Showing papers in "Journal of Conflict Resolution in 2007"
Abstract: Since 1989, international efforts to end protracted conflicts have included sustained investments in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of combatants. Yet while policy analyst...
390 citations
TL;DR: In the spirit of Lewis Richardson's original study of the statistics of deadly conflicts, the authors studied the frequency and severity of terrorist attacks worldwide since 1968 and showed that these events ar...
Abstract: In the spirit of Lewis Richardson’s original study of the statistics of deadly conflicts, we study the frequency and severity of terrorist attacks worldwide since 1968. We show that these events ar...
366 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a model of cultural differentiation that combines the traditional mechanisms of homophily and influence with a third mechanism of network homophiness, in which network structure co-evolves with cultural interaction.
Abstract: Studies of cultural differentiation have shown that social mechanisms that normally lead to cultural convergence—homophily and influence—can also explain how distinct cultural groups can form. However, this emergent cultural diversity has proven to be unstable in the face of cultural drift—small errors or innovations that allow cultures to change from within. The authors develop a model of cultural differentiation that combines the traditional mechanisms of homophily and influence with a third mechanism of network homophily, in which network structure co-evolves with cultural interaction. Results show that in certain regions of the parameter space, these co-evolutionary dynamics can lead to patterns of cultural diversity that are stable in the presence of cultural drift. The authors address the implications of these findings for understanding the stability of cultural diversity in the face of increasing technological trends toward globalization.
364 citations
TL;DR: The authors examines states' decisions to commit to human rights treaties and argues that the effect of a treaty on a state is largely determined by the domestic enforcement of the treaty and the treaty's collateral consequences.
Abstract: This article examines states' decisions to commit to human rights treaties. It argues that the effect of a treaty on a state—and hence the state's willingness to commit to it—is largely determined by the domestic enforcement of the treaty and the treaty's collateral consequences. These broad claims give rise to several specific predictions. For example, states with less democratic institutions will be no less likely to commit to human rights treaties if they have poor human rights records, because there is little prospect that the treaties will be enforced. Conversely, states with more democratic institutions will be less likely to commit to human rights treaties if they have poor human rights records—precisely because treaties are likely to lead to changes in behavior. These predictions are tested by examining the practices of more than 160 countries over several decades.
331 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors model foreign-aid-for-policy deals, assuming that leaders want to maximize their time in office, and their actions are shaped by two political institutions, their selectorate and winning coalition.
Abstract: We model foreign-aid-for-policy deals, assuming that leaders want to maximize their time in office. Their actions are shaped by two political institutions, their selectorate and winning coalition. Leaders who depend on a large coalition, a relatively small selectorate, and who extract valuable policy concessions from prospective recipients are likely to give aid. Prospective recipients are likely to get aid if they have few resources, depend on a small coalition and a large selectorate, and the policy concession sought by the donor is not too politically costly. The amount of aid received, if any, increases as the recipient leader’s coalition increases, the selectorate decreases, the issue’s salience increases, and the domestic resources increase. The theory explains why many Third World people hate the United States and want to live there. Empirical tests using the U.S. Agency for International Development data for the post‐World War II years support the model’s predictions.
315 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the determinants of proliferation and the policy option for nuclear weapons proliferation and present diverse opinions about these determinants and their impact on the policy options.
Abstract: Nuclear weapons proliferation is a topic of intense interest and concern among both academics and policy makers. Diverse opinions exist about the determinants of proliferation and the policy option...
281 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the effects of leadership on the private provision of a public good when group members are heterogeneously endowed and show that the presence of a leader increases average contribution levels but less so than in case of homogeneous endowments.
Abstract: We study the effects of leadership on the private provision of a public good when group members are heterogeneously endowed. Leadership is implemented as a sequential public goods game where one group member contributes first and all the others follow. Our results show that the presence of a leader increases average contribution levels but less so than in case of homogeneous endowments. Leadership is almost ineffective, though, if participants do not know the distribution of endowments. Granting the leaders exclusion power does not lead to significantly higher contributions.
205 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that the effect of economic punishment is conditional on a state's political institutions and that economic sanctions sometimes succeed, but often fail, to produce a policy change in a country.
Abstract: Why do economic sanctions sometimes succeed, but often fail, to produce a policy change? The authors argue that the effect of economic punishment is conditional on a state's political institutions
195 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the impact of earthquakes on intrastate conflict through a statistical analysis of 185 countries over the period from 1975 to 2002, and found that earthquakes not only increase the likelihood of conflict, but their effects are greater for higher magnitude earthquakes striking more densely populated areas of countries with lower gross domestic products.
Abstract: Although many scholars, policy makers, and relief organizations suggest that natural disasters bring groups together and dampen conflicts, earthquakes can actually stimulate intrastate conflict by producing scarcities in basic resources, particularly in developing countries where the competition for scarce resources is most intense. Capitalizing on a natural experiment design, this study examines the impact of earthquakes on intrastate conflict through a statistical analysis of 185 countries over the period from 1975 to 2002. The analysis indicates that earthquakes not only increase the likelihood of conflict, but that their effects are greater for higher magnitude earthquakes striking more densely populated areas of countries with lower gross domestic products as well as preexisting conflicts. These results suggest that disaster recovery efforts must pay greater attention to the conflict-producing potential of earthquakes and undertake certain measures, including strengthening security procedures, to pre...
178 citations
TL;DR: This article conducted quantitative tests on the relationship between regime type and suicide terrorism for 1980 to 2003 and found that in general, regime type is uncorrelated with suicide terrorism, but the statistical significance of this finding is limited, and its substantive impact is marginal.
Abstract: This article conducts quantitative tests on the relationship between regime type and suicide terrorism for 1980 to 2003. We present the recently popularized argument that democracies are more likely to experience suicide terrorism and a new hypothesis that mixed regimes are especially likely to experience suicide terrorism. We offer several improvements in research design, including using more controls, the nation-year as the unit of analysis, and more appropriate statistical techniques. Using both Freedom House and Polity data, we find that in general, regime type is uncorrelated with suicide terrorism. We do find that there is a statistically significant interaction between regime type and the number of religiously distinct minorities at risk (MARs) with suicide terrorism, but the statistical significance of this finding is limited, and its substantive impact is marginal. We also find that national size, Islam, national experience with suicide terrorism, and global experience with suicide terrorism affe...
168 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explored the conditions for negotiated settlements and found that if the belligerents' demands are explicitly anchored in a religious tradition, they will come to perceive the conflicting issues as indivisible, and the conflict will be less likely to be settled through negotiations.
Abstract: A growing literature has started to explore the relationship between religious dimensions and the escalation, duration, and termination of armed conflicts. This study explores the conditions for negotiated settlements. The author argues that if the belligerents' demands are explicitly anchored in a religious tradition, they will come to perceive the conflicting issues as indivisible, and the conflict will be less likely to be settled through negotiations. Utilizing unique data on the primary parties' religious demands and identities, all intrastate conflict-dyads in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), 1989-2003, are examined. The study finds that if governments or rebel-groups have made explicit religious claims, these conflict-dyads are significantly less likely than others to be terminated through negotiated settlement. By contrast, whether the primary parties come from different religious traditions does not affect the chances for negotiated settlement.
TL;DR: This paper argued that natural resource exploitation promoted conflict in Aceh only because it became entangled in wider processes of identity construction and was reinterpreted back to the population by ethnic political entrepreneurs in a way that legitimated violence.
Abstract: This article makes a case for extending social constructivist approaches to the study of grievance in natural resource conflicts. It does this by analyzing the separatist conflict in Aceh, Indonesia, which is often portrayed as a paradigmatic resource conflict due to the importance of the natural gas industry there. It is argued here, however, that natural resource exploitation promoted conflict in Aceh only because it became entangled in wider processes of identity construction and was reinterpreted back to the population by ethnic political entrepreneurs in a way that legitimated violence. Rather than any intrinsic qualities of natural resource extraction, the key factor was the presence of an appropriate identity-based collective action frame. The argument is strengthened by comparison with two other resource-rich Indonesian provinces where resource extraction patterns were similar to Aceh but where no protracted violence occurred because similar identity resources were not available to local actors.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors model the trade-off between security and intragroup communication faced by terrorists and derive the anticipated changes in network structure and the consequent changes in the type, complexity, and success rate of potential terrorist attacks.
Abstract: After the events of 9/11, U.S. counterterrorism became more proactive in that the Patriot Act allowed the authorities far more freedom to directly attack terrorist network structures. We argue that rational terrorists will attempt to thwart such policies and restructure themselves to be less penetrable. We model the trade-off between security and intragroup communication faced by terrorists. The model is used to derive the anticipated changes in network structure and the consequent changes in the type, complexity, and success rate of potential terrorist attacks.
TL;DR: This paper found that support for community is most important for predicting support for humanitarian military operations, while hierarchy and community are more important for supporting military operations in the US. But they also found that it is generally inappropriate to distinguish between the two domains.
Abstract: Although there is increasing evidence of a relationship between domestic and foreign policy attitudes among American elites, we have less of an idea about why these sets of attitudes cohere. The answer lies in a better understanding of what we mean when we talk about “left” and “right” or “liberal” and “conservative.” Drawing on the literature on rights theory, partisan cleavages, and ideological continua, I posit the existence of two core values, hierarchy and community, that should manifest themselves both at home and abroad. I perform a principal components analysis on data capturing both the domestic and foreign policy attitudes of American elites. The results indicate an almost identical structure of attitudes in both domains, indicating that it is generally inappropriate to distinguish between the two. Using factor scores in a series of logistic regressions, I demonstrate that support for community is most important for predicting support for humanitarian military operations, while hierarchy and com...
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors develop a theory focusing on how states with tremendous advantages in capabilities and resources are often unable to attain even limited objectives vis-a-vis much weaker adversaries.
Abstract: Why are states with tremendous advantages in capabilities and resources often unable to attain even limited objectives vis-a-vis much weaker adversaries? The theory I develop focuses on how the nat...
TL;DR: In this paper, the effects of international political conflict on trade are less severe in cases where internationalist economic interests have relatively strong political clout domestically, and further evidence is provided via a brief case study of Mainland China-Taiwan relations.
Abstract: Limited commercial integration between India and Pakistan or within much of the Middle East suggests that conflicting political interests between countries can have a detrimental effect on their economic relations. But rapidly growing economic ties between Mainland China and Taiwan show that commerce can also flourish even in the presence of very hostile relations. I explore this variation and hypothesize that the effects of international political conflict on trade are less severe in cases where internationalist economic interests have relatively strong political clout domestically. Simple quantitative tests on a sample of seventy-six countries over the years 1961 to 1992 are supportive; further evidence is provided via a brief case study of Mainland China-Taiwan relations.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors test the competing arguments using three laboratory experiments conducted in two different countries (Spain and the United States) and find that a weak position in terms of military power increases threat perception, as realists predict, while a shared identity decreases threat perception.
Abstract: Realists in international relations and realistic conflict theorists in social psychology argue that the perception of threat in intergroup conflict is a function of power asymmetries between groups. In contrast, social constructivists and social identity theorists argue that a shared sense of identity can reduce perceptions of intergroup threat. In this article, we test these competing arguments using three laboratory experiments conducted in two different countries (Spain and the United States). Four findings emerge from the experiments: (1) a weak position in terms of military power increases threat perception, as realists predict; (2) shared identity decreases threat perception, as constructivists predict; (3) an interactive relationship between power and identity appears in two of the three studies; and (4) shared identity increases cooperation in economic policy areas.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate public good provision in normal and privileged groups with and without decentralized punishment and show that privileged groups are relatively inefective in using costly sanctions to increase everyone's contributions.
Abstract: In public good provision, privileged groups enjoy the advantage that some of its members flnd it optimal to supply a positive amount of the public good. However, their inherent asymmetric nature may make the enforcement of cooperative behavior through informal sanctioning harder to accomplish. In this paper we experimentally investigate public good provision in normal and privileged groups with and without decentralized punishment. We flnd that compared to normal groups, privileged groups are relatively inefiective in using costly sanctions to increase everyone’s contributions. Punishment is less targeted towards strong free-riders and they exhibit a weaker increase in contributions after being punished. Thus, we show that privileged groups are not as privileged as they initially seem.
TL;DR: This paper found that approval of terrorism is fostered by negative attitudes toward actors considered responsible for the political and economic status quo in Algeria and Jordan, and that the observed relationships are not country specific and may apply more generally.
Abstract: Findings from representative national surveys in Algeria and Jordan show that neither religious orientations, judgments about Western culture, nor economic circumstances account for variance in approval of terrorist acts against U.S. targets. Alternatively, in both countries, approval of terrorism against the United States is disproportionately likely among men and women with negative judgments about their own government and about U.S. foreign policy. Taken together, these findings suggest that approval of terrorism is fostered by negative attitudes toward actors considered responsible for the political and economic status quo. Given that Algeria and Jordan have had different experiences with respect to terrorism and also differ in demographic, political, and economic structure, identical findings from these dissimilar countries suggest that the observed relationships are not country specific and may apply more generally.
TL;DR: In this paper, a model that demonstrates the differences between expected value and prospect theory when applied to strategic interaction is presented. But this model is restricted to the case of power-based, equity, variants of the status quo, and extreme I-want-it-all reference points.
Abstract: Despite many applications of prospect theory's concepts to explain political and strategic phenomena, formal analyses of strategic problems using prospect theory are rare. Using Fearon's model of bargaining, Tversky and Kahneman's value function, and an existing probability weighting function, I construct a model that demonstrates the differences between expected value and prospect theory when applied to strategic interaction. Critically important to this demonstration is an examination of different types of reference points that make sense for bargaining problems. Four types of reference points are discussed and analyzed: power-based, equity, variants of the status quo, and extreme ``I-want-it-all'' reference points. Each of these types of reference points produce different bargaining behavior at the individual level and in combination with the type of reference point of the other actor. Additionally, I demonstrate that bargaining failure is possible for this model under complete and perfect information ...
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study conflict on multiple fronts and show that even if there is a defense advantage at each of them, the payoff of the defending player is zero if the number of fronts is large.
Abstract: The authors study conflict on multiple fronts. A defending player needs to successfully defend all fronts, and an attacker needs to win at only one. Multiple fronts result in a considerable disadvantage for the defending player, and even if there is a defense advantage at each of them, the payoff of the defending player is zero if the number of fronts is large. With some positive probability, in the equilibrium defending players surrender without expending effort. © 2007 Sage Publications.
TL;DR: The long history of experimental research on the prisoner's dilemma (PD) has primarily used a methodology that eliminates cues to participants as discussed by the authors, which has been interpreted as an attempt to eliminate participants' cues.
Abstract: The long history of experimental research on the prisoner's dilemma (PD) has primarily used a methodology that eliminates cues to participants. Researchers, however, have interpreted participants' ...
TL;DR: In this paper, a quasi-hyperbolic discount model is applied to the problem of cooperation in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games, and it is shown that if actors display the widely observed tendency to highly discount the immediate future, then cooperation in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game is more difficult than Axelrod suggests.
Abstract: Although many decisions involve a stream of payoffs over time, political scientists have given little attention to how actors make the required tradeoffs between present and future payoffs, other than applying the standard exponential discounting model from economics. After summarizing the basic discounting model, we identify some of its leading behavioral anomalies—declining discount rates; preference reversals; higher discount rates for smaller payoffs than for larger payoffs and for gains than for losses; framing effects based on expectations; and a preference for ascending rather than descending sequences. We examine the leading alternative models of discounting and then apply a quasi-hyperbolic discount model to the problem of cooperation in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games. We demonstrate that if actors display the widely observed tendency to highly discount the immediate future, then cooperation in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game is more difficult than Axelrod suggests.
TL;DR: The authors developed a formal model motivated by recent literature on the informational effects of security institutions, showing that leaders have incentives to consult relatively conservative institutions, because their support convinces audiences that they should also support proposed policies.
Abstract: Scholars have devoted considerable attention to the informational role of international institutions. However, several questions about the informational aspects of institutional behavior remain underexplored: What determines how audiences respond to institutional decisions? Through what channels does information provision affect foreign policy? To answer these questions, I develop a formal model motivated by recent literature on the informational effects of security institutions. The formal model depicts information transmission between a domestic audience, an international institution, and a foreign policy maker. Statements issued by member states through the institution serve to inform the audience about the likely outcomes of its leader’s actions. The model demonstrates that leaders have incentives to consult relatively conservative institutions, because their support convinces audiences that they should also support proposed policies. Leaders face incentives to avoid the disapproval of more revisionis...
TL;DR: This paper investigated the effect of regime type on the number of civilian fatalities that states inflicted in interstate wars between 1900 and 2003 and found that democracies are significantly more likely than non-democracies to kill more than fifty thousand non-combatants.
Abstract: This article investigates the effect of regime type on the number of civilian fatalities that states inflicted in interstate wars between 1900 and 2003. As opposed to several previous studies, the author finds little support for normative arguments positing that democracies kill fewer civilians in war. In fact, the author finds that democracies are significantly more likely than nondemocracies to kill more than fifty thousand noncombatants. Democracies also kill more civilians when they are involved in wars of attrition and kill about as many (and perhaps more) noncombatants than autocracies in such wars. These findings provide qualified support for institutional arguments about democratic accountability. Other implications of the institutional view, however, are not upheld, such as the argument that democracies select easy wars that should result in few civilian casualties because they are won quickly and decisively. Finally, democracies do not appear to kill fewer civilians in more recent wars.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors develop sequential game models for key operational terrorist (how often to attack) and government (How often to execute targeted killings) decisions taken during a (counter-) terror attack.
Abstract: This article develops sequential game models for key operational terrorist (how often to attack) and government (how often to execute targeted killings) decisions taken during a (counter-) terror c...
TL;DR: The authors compare two regimes of leadership succession: the conclave regime and the divide-et-impera regime, which differ with respect to the role of supporters of the previous leader once the new leader takes power.
Abstract: Leaders compensate supporters not just for performing their duties but also to preempt an overthrow by the same supporters. We show how succession rules affect the power of leaders relative to supporters as well as the resources expended on possible succession struggles. We compare two regimes of leadership succession: the conclave regime and the divide-et-impera regime, which differ with respect to the role of supporters of the previous leader once the new leader takes power. The leadership rent is higher, and supporters receive a lower compensation in the divide-et-impera regime, as supporters have to fight harder for succession to avoid the grim outcome of loss. A leader, then, would like to induce the divide-et-impera regime even when every supporter has veto power over her leadership. © 2007 Sage Publications.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the effects of personality traits on attitudes toward foreign policy issues among the German public and found that agreeableness and openness render persons more supportive of international cooperation and more skeptical of the use of military force, whereas conscientiousness exhibits reverse effects.
Abstract: This article examines the effects of personality traits on attitudes toward foreign policy issues among the German public. Building on previous research, it argues that personality characteristics shape an individual's motivation, goals, and values, thereby providing criteria to evaluate external stimuli and affecting foreign policy opinions. An analysis of survey data from a random sample of Germans eligible to vote confirms that the personality traits play a role in attitudes toward foreign policy issues. By and large, personality affects foreign policy opinions roughly as strongly as traditional factors such as partisanship, ideology, and social background. Among the traits studied, agreeableness and openness render persons more supportive of international cooperation and more skeptical of the use of military force, whereas conscientiousness exhibits reverse effects. Thus, personality traits merit serious attention in analyses of public opinion on foreign policy.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors join the debate on trade interdependence and conflict with a reexamination of Barbieri's (1996) intriguing empirical results showing that under certain circumstances, trade interdependencies cause conflict.
Abstract: We join the debate on trade interdependence and conflict with a reexamination of Barbieri's (1996) intriguing empirical results showing that under certain circumstances, trade interdependence cause...
TL;DR: This paper examined the effects of food supply, economic growth, social stratification, and military power on child hunger in less developed countries (1990-2000) using a cross-national analysis.
Abstract: Discussions of world hunger have focused on economic growth and international food aid, assuming that food supply is the critical issue. The authors show that food access rooted in social stratification and military power is the central problem. Synthesizing the entitlement and military famine approaches to hunger, the authors examine the effects of food supply, economic growth, social stratification, and military power on child hunger in less developed countries (1990-2000) using a cross-national analysis. Child hunger is largely due to gender stratification, militarization, and armed conflict. Halting wars, expanding political rights, and improving gender equity reduce child hunger. Economic growth and programmatic international food aid reduce child hunger, but there are no benefits from increased total food supply or international emergency relief. Child hunger is an access problem best addressed by expanding social and political rights, reducing armed conflict and militarization, and improving women'...