Georgetown University Law Center

About: Georgetown University Law Center is a based out in . It is known for research contribution in the topics: Supreme court & Public health. The organization has 585 authors who have published 2488 publications receiving 36650 citations. The organization is also known as: Georgetown Law & GULC.

THE WAY I SEE IT: DVD: The new library video format?

Abstract: Les bibliotheques doivent-elles continuer a acheter du materiel VHS ? Rien n'indique que le DVD rendra le VHS obsolete, du moins dans les cinq prochaines annees

Terrorism Trials in Article III Courts

Abstract: Some individuals reject Article III courts as a forum for bringing terrorist suspects to justice on the grounds that the ordinary judicial system cannot handle such cases. As an empirical matter, this claim is simply false. Since 2001, myriad terrorism trials have progressed through the criminal system. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) reports that between 2001 and 2010, there were 998 defendants indicted in terrorism prosecutions. Eighty-seven percent of the defendants were convicted on at least one charge. According to the Executive Office for the U.S. Attorneys, from FY 2004 to FY 2009, there were 3,010 terrorism prosecutions. It reported 2,663 terrorism convictions during the same time period. What these numbers demonstrate (reporting inconsistencies not-withstanding) is that Article III courts have routinely, and successfully, managed international and domestic terrorist cases. Nevertheless, there are important concerns driving such critiques that deserve further scrutiny. The author first considers the most common objections to pursuing terrorist cases in the ordinary judicial system. The arguments fall into five categories: rules of evidence, the problems created by classification, the right to call and confront witnesses, the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, and the right to self-representation. Critics look to these areas to suggest that either detention or military commissions would be a more appropriate way to handle individuals suspected of terrorist activity. Second, she suggests that there are risks in sidestepping Article III courts. Lowered standards that mark the alternative realms impact due process, public perception, and conviction. Transferring cases out of the civilian system undermines citizens’ rights: namely, the right to participate in the administration of justice. The creation of alternative venues creates forum competition, which may lead to an abrogation of justice. Pursuing cases through the military system may also undermine judicial authority and contribute to a perception of incompetence with regard to the criminal system. Third, as an empirical matter, many of the claims about the incompetence of Article III courts do not play out in practice. Here, by way of illustration, the author focuses on a case currently underway in Manhattan, United States v. Abu Ghayth. Some procedures (not used in this case) offer further ways to address the difficulties endemic to terrorist prosecution. While many of the objections can be overcome, one — the right to self-representation — proves more troublesome. Although it occurs in only a small fraction of cases and there are a handful of ways to address it, each of the solutions carries consequences. The problem, nevertheless, is not unique to the Article III context and thus vitiates not in favor of moving to a system of military commissions, but instead a re-examination of the issues associated with denying a defendant a right to appear pro se and appointment of standby counsel to address the underlying purpose of the right itself.

Treaty Self-Execution as “Foreign” Foreign Relations Law

Abstract: This contribution to the Oxford Handbook on Comparative Foreign Relations Law considers how a state’s approach to foreign relations problems may have an external origin, or what we call “foreign” Foreign Relations Law (FFRL). Using the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties as a case study, we find close parallels between manifestations of this distinction in various states and how it evolved in the United States, where the distinction was first articulated. The chapter explores whether these parallels reflect the distinction’s transplantation from one legal system to another or the organic development of similar doctrines to address similar problems within the states involved. The chapter then addresses the utility of differentiating the exogenous/endogenous origins of particular foreign relations doctrines. We argue that consideration of a doctrine’s exogenous origins raises questions that can deepen and develop the nascent field of comparative foreign relations law. Why do states accept (or reject) FFRL? How does FFRL enter a state’s system? Who is doing the transporting? What happens to FFRL in its new site(s) – i.e., how static or dynamic does the concept prove in different settings? Further research on such questions may, in turn, set the table for more normative questions such as when states should seek (or resist) the importation of foreign relations law.

Global Goal for Vaccine Quest

Abstract: Lawrence Gostin, Visiting Professor of Global Health Law at the University of Sydney and the O’Neill Professor of Global Health Law at Georgetown University argues in The Australian that scarce swine flu immunization must go to the needy: The rapid global transmission of Influenza (A) H1N1 (swine flu) has sparked a worldwide race to develop an effective vaccine. Finding a technological solution to swine flu will be a major scientific advance, but vital questions of scarcity and fairness loom large. The swine flu vaccine will almost certainly be scarce, with manufacturers unable to meet the huge global demand. Governments face hard choices on how to ethically ration this scarce life-saving resource. Children and their caretakers should certainly be a high priority for swine flu vaccine because they rapidly spread the infection in day care and school. Yet privileging the elderly would be a mistake because they have contracted the new strain at the lowest rate and appear to have some immunity. Instead, government should assign top priority to the most vulnerable who have died at a disproportionate rate - those who have poor health such as heart disease, asthma, or diabetes. This is also the fairest way to allocate scarce vaccines because people with multiple health conditions also tend to be the most disadvantaged in society. It is vital that government makes allocation decisions fairly and transparently. The public has a right to know which groups will have priority access and why. One key problem, however, is that the private market is still likely to privilege the rich and politically connected in gaining access. Business culture is geared toward satisfying consumer demand, so the industry will charge what the market will bear for a scarce, valuable vaccine. Rich countries will face scarcity, but they will have much more ample supplies than poor countries. The pressure on governments to protect their own citizens will be intense during a pandemic. The vaccine industry is likely to supply markets that can afford to pay and in countries where they are located. More than 90% of the world’s capacity to manufacture influenza vaccines is concentrated in Europe and North America. This leaves poor countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America much more vulnerable as the rich stockpile vaccines. Europe, and the United States are spending a fortune on vaccines and antiviral medication, but virtually none of these resources will benefit poor countries. Serious questions of global social justice arise when wealth, rather than need, becomes the primary allocation criterion. The mal-distribution of vaccines in the face of a global financial crisis will only widen the already yawning health gaps between the rich and the poor. Rich countries hoarding vaccines is also is a bad public health strategy because it allows the virus to circulate unchecked in highly populated developing countries. Even if it is not politically expedient, justice requires that scarce vaccines go to the most disadvantaged. Equitable access to a vaccine against swine influenza is not merely a moral imperative. It is also critically necessary to safeguard global health.

Ricardian Equilibrium with Stochastic Free Entry

Abstract: The standard Ricardian model of competition has a fixed number of firms, each with limited capacity and differential exogenous costs or qualities. In this paper, we introduce a real entry process by formulating a multistage Ricardian equilibrium model with free entry and stochastic product qualities and costs. The set of active firms and their qualities and costs are determined by an equilibrium dynamic entry process in which an unlimited number of potential entrants face identical investment costs and prospects. In the first stage, each firm sequentially chooses whether or not to undertake a risky investment that determines its quality and cost. The process continues until no more firms wish to invest. In the second stage, the firms compete to sell their limited capacity to a fixed number of identical buyers. The resulting Ricardian stochastic free entry equilibrium has a number of interesting properties. Firms invest as long as the "marginally active" (i.e., worst sold) seller's quality (or cost) does not meet a critical threshold that does not depend on the realizations of the other active sellers or the number of units demanded. There are two possible equilibrium market structures. One structure involves excess sellers in which prices are determined by the cost and quality of the "marginally inactive" (i.e., best unsold) seller. The other structure involves the number of investing potential entrants just equal to the number of units demanded, and sellers charging prices equal to the buyers' value. Regardless of the market structure, the entry process and equilibrium are socially optimal. Surprisingly, demand increases either have no effect on prices or, more generally, lead to lower prices. Restricting sales by active sellers similarly cannot lead to higher prices because such supply restrictions induce entry investment that continues until a new entrant replaces the unit that was withheld from the market. In fact, it generally leads to lower prices. However, "warehousing" the marginally inactive (best unsold) unit is a profitable method of raising prices because it does not induce entry. In the limiting case of a large number of small sellers, the model nicely illustrates the distinction between short and long run competitive equilibrium, and the expected price converges to a long run supply price.