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Georgetown University Law Center

About: Georgetown University Law Center is a based out in . It is known for research contribution in the topics: Supreme court & Public health. The organization has 585 authors who have published 2488 publications receiving 36650 citations. The organization is also known as: Georgetown Law & GULC.


Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyze potentially anticompetitive "overbuying" conduct by power buyers and suggest a four-part rule-of-reason legal standard, including a requirement that plaintiffs show price less than cost.
Abstract: There is now a growing interest in antitrust in the anticompetitive conduct of buyers. This article (to be published in the Antitrust Law Journal) analyzes potentially anticompetitive "overbuying" conduct by power buyers. Overbuying involves increasing the purchases of a particular input with the purpose and effect of gaining either monopsony power in the input market or market power in the output market. Predatory overbuying is overbuying inputs as a predatory strategy to cause buyer-side competitors in the input market to exit from the market or permanently shrink their capacity, in order to gain monopsony power in the input market. Raising Rivals' Costs ("RRC") Overbuying is overbuying inputs in order to raise rivals' input costs and thereby gain market power in the output market. After briefly reviewing classical monopsony conduct, the article analyzes these two strategies in detail. It examines the impact of the conduct on the overbuying firm, its competitors, input suppliers and the consumers in the output market. It sets out the conditions under which these strategies are both profitable for the firm and harmful to consumers. This analysis suggests a four-part rule of reason legal standard. It then discusses short-cut tests and compares this conduct to classical predatory pricing, including the relevance of the price-cost test and the profit-sacrifice test. It also compares the relative competitive risks of the two overbuying strategies. It concludes that predatory overbuying raises less serious competitive concerns than RRC overbuying, and that plaintiffs alleging such predatory overbuying should be subject to a more demanding legal standard, including a requirement that plaintiffs show price less than cost.

9 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the potential drawbacks of the unified family court system are highlighted. But, the authors do not discuss the potential benefits of the system and instead suggest that reformers proceed with their eyes open and consider potential drawbacks before using valuable resources for its implementation.
Abstract: Much has been written about the potential success of unified family courts. Unified family court proponents share great optimism and enthusiasm for what they see as a solution to several of the problems facing court systems today. This enthusiasm should be applauded. As with any reform, however, unified family court advocates must stop to consider the possible drawbacks to the system that they propose; otherwise, they might end up with a system that is the same or worse than the one that they were attempting to fix. This article highlights several of the potential problems with unified family courts. It is not a condemnation of unified family courts per se; it is simply a suggestion that reformers proceed with their eyes open, taking time to consider the potential drawbacks of the unified family court system before using valuable resources for its implementation.

9 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present the potential competitive harms and benefits of vertical and complementary product mergers and the types of economic and factual analysis of competitive effects that can be applied to those mergers during the HSR review process.
Abstract: The purpose of this short article is to aid practitioners in analyzing the competitive effects of vertical and complementary product mergers. It is also intended to assist the agencies if and when they undertake revision of the 1984 U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines. Those Guidelines are out of date and do not reflect current enforcement or economic thinking about the potential competitive effects of vertical mergers. Nor do they provide the tools needed to carry out a modern competitive effects analysis. This article is intended to partially fill the gap by summarizing the various potential competitive harms and benefits that can occur in vertical mergers and the types of economic and factual analysis of competitive effects that can be applied to those mergers during the HSR review process. The analysis in the article also identifies several legal and policy issues that the agencies would consider when they undertake the process of revising the Vertical Merger Guidelines. The Appendix contains a listing and summary of the vertical merger cases challenged by the DOJ and FTC since 1994.

9 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The corporate governance landscape is much different than a generation ago Independent directors now hold a great majority of all board seats, institutional shareholders hold a supermajority of all shares in public corporations, and activist shareholders have become a recurring player in entity governance.
Abstract: The corporate governance landscape is much different than a generation ago Independent directors now hold a great majority of all board seats, institutional shareholders hold a supermajority of all shares in public corporations, and activist shareholders have become a recurring player in entity governance In turn, other corporate stakeholders express increasing concern about shareholders’ use of their power for selfish reasons and the perceived pernicious impact of shareholder wealth maximization as a guide for corporate law This chapter, part of a book on “The Corporate Contract in Changing Times” asks: Why does corporate law change and how it might change now? Corporate law changed regularly in the first half of our country’s history A series of innovations followed one after another during the nineteenth century — limited liability; general incorporation statutes; a strong shift to director-centric corporate governance; authorization of corporations holding stock in other corporations; and the disappearance of ultra vires and other limits on corporate behavior By the arrival of the twentieth century all the key economic elements of the modern corporation were in view and corporate law settled into a stable pattern we still see today State law abandoned its prior regulatory approach and its continual change in favor of a director-centric structure with expansive room for private ordering that has remained remarkably stable Federal law stepped in to restrain economic concentration (antitrust law), to protect employees and consumers against corporate power (done by industry regulation, employment and consumer laws not corporate governance), to limit corporate political contributions, and to make recurring, if sporadic and non-comprehensive, efforts to enhance the role of shareholders against managers This chapter examines this history of change in corporate law in America, the dramatic and abrupt shift in the focus of state corporate law visible in last decade or so of the nineteenth century, the interactive pattern of state and federal law that has grown up over the second half of the country’s history and prominent theories explaining what leads to corporate law change Together these various strands suggest there will be no fundamental change in state corporate law even in this time of visible stress to the now classic structure Changes that we see is more likely to come from federal law or, as has been most visible in recent times, because of market and technological-driven changes outside of law

9 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide an overview of the relevant law regarding insider trading, discuss some of the general legal and factual defenses that may be raised, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, and provide guidelines for establishing and maintaining an effective compliance program to minimize the risks of insider trading liability.
Abstract: The government’s 2011 prosecution of hedge fund manager Raj Rajaratnam and the various investigations into the use of expert networks by hedge funds and other institutional investors have prompted questions about the law of insider trading, permissible methods of gathering information, general defenses to allegations of insider trading, and the ways in which firms can reduce risks of liability. As a first line of defense, investment firms should ensure that robust and comprehensive compliance programs are in place to reduce the risk of potential insider trading. Regardless of the quality of their compliance procedures, however, institutional investors and financial services personnel may be suspected of, or even face criminal and civil charges for insider trading. To assist firms and individuals in considering and weighing possible defenses against actions brought by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) or the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), this Article (1) provides an overview of the relevant law regarding insider trading, (2) discusses some of the general legal and factual defenses that may be raised, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, and (3) provides guidelines for establishing and maintaining an effective compliance program to minimize the risks of insider trading liability. Any firm that becomes the subject of an insider trading investigation should be mindful that the law of insider trading is nuanced and highly dependent upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case. This Article analyzes the current law of insider trading and describes some of the key defenses that may be raised in consultation with counsel.

9 citations


Authors

Showing all 585 results

NameH-indexPapersCitations
Lawrence O. Gostin7587923066
Michael J. Saks381555398
Chirag Shah343415056
Sara J. Rosenbaum344256907
Mark Dybul33614171
Steven C. Salop3312011330
Joost Pauwelyn321543429
Mark Tushnet312674754
Gorik Ooms291243013
Alicia Ely Yamin291222703
Julie E. Cohen28632666
James G. Hodge272252874
John H. Jackson271022919
Margaret M. Blair26754711
William W. Bratton251122037
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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers from the Institution in previous years
YearPapers
202174
2020146
2019115
2018113
2017109
2016118