enormous systemic risk that can arise where securities are sold across borders. Meanwhile, the Bernie Madoff and Allen Stanford frauds have illustrated the international reach of swindlers and conmen. Consequently, policymakers have vociferously called for not only domestic securities law reform, but also a more effective international regulatory architecture. Yet international securities regulation is poorly understood. Securities scholars traditionally view the SEC as a global regulatory monopolist due to the size of US stock exchanges. But they overlook the rise of foreign capital markets and the diminished influence of the SEC. Meanwhile, international law scholars view international securities regulation as involving what game theoreticians would call an "assurance" game where information sharing through informal networks of regulators facilitates swift agreement on standards. But they ignore the asymmetric costs of adopting international standards and thus underestimate the obstacles to convergence. This Article overcomes these limitations and offers a fuller theoretical account of international securities regulation. It argues that due to increased global competition for securities transactions, coordination among securities regulators often comprises a "battle of the sexes" game where regulators are not necessarily incentivized to adopt the other's regime. Instead, only where securities regulation touches upon what can be considered "systemic risks" - defined as financial risks whose costs are internalized broadly and deeply across borders - will networks be potentially capable of realizing significant regulatory coordination. And even here, coordination is most likely to be undertaken by cross-functional networks operating with the credibility and support of political elites. The Article then shows how the SEC, cognizant of this development, is forming club-like alliances that offer foreign regulators special rewards, like eased market access for foreign market participants, for adopting some of its policy preferences. The Article then assesses the effectiveness of this approach and concludes that clubs have better prospects of success in enforcement cooperation than in substantive areas of securities law.
15 citations
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01 Jan 2008TL;DR: The field of international public health and the contribution of international organizations to its development is described and particular attention is paid to the global health impact of international law developed under the auspices of the World Health Organization and the World Trade Organization.
Abstract: The field of international public health and the contribution of international organizations to its development is described. The growth and elaboration of the field of international public health law in the last decade and a half is one of the most notable developments in global health policy. In this new era of global health governance, international law has an important, albeit limited, role to play in promoting and coordinating international cooperation and national action to protect and promote global health. Particular attention is paid to the global health impact of international law developed under the auspices of the World Health Organization and the World Trade Organization.
15 citations
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TL;DR: An interprofessional panel of medical and legal experts is convened to elucidate the state of medical-legal ACP and begin to identify strategies to improve and align practices within and across professions.
15 citations
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TL;DR: Hersch et al. as mentioned in this paper analyzed the effect of early offer reform in medical malpractice litigation and found that defendants will normally not make early offers in cases with large economic damages (over $500,000 in 1988 dollars) because doing so will increase payouts.
Abstract: Medical malpractice litigation is costly and time-consuming. Professor Jeffrey O'Connell, with various coauthors, has long advocated 'early offer' rules that would encourage defendants to offer to settle for economic damages plus attorney fees, and punish plaintiffs who refuse such offers. Using detailed closed claims data from Texas for 1988-2005, we simulate the effects of these 'early offers.'We find that defendants will normally not make early offers in cases with large economic damages (over $500,000 in 1988 dollars) because doing so will increase payouts. Early offers will normally reduce payouts, and hence will be made, in cases with small economic damages (under $100,000 in 1988 dollars). Defendants may also make offers in cases with moderate ($100,000-500,000) economic damages, depending on case characteristics and the plaintiff’s chances of prevailing. An early offer program will (i) sharply reduce payouts in cases with small economic damages; (ii) will not materially affect predicted payouts in other cases; (iii) will have very different effects on different types of plaintiffs, with large payout reductions for elderly and deceased plaintiffs and much smaller effects for newborns and employed adult plaintiffs; and (iv) will overlap substantially in its effects with statutory caps on non-economic damages, and hence have a smaller effect in states with these caps. Our mixed results contrast sharply with dramatic claims by O’Connell and co-authors, who predict 70% reductions in payouts and defense costs. Their estimates reflect the compound effects of a series of unreasonable assumptions.This article, in part, responds to Hersh, O’Connell and Viscusi, An Empirical Assessment of Early Offer Reform for Medical Malpractice, 36 Journal of Legal Studies s231-s259 (2007).Hersch, O’Connell and Viscusi reply to this article in Reply to the Effects of 'Early Offers' in Medical Malpractice Cases: Evidence from Texas, 7 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies (forthcoming 2010), working paper version available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1487681We extend our analysis and respond to Hersch, O’Connell and Viscusi in Black, Hyman, and Silver, O’Connell Early Settlement Offers: Toward Realistic Numbers and Two-Sided Offers, 7 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1503125
15 citations
Authors
Showing all 585 results
Name | H-index | Papers | Citations |
---|---|---|---|
Lawrence O. Gostin | 75 | 879 | 23066 |
Michael J. Saks | 38 | 155 | 5398 |
Chirag Shah | 34 | 341 | 5056 |
Sara J. Rosenbaum | 34 | 425 | 6907 |
Mark Dybul | 33 | 61 | 4171 |
Steven C. Salop | 33 | 120 | 11330 |
Joost Pauwelyn | 32 | 154 | 3429 |
Mark Tushnet | 31 | 267 | 4754 |
Gorik Ooms | 29 | 124 | 3013 |
Alicia Ely Yamin | 29 | 122 | 2703 |
Julie E. Cohen | 28 | 63 | 2666 |
James G. Hodge | 27 | 225 | 2874 |
John H. Jackson | 27 | 102 | 2919 |
Margaret M. Blair | 26 | 75 | 4711 |
William W. Bratton | 25 | 112 | 2037 |