Showing papers in "Mathematical Social Sciences in 2017"

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among interested agents using the concept of maximin share and characterized the cardinality of the groups for which a positive approximation of the maximin-share is possible regardless of the number of goods.

TL;DR: This paper investigates envy-free divisions in the setting where there are multiple players in each interested party and shows that a simple truthful mechanism, namely the random assignment mechanism, yields an allocation that satisfies the weaker notion of approximate envy-freeness with high probability.

TL;DR: The SAT solver is able to construct a Condorcet-consistent voting rule that satisfies participation as well as a number of other desirable properties for up to 11 voters, proving the optimality of the above bound.

TL;DR: An unusually detailed picture of a discovery, the beauty contest game – with Herve Moulin as the center of the initial inspiration – is drawn, illustrating the recent interaction between macroeconomic theorists and experimenters.

TL;DR: A new approach is proposed in which seasonality is evaluated on the basis of the solution of a transportation problem, and the main indices used for measuring seasonality in different study contexts are reviewed.

TL;DR: This analysis for three-candidate elections provides a characterization of unstable voting situations at which a positional voting rule is manipulable by some coalition not larger than an arbitrary proportion of the electorate.

TL;DR: In this article, the weak core of normal form games with a continuum of players and without side payments is studied and it is shown that for games where payoffs depend on the distribution of players' strategy profile, analogous regularity conditions ensuring the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria are irrelevant for the non-vacuity of the weak-core.

TL;DR: It is assumed that economic justice requires resources to be allocated fairly, and individual well-being measures are constructed that embody fairness principles in interpersonal comparisons that are required to respect agents’ preferences.

TL;DR: An axiomatic approach to characterize centrality measures for which the centrality of an agent is recursively related to the centralities of the agents she is connected to, including the Katz–Bonacich and the eigenvector centrality.

TL;DR: This paper extends the Serial Dictatorship with Project Closures mechanism to the case when an applicant can be assigned more than one course and shows the intractability of the following problems: deciding about the Pareto optimality of a given matching, computation of a POM with maximum cardinality and computation ofA POM in case of indifferences.

TL;DR: A short proof for the existence of such fair divisions is given and how to share a good between n players in a simple and equitable way is studied.

TL;DR: A symmetrized version of the popular divide and choose mechanism for the allocation of a collectively owned indivisible good among two agents when monetary compensation is available and corrects its ex-post asymmetry is introduced.

TL;DR: A simple consumption model, the so-called cake eating model, is used to study the interaction of equity, time and risk in social decision making and the robustness of these optimal consumption allocations to learning and to more complicated social welfare functions is discussed.

TL;DR: This paper further restricts the domain and investigates the existence of rules satisfying the three properties of stochastic dominance efficiency, efficiency, and strategyproofness, and finds that they are still incompatible even if all agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object.

TL;DR: It is shown that the egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) behaves as in the class of convex games, and two axiomatic characterizations by means of suitable properties such as consistency, rationality and Lorenz-fairness are provided.

TL;DR: It is shown that the method proposed by this later in which players ordering is based on the distance between bliss and political issues points, yields the Shapley index if issues can be any point in the space.

TL;DR: In this paper, the relation between monotonicity and the no-show paradox in voting rules is investigated, and it is shown that the two conditions are closer than a general logical independency result would suggest.

TL;DR: This paper discusses how quantitative model specifications can, in some cases, be given a more formal scientific underpinning in the sense of being based on a priori theory.

TL;DR: The core ideas of Flexible Majority Rules are presented with a new model and it is shown that the proposal-dependency of Flexibles Majority Rules can take many forms and it allows many applications.

TL;DR: In 2013, the existence of an enormous counter-example to the conjecture was shown using a non-constructive proof as mentioned in this paper, which left open which of the properties are actually satisfied by ME.

TL;DR: A discrete-time version of logit dynamics, as applied to the rock–paper–scissors (RPS) game, is investigated, which finds a period-three attracting cycle, which can be thought of as a counterpart to the cyclically stable set in the RPS game with best response dynamics.

TL;DR: A 3-period overlapping generations (OLG) model where individuals borrow at the young age to finance their education is developed, and it is shown that the second-best optimal non-linear tax scheme involves a downward distortion in the level of education of less able types, which, quite paradoxically, would reinforce the longevity gap in comparison with the laissez-faire.

TL;DR: Voting functions that are Condorcet Consistent and immune against the two paradoxes must select from this maximal correspondence, which is maximal in the following strong sense: it is the union of all smaller voting correspondences with these two properties.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors incorporate malice into the Rubinstein alternating offers bargaining game and identify a unique SPNE of the bargaining game, which requires an upper bound on the players' patience; malicious players who are also infinitely patient would not participate in the bargain in the first place.

TL;DR: It is shown that when the nominal interest rate is bound to be non-negative, under active policy rules a liquidity trap steady state does emerge besides the Leeper (1991) equilibrium, and policy and Taylor rules are theoretically rehabilitated since their targets, by contrast with a vast literature, may be now stable.

TL;DR: This work considers a significant subclass of GAI models, namely the discrete 2-additive GAi models, and provides for this class a decomposition into nonnegative monotone terms, which allows a reduction from exponential to quadratic complexity in any optimization problem involving discrete 1- additive models.

TL;DR: The main proposition is that, for each permissible coalition structure, the kernel is a singleton; thus, the number of licensees that maximizes the patent holder’s revenue can be determined with the kernel.

TL;DR: Borda does not, in general, operate as a majoritarian system in that a supermajority of roughly 2/3rd is required to guarantee electing a candidate of choice, and the Threshold of Exclusion for the Dowdall rule tends to zero, in the same way as list systems of proportional representation (PR).

TL;DR: The problem of inferring probability comparisons between events from an initial set of comparisons arises in several contexts, ranging from decision theory to artificial intelligence to formal semantics, and is treated as follows: beginning with a binary relation ≿ on events that does not preclude a probabilistic interpretation, this paper characterize the extension ≿+ of ≿ that is exactly the intersection of all probabilistically representable extensions of ≵.

TL;DR: It is shown that there exists no normatively desirable aggregation rule satisfying minimal comparability, which requires that for any profile, there is some comparable pair of distinct alternatives.