Showing papers in "Journal of Mathematical Economics in 1982"

TL;DR: In this article, the principal can restrict himself to incentive-compatible direct coordination mechanisms, in which agents report their information to the principal, who then recommends to them decisions forming a correlated equilibrium.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore bidders' incentives to gather information in auctions, when there is one bidder with only public information and another with some private information, and find that the bidder with private information generally makes positive profits while the informed bidder's profits rise when he gathers extra information.

TL;DR: A turnpike theorem for a general equilibrium model with finitely many immortal consumers was proved in this paper. But the theorem was proved for a special case of the model with finite number of immortal consumers.

TL;DR: In a committee where cooperative voting occurs, effectivity functions describe the blocking power of coalitions as mentioned in this paper, a binary relation that says for each coalition T and each subset of outcomes B whether or not T can force the final outcome within B. The corresponding cooperative stability notion generalizes the familiar core of a simple game.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors considered an assignment game without side payments and proved the non-emptiness of the core of the game and showed the existence of a competitive equilibrium of the market model.

TL;DR: A function f :En→E is strongly convex if there exists a constant α>0 such that for all x and y, f((x+y)/2)≦ 1 2 ;f(x)+ 1 2 2 ;(y)−α|x −y|2).

TL;DR: In this paper, the problem of correct revelation is studied as a game with incomplete information where players have individual beliefs concerning other's types and general conditions on the beliefs are given which are shown to be sufficient for the existence of a Pareto-efficient mechanism for which truth-telling is a Bayesian equilibrium.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a non-cooperative strategic equilibrium for games generated by social choice functions, and fully characterize the class of functions which are directly implementable under this equilibrium concept.

TL;DR: In this paper, the existence of a quasi-equilibrium with or without the free-disposal assumption was shown. But the conditions under which a quasi equilibrium is an equilibrium were not investigated.

TL;DR: In this paper, the existence of stationary equilibria is studied by using the hemi-continuity properties of the transition correspondence rather than continuity or stability properties of some pre-chosen selection from the equilibrium correspondence.

TL;DR: In this paper, a non-linear generalization of the Perron-Frobenius theorem has been proposed, where A has a positive eigenvector x0, unique up to multiplication by a positive scalar, and for all x⩾0, Anx/|Anx| converges to x0/|x0|.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors studied two standard properties of rules for aggregating individual into social preferences: non-dictatorship and the Pareto condition, together with the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives, these are the three basic axioms of Arrow's social choice paradox.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider constrained optimization problems on the (non-reflexive) Banach Space of bounded sequences and derive sufficient conditions on the objective function and the constraints so that the Lagrangean can be represented by a summable sequence of multipliers.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors extend the concept of regularity developed by Mas-Colell and Kehoe for constant-returns production economies to economies with primary and intermediate goods.

TL;DR: In this paper, a simplicial approximation algorithm is used to find an unemployment equilibrium such that at least one commodity is not rationed, and some insight about the structure of the set of unemployment equilibria is obtained from the sequence of simplices generated by the algorithm.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider a simple business cycle model of the multiplier-accelerator type with an infinite time horizon and show that the result of present wage bargaining influences not only present incomes but also the future bargaining positions.

TL;DR: The first attempt to apply the rigorous constructive methods advocated by Errett Bishop to problems of mathematical economics was made in this paper, where the main theorem deals with the construction of a utility function representing a preference relation with an inbuilt measure of degree of preference.

TL;DR: In this paper, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem of implementation in dominant strategies has been extended to differential economic environments, and the authors characterize for quasi-linear utility functions mechanisms which are implementable in dominant strategy and in Nash strategy.

TL;DR: In this paper, the structural instability of Pareto decisive majority rules is studied and it is shown that the outcome preference will undergo major changes in structure in response to small changes in the underlying parameters.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that with the usual concavity assumptions on utilities there always exists one and only one admissible distribution scheme, which is Pareto optimal and gives each agent an expected consumption proportional to his share of the resource.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors give an example of a sequence economy, in which every sequence of selections of the temporary equilibrium correspondences determines a Markov process and the unique rational expectations equilibrium process is not Markov.

TL;DR: In this article, the minmax set is shown to shrink to a single point when the population increases smoothly enough under suitable assumptions of single peakedness and intermediate preferences, and it is shown that the set of majority winners may not always exist over a multidimensional space.

TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that the Aumann-Shapley price mechanism is continuous with respect to the quantities consumed, under quite weak assumptions on the cost function, using the theory of non-atomic games.

TL;DR: In this article, a special case of the adjustment process for competing duopolists, introduced elsewhere, is further analyzed and some exact solutions are obtained, which support the widely held belief that firms acting without co-operation and with little information will evolve towards a co-operative equilibrium.

TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that differentiability is a generic property of convex functions and not a special case of differentiability in convex convex function functions, i.e.

TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that if f (0)=0 then the non-atomic game ƒ∘μ belongs to the space p NAD for each vector μ of m nonatomic probability measures.

TL;DR: In this paper, a model of spatial barter economy with costly transportation to the CBD and a continuum of households is presented, where the notions of competitive equilibrium under spatial choice as well as under fixed assignment of households to their place of residence are introduced.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors prove the existence of a stable partition of the individuals and then present an example showing how this stable partition varies with the overall composition of the society, where trade takes place within a group.

TL;DR: In this article, two types of production economies in mixed markets are introduced, and the properties of their respective cores are investigated, and it is shown that core allocations involve exploitation of the small traders.

TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that the core is not always equal to the set of Walras allocations in an economy with production and that this equality does hold when the production correspondence exhibits constant returns to scale with respect to coalitions, or has this property locally.