Showing papers in "International Studies Quarterly in 2001"

Treating International Institutions as Social Environments

Abstract: Socialization theory is a neglected source of explanations for cooperation in international relations. Neorealism treats socialization (or selection, more properly) as a process by which autistic non-balancers are weeded out of the anarchical international system. Contractual institutionalists ignore or downplay the possibilities of socialization in international institutions in part because of the difficulties in observing changes in interests and preferences. For constructivists socialization is a central concept. But to date it has been undertheorized, or more precisely, the microprocesses of socialization have been generally left unexamined. This article focuses on two basic microprocesses in socialization theory—persuasion and social influence—and develops propositions about the social conditions under which one might expect to observe cooperation in institutions. Socialization theories pose questions for both the structural-functional foundations of contractual institutionalist hypotheses about institutional design and cooperation, and notions of optimal group size for collective action.

Transnational Networks and Policy Diffusion: The Case of Gender Mainstreaming

Abstract: How can we account for the global diffusion of remarkably similar policy innovations across widely differing nation-states? In an era characterized by heightened globalization and increasingly radical state restructuring, this question has become especially acute. Scholars of international relations offer a number of theoretical explanations for the cross-national convergence of ideas, institutions, and interests. We examine the proliferation of state bureaucracies for gender mainstreaming. These organizations seek to integrate a gender-equality perspective across all areas of government policy. Although they so far have received scant attention outside of feminist policy circles, these mainstreaming bureaucracies—now in place in over 100 countries—represent a powerful challenge to business-as-usual politics and policymaking. As a policy innovation, the speed with which these institutional mechanisms have been adopted by the majority of national governments is unprecedented. We argue that transnational networks composed largely of nonstate actors (notably women's international nongovernmental organizations and the United Nations) have been the primary forces driving the diffusion of gender mainstreaming. In an event history analysis of 157 nation-states from 1975 to 1998, we assess how various national and transnational factors have affected the timing and the type of the institutional changes these states have made. Our findings support the claim that the diffusion of gender-mainstreaming mechanisms has been facilitated by the role played by transnational networks, in particular by the transnational feminist movement. Further, they suggest a major shift in the nature and the locus of global politics and national policymaking.

Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics

Abstract: Instead of assuming that all actors are equally likely to clash, and that they do so independently of previous clashes, rivalry analysis can focus on the small number of feuding dyads that cause much of the trouble in the international system. But the value added of this approach will hinge in part on how rivalries are identified. Rivalry dyads are usually identified by satisfying thresholds in the frequency of militarized disputes occurring within some prespecified interval of time. But this approach implies a number of analytical problems including the possibility that rivalry analyses are simply being restricted to a device for distinguishing between states that engage in frequent and infrequent conflict. An alternative approach defines rivalry as a perceptual categorizing process in which actors identify which states are sufficiently threatening competitors to qualify as enemies. A systematic approach to identifying these strategic rivalries is elaborated. The outcome, 174 rivalries in existence between 1816 and 1999 are named and compared to the rivalry identification lists produced by three dispute density approaches. The point of the comparison is not necessarily to assert the superiority of one approach over others as it is to highlight the very real costs and benefits associated with different operational assumptions. The question must also be raised whether all approaches are equally focused on what we customarily mean by rivalries. Moreover, in the absence of a consensus on basic concepts and measures, rivalry findings will be anything but additive even if the subfield continues to be monopolized by largely divergent dispute density approaches. The analysis of rivalry in world politics possesses some considerable potential for revolutionizing the study of conflict. Rather than assume all actors are equally likely to engage in conflictual relations, a focus on rivalries permits analysts to focus in turn on the relatively small handful of actors who, demonstrably, are the ones most likely to generate conflict vastly disproportionate to their numbers. For instance, strategic rivals, a conceptualization that will be developed further in this article, opposed each other in 58 (77.3 percent) of 75 wars since 1816. If we restrict our attention to the twentieth century, strategic rivals opposed one another in 41 (87.2 percent) of 47 wars. A focus on the post-1945 era yields an opposing rival ratio of 21 (91.3 percent) of 23 wars. Moreover, their conflicts are not independent across time-another frequent and major assumption in conflict studies. They are part of an historical process in which a pair of states create Author's note: The strategic rivalry data were collected with support from a National Science Foundation grant. The present article has benefited from the criticisms of three reviewers, including Paul Diehl who finally has been allowed to review a rivalry paper.

Money with a Mean Streak? Foreign Economic Penetration and Government Respect for Human Rights in Developing Countries

Abstract: This study examines the relationship between foreign economic capital and the level of government respect for two types of human rights in developing countries. Two opposing schools of thought offer explanations as to what this relationship might be like. According to the liberal neoclassical school, the acceptance of liberal economic doctrine will provide positive political benefits to developing countries. The “dependency” school, on the other hand, argues that because ties between core and periphery elites give governments in developing nations an incentive to repress, human rights conditions will worsen as foreign economic penetration increases. The results of previous empirical queries into this matter have been mixed. In contrast to most studies, we focus on a broader measure of foreign economic capital, including foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, debt, and official development assistance. Using ordered logit analysis on a cross-national sample of forty-three developing countries from 1981 to 1995, we discover systematic evidence of an association between foreign economic penetration and government respect for two types of human rights, physical integrity rights and political rights and civil liberties. Of particular interest is the finding that both foreign direct investment and portfolio investment are reliably associated with increased government respect for human rights.

Contentious Issues and World Politics: The Management of Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816-1992

Abstract: This article studies the management of territorial claims using an issue-based approach that reconceptualizes processes of interstate conflict and cooperation as reflecting contention over issues. Hypotheses on issue management techniques are tested using newly collected data from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) research project. Empirical analysis of territorial claims in the Western Hemisphere supports the general model, with issue salience and past issue interactions systematically affecting states' choices between peaceful and militarized techniques for managing or settling their contentious issues. In particular, action over territorial claims is most likely when more valuable territory is at stake, in the aftermath of militarized conflict, and when recent peaceful settlement attempts have failed. Third parties are more likely to become involved in nonbinding activities when the claim appears more threatening to regional or global stability, and submission of claims to binding third-party decisions is most likely between adversaries that have begun to build up a legacy of successful agreements. The article concludes with a discussion of directions for future research on territory and on other issues.

Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict

Abstract: Huntington's (1993a, 1993b, 1996) clash of civilizations thesis suggests that states belonging to different civilizations are more likely to become involved in conflict with one another. To evaluate the empirical accuracy of Huntington's claims, we examined the relationship between civilization membership and interstate war between 1816 and 1992. We find that civilization membership was not significantly associated with the onset of interstate war during the Cold War era (1946–1988), which is consistent with one aspect of Huntington's thesis; however, we also find that for the pre–Cold War period (1816–1945) states of similar civilizations were more likely to fight each other than were those of different civilizations, which contradicts Huntington's thesis. Most importantly, our analysis reveals that during the post–Cold War era (1989–1992), the period in which Huntington contends that the clash of civilizations should be most apparent, civilization membership was not significantly associated with the probability of interstate war. All told, our findings challenge Huntington's claims and seriously undermine the policy recommendations that devolve from his clash of civilizations thesis.

Political Freedom, Political Instability, and Policy Uncertainty: A Study of Political Institutions and Private Investment in Developing Countries

Abstract: This paper examines whether democracy and other major characteristics of political institutions have any significant consequences for private investment. I isolate three political determinants that may affect property rights and private investment: political freedom, political instability, and policy uncertainty. The major findings in this paper can be characterized as follows: Political freedom promotes private investment, particularly through the channel of improving human capital formation. Political instability, as measured by the variability of political freedom, has a negative effect on private investment. Finally, policy uncertainty, as measured by the variability of government capacity, adversely affects private investment. These findings have been tested rigorously through using variables controlling for both domestic and international conditions.

Institutional Effects on State Behavior: Convergence and Divergence

Abstract: We develop a new typology for examination of the effects of international institutions on member states' behavior. Some institutions lead to convergence of members' practices, whereas others result, often for unintended reasons, in divergence. We hypothesize that the observed effect of institutions depends on the level of externalities to state behavior, the design of the institution, and variation in the organization and access of private interests that share the goals of the institution. We illustrate these propositions with examples drawn from international institutions for development assistance, protection of the ozone layer, and completion of the European Union's internal market. We find that significant externalities and appropriately designed institutions lead to convergence of state behavior, whereas divergence can result from the absence of these conditions and the presence of heterogeneity in domestic politics.

Global Economic Patterns and Personal Integrity Rights After the Cold War

Abstract: With the end of the Cold War economic issues moved to the fore of the international agenda. The integration of markets, dominated by multinational corporations and orchestrated by international financial institutions, has many concerned for the political and economic rights of the common citizen. This is a comprehensive cross-national study examining the effect of globalization on the attainment of the subgroup of human rights known as personal integrity rights. The impact of global economic patterns on the attainment of these rights is mixed.

Feminism and Constructivism: Worlds Apart or Sharing the Middle Ground?

Abstract: The discipline of international relations (IR) is witnessing a “constructivist turn.” In this article, we argue that the new preoccupation with constructivism provides a unique opportunity to further understanding between feminism and the IR mainstream. Feminism and constructivism share a commitment to an ontology of becoming that can serve as a common basis for conversation. Yet there are also profound differences between feminists and constructivists. First, most IR feminists approach gender and power as integral elements in processes of construction, whereas most constructivists consider power to be external to such processes. This failure to conceptualize power and gender as social and pervasive leads constructivists to miss an important part of the empirical reality of power politics. Second, constructivists tend to ignore the implications of a postpositivist epistemology, whereas for feminists the question of “Who knows?” is crucial. We argue that the constructivist failure to problematize the research process as a social (and therefore political) process of construction is logically inconsistent with an ontology of becoming. We introduce empirical materials to illustrate the advantages of feminist approaches. We hope to advance a dialogue between feminism and constructivism because the two approaches add to each other and in combination can yield better theoretical and empirical understandings of the world.

How Americans Think about Trade: Reconciling Conflicts among Money, Power, and Principles

Abstract: Trade has again emerged as a controversial issue in America, yet we know little about the ideas that guide American thinking on these questions. By combining traditional survey methods with experimental manipulation of problem content, this study explores the ideational landscape among elite Americans and pays particular attention to how elite Americans combine their ideas about commerce with their ideas about national security and social justice. We find that most American leaders think like intuitive neoclassical economists and that only a minority think along intuitive neorealist or Rawlsian lines. Among the mass public, in contrast, a majority make judgments like intuitive neorealists and intuitive Rawlsians. Although elite respondents see international institutions as promising vehicles in principle, in practice they favor exploiting America's advantage in bilateral bargaining power over granting authority to the World Trade Organization. The distribution of these ideas in America is not arrayed neatly along traditional ideological divisions. To understand the ideational landscape, it is necessary to identify how distinctive mental models-mercantilist, neorealist, egalitarian, and neoclassical economic-sensitize or desensitize people to particular aspects of geopolitical problems, an approach we call cognitive interactionism.

Risk Aversion in International Relations Theory

Abstract: When international relations writers use the idea of risk aversion, they either leave it undefined or cite the economics conception, that the decision-maker has a concave utility function for the goal. However, in the international context the goal is typically not money or any other objectively measurable quantity, and in this case the concept of concavity is meaningless. This article gives two definitions of risk aversion that are “non-metric” in the sense that they do not require such a quantity. The first, comparative risk aversion , specifies the relative degree of aversion but does not specify a zero point. The second concept, multiattribute risk aversion , does the reverse, separating risk-averters from risk-seekers in an absolute sense without making comparisons within each group. The arguments imply significant revisions of work on historical case studies using prospect theory and Fearon's categorization of rationalist explanations for war. It indicates that countries might be unable to negotiate their way out of a war because certain kinds of disputes, especially those over symbols or religious places, often generate risk-seeking behavior.

Militarized Interstate Disputes and United States Uses of Force

Abstract: Research on questions such as whether national leaders use force in the international arena to divert attention from problems at home depends on a valid and reliable list of the incidents in which various states have used military force. In the case of the United States, several data sets have been used for this purpose. This research note compares two widely used data sets, the militarized interstate disputes (MID) data, which cover disputes involving all states between 1816 and 1992, and the data originally compiled by Stephen Kaplan and Barry Blechman, which cover only the United States since World War II. This comparison indicates that, in spite of its usefulness for other conflict research, the MID data are not appropriate for analyses of U.S. decisions to use force, including tests of the diversionary hypothesis. The MID data set excludes several categories of incidents relevant to major theoretical arguments about the use of force and includes many irrelevant incidents. These problems are likely to apply to similar analyses of other states as well. The Blechman and Kaplan data set also excludes some relevant events, but its omissions are less consequential. We offer a revised list of United States uses of force between 1870 and 1995.

Prospect Theory and the Cuban Missile Crisis

Abstract: This article tests the predictions of expected-utility and prospect theories against the most important dimensions of the Cuban missile crisis. Largely through use of the most recently released information on the crisis from the American and Soviet governments, I attempt to ascertain the anticipated benefits, costs, and probabilities of success associated with each of the major policy choices that the key leaders in both superpowers perceived before each of the major decisions throughout the crisis was made. Using this information and the logic of extensive-form game-theoretic models of choice, I construct a baseline for expected-utility theory that helps us to understand when prospect or expected-utility theory provides the better explanation for a particular decision. Prospect theory predicts that when individuals perceive themselves to be experiencing losses at the time they make a decision, and when their probability estimates associated with their principal policy options are in the moderate to high range, they will tend to make excessively risky, non–value maximizing choices. I find that the evidence for the Cuban missile crisis supports this prediction for the most important decisions made by both Khrushchev and Kennedy.

Time Remembered: A Dynamic Model of Interstate Interaction

Abstract: Over time, states form relationships. These relationships, mosaics of past interactions, provide political leaders with information about how states are likely to behave in the future. Although intuitive, this claim holds important implications for the manner in which we construct and evaluate empirically our expectations about interstate behavior. Empirical analyses of interstate relations implicitly assume that the units of analysis are independent. Theories of interstate interaction are often cast in the absence of historical context. In this article we construct a dynamic model of interstate interaction that we believe will assist scholars in empirical and theoretical studies by incorporating a substantively interpretable historical component into their models of interstate relations. Our conceptual model includes both conflictual and cooperative components, and exhibits the basic properties of growth and decay that characterize dyadic relationships. In an empirical exposition, we derive a continuous measure of interstate conflict from the conflictual component of the model. We rely on Oneal and Russett's (1997) analysis of dyadic conflict for the period 1950–1985 as a benchmark, and examine whether the inclusion of our measure of interstate conflict significantly improves our ability to predict militarized conflict. We find empirical support for this hypothesis, indicating that our continuous measure of interstate conflict significantly augments a well-known statistical model of dyadic militarized conflict. Our findings reinforce the assertion that historical processes in interstate relationships represent substantively important elements in models of interstate behavior rather than econometric nuisances.

Democracy and the Preparation for War: Does Regime Type Affect States' Anticipation of Casualties?

Abstract: Immanuel Kant and more recent expositors of the democratic peace thesis suggest that citizens in a republic sanction leaders for resorting to war because, in part, citizens are loath to shed their own blood. This Kantian thesis in turn implies substitution. Just as consumers confronted with price shocks shift consumption to less affected goods rather than simply curtailing consumption, democratic leaders facing retribution for casualties can limit losses, not just by avoiding military contests, but also by substituting capital (ships, tanks, aircraft) for labor (soldiers, sailors, airmen) in the provision of security. A simple consumer choice model shows that citizens' leverage over leaders implies that democracies should consume disproportionately more capital in preparing for—and conducting—defense. Numerous anecdotes assert that democracies do shelter labor with capital, especially during war, but tests of defense-factor allocations on factor endowments, regime-type, and other variables show that defense-factor usage is explained by basic economic theory and not by democracy.

Bilateral Import, Export, and Conflict/Cooperation Simultaneity

Abstract: A mathematical model of dyadic trade and the level of political conflict/cooperation is developed and empirically tested. The model extends the literature in three ways. First, the bilateral trade quantities and the level of conflict/cooperation are simultaneously determined. Second, the commonly used unitary state actor is replaced by a government, an exporter, and an importer in each country in a dyad. Third, action-reaction conflict/cooperation dynamics are incorporated into the model. The model predicts that the effect of bilateral trade quantity on conflict/cooperation and the effect of conflict/cooperation on the monetary value of trade may be positive or negative, whereas the effect of conflict on trade quantity will be negative. These predictions depend on certain conditions, heretofore unrecognized in the literature. The empirical test employs statistical methods, and the results generally support the model's predictions. Overall, this paper suggests that contemporary trade and conflict theories may miss important elements, pointing out the need for richer, more microfounded models.

Repetitive Military Challenges and Recurrent International Conflicts, 1918–1994

Abstract: This article seeks to shed light on the problem of recurrent international conflicts. It does so by investigating the relative frequency of a particular class of such conflicts, those in which the challenger in a given conflict is the challenger in the next conflict involving the same two countries. I demonstrate that these “repetitive military challenges” constitute a significant majority of several types of recurrent conflicts. I also develop a Cox proportional hazards model of the risk that, after a given conflict, the defender is re-challenged by the original challenger, a conflict that is usually but not always a repetitive challenge. This analysis finds that a range of systemic, dyadic, and national conditions contribute to the risk of re-challenges. One key finding is that after low-severity conflicts, democratic defenders are at a greater risk than are nondemocratic defenders to be the victims of re-challenges.

The Role of Communication in Global Civil Society: Forces, Processes, Prospects

Abstract: The author examines the concept of global civil society (GCS) through the use of theoretical tools and empirical evidence related to the study of International Communication. He demonstrates that scholarship on GCS tends to simplify the process through which information becomes knowledge and that the state system–GCS relationship often is presented in terms of an ahistorical power dichotomy. In relation to these problems, what the author calls “GCS progressives” tend to underplay political-economic factors shaping GCS, including the implications of structural power; they tend to emphasize the importance of spatial integration while neglecting related changes in temporal norms; and, more essentially, they often under-theorize the importance of socialization processes and relatively unmediated relationships in the ongoing construction of “reality.” The author concludes that through a more focused analysis—concentrating on how new technologies can be used to organize nationally and locally, and on lifestyle changes associated with communications developments—more precise analyses and fruitful strategies for GCS progressives may emerge.

Mapping Internationalization: Domestic and Regional Impacts

Abstract: This article introduces a conceptual design for mapping the domestic impact of internationalization. It proposes that internationalization leads to a trimodal domestic coalitional profile and advances a set of expectations about the regional effects of each profile. Aggregate data from ninety-eight coalitions in nineteen states over five regions suggests that between 1948 and 1993 the three coalitional types differed in their international behavior. Internationalizing coalitions deepened trade openness, expanded exports, attracted foreign investments, restrained military-industrial complexes, initiated fewer international crises, eschewed weapons of mass destruction, deferred to international economic and security regimes, and strove for regional cooperative orders that reinforced those objectives. Backlash coalitions restricted or reduced trade openness and reliance on exports, curbed foreign investment, built expansive military complexes, developed weapons of mass destruction, challenged international regimes, exacerbated civic-nationalist, religious, or ethnic differentiation within their region, and were prone to initiate international crises. Hybrids straddled the grand strategies of their purer types, intermittently striving for economic openness, contracting the military complex, initiating international crises, and cooperating regionally and internationally, but neither forcefully nor coherently. These findings have significant implications for international relations theory and our incipient understanding of internationalization. Further extensions of the conceptual framework can help capture international effects that are yet to be fully integrated into the study of the domestic politics of coalition formation.

Military Power and Food Security: A Cross‐National Analysis of Less‐Developed Countries, 1970–1990

Abstract: Addressing the longstanding debate over the social impact of military power and recent discussions of military-induced famine the authors conduct a panel analysis of aggregate food supply and child hunger rates in 75-79 less-developed countries (LDCs). Distinguishing between militarization as the growth of military resources and militarism as the use of military force to handle political conflicts the authors show that militarization is both beneficial and detrimental to food security whereas militarism is consistently detrimental. Arms imports and associated increased military spending plus praetorianism and military repression reduce food security whereas increased military participation and arms production boost food security. Increased food supply reduces child hunger and is largely confined to the more developed of the LDCs. These military power effects show net economic growth which "trickles down" to improve food supply and reduce child hunger among the more developed LDCs reflecting the growth of global economic inequality. Contrary to views that see militarization as a single unified process use of armed force is not strongly rooted in either praetorianism or militarization. (authors)

Political Consequences of the New Inequality

Abstract: This article proposes agendas for teaching and research about shifting global patterns of equality and inequality, a very different agenda than was appropriate when the last undergraduate professor was president of ISA, almost forty years ago. Today, unlike in that Cold War world, formal democracy is flourishing, state power is diminishing, gender inequality has diminished, and income inequality has risen. Consequences of these new patterns that demand our attention as teachers and scholars include: (1) more frequent protracted social conflicts, (2) a newly politicized sphere of international public health, (3) the new global gender politics, (4) the new global politics of the super-rich, and (5) the new politics and ethics of the world's privileged, a group that includes most ISA members and most of our students. Our responsibilities as teachers have grown, in part, because popular media present a decreasingly coherent picture of each of these patterns; and that incoherence, itself, may help sustain global inequalities.

Asset Specificity and State Subsidies in Industrialized Countries

Abstract: Why do national governments in industrialized countries subsidize many of their industries? Borrowing insights from literature on transaction cost economics and international trade, I build a model which tests the hypothesis that under threat of international competition disbursement of state subsidies varies systematically with the degree of asset (factor) specificity employed in a national economy. Asset specificity refers to the cost of moving factors (assets) from one activity to the next. I pool annual data on state subsidies in thirteen OECD countries during the period 1990–93 and regress them on two measures of asset specificity (physical and human capital) in the face of competition from abroad. Physical capital exercises a significant u-shaped effect on total and sectoral subsidies. Human capital has a weak negative effect on horizontal subsidies. The results extend the literature on asset specificity and trade in two ways. First, they provide empirical support in favor of the argument that asset specificity and subsidy protection are related. While theoretical claims concerning asset specificity abound, the literature is generally short of empirical studies. Second, asset specificity helps determine the scope of subsidies.

Constructing NAFTA: Myth, Representation, and the Discursive Construction of U.S. Foreign Policy

Abstract: The passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement in November 1993 signified the acceptance of Mexico as an equal trading partner with the United States and Canada. However, accepting Mexico as an equal partner challenged a deeply ingrained U.S. image of Mexico as inferior, childlike, dependent, and suspicious. How was it possible for the U.S. public and its congressional representatives to accept equal economic integration with a country that embodied such a negative image? Addressing this dilemma through a constructivist approach, this article argues that the existing image of Mexico remained intact. The passage of NAFTA instead resulted from a discursive construction of NAFTA that emphasized a positive U.S. self-image through American myths thereby allowing the simultaneous acceptance of Mexico as inferior and as an equal trading partner. American myths and other representational elements constructed NAFTA for the American public and created a policy success for President Clinton. This article relies on an empirical investigation of newspaper advertisements to demonstrate how myths contributed to the discursive construction of NAFTA.

National Preferences and International Institutions: Evidence from European Monetary Integration

Abstract: How do states reach agreement on creating or changing international institutions? The dominant theory of international cooperation—institutional theory—specifies how states with shared interests use institutions to realize joint gains and to minimize the possibility of defection. But institutional theory has little to say about when states will hold the shared interests that lead them to create international institutions in the first place. I evaluate two general explanations of national preferences regarding international institutions against the record of attempts to institutionalize monetary cooperation in the European Union since the 1970s. Drawing on central insights of the constructivist tradition, idea diffusion theory holds that national preferences converged on those of German decision-makers by the late 1980s and that European governments willingly accepted German terms for monetary union. Recognition that German institutions and policies produced superior economic outcomes drove this change in preferences. A domestic-politics explanation holds that preferences varied because of differences in the structure of the domestic political economy and the political costs of achieving price stability, which was one of Germany's conditions for monetary integration. Lower inflation in the late 1980s reduced these costs enough for French and Italian governments to pursue a monetary union that included Germany. The evidence indicates that idea diffusion had little influence on the development of European monetary institutions. Governments held and advocated distinctly different preferences regarding such institutions from the late 1970s through the mid-1990s. The finding that domestic politics rather than idea diffusion drives national preferences challenges some of the claims of recent constructivist literature in international politics about the importance of communication and ideas in promoting cooperation. In the conclusion I discuss how the findings of this article might be squared with constructivism by paying more attention to domestic politics.

The Intra-National Struggle to Define “US”: External Involvement as a Two-Way Street

Abstract: Three perspectives on the causes of communal conflict are visible in extant work: a focus on ancient hatreds, on leaders, or on the context that leaders “find” themselves in. Leaders therefore have all the power to mobilize people to fight (or not to) or leaders are driven by circumstantial opportunities or the primordial desires of the masses to resist peace or coexistence with historical enemies. Analysts who focus on leaders or context recognize that external actors affect internal conflicts, but little systematic research has explored the processes relating the domestic politics of nationalist mobilization to factors in the international arena. How does the international arena affect the competition among leaders? How do skillful leaders draw in external actors to lend credibility to their own views? This article asserts that leaders compete to frame identity and mission, and explores the degree to which international factors affect whose “definitions of the situation” are successful in precipitating mobilization shifts among potential followers. A unique finding of this longitudinal study of Northern Ireland is that the role played by international institutions and actors is affected by how domestic actors perceive, cultivate, and bring attention to the linkages between the two spheres.