Showing papers in "Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics in 2014"

Disappearance and emergence of space and time in quantum gravity

Abstract: We discuss the hints for the disappearance of continuum space and time at microscopic scale. These include arguments for a discrete nature of them or for a fundamental non-locality, in a quantum theory of gravity. We discuss how these ideas are realized in specific quantum gravity approaches. Turning then the problem around, we consider the emergence of continuum space and time from the collective behaviour of discrete, pre-geometric atoms of quantum space, and for understanding spacetime as a kind of ”condensate”, and we present the case for this emergence process being the result of a phase transition, dubbed “geometrogenesis”. We discuss some conceptual issues of this scenario and of the idea of emergent spacetime in general. As a concrete example, we outline the GFT framework for quantum gravity, and illustrate a tentative procedure for the emergence of spacetime in this framework. Last, we re-examine the conceptual issues raised by the emergent spacetime scenario in light of this concrete example. PACS numbers:

Why Einstein did not believe that General Relativity geometrizes gravity

Abstract: I argue that, contrary to folklore, Einstein never really cared for geometrizing the gravitational or (subsequently) the electromagnetic field; indeed, he thought that the very statement that General Relativity geometrizes gravity "is not saying anything at all". Instead, I shall show that Einstein saw the "unification" of inertia and gravity as one of the major achievements of General Relativity. Interestingly, Einstein did not locate this unification in the field equations but in his interpretation of the geodesic equation, the law of motion of test particles.

Challenges for Emergent Gravity

Abstract: The idea of gravity as an “emergent” phenomenon has gained popularity in recent years. I discuss some of the obstacles that any such model must overcome in order to agree with the observational underpinnings of general relativity.

‘Einselection’ of pointer observables: The new H-theorem?

Abstract: In attempting to derive irreversible macroscopic thermodynamics from reversible microscopic dynamics, Boltzmann inadvertently smuggled in a premise that assumed the very irreversibility he was trying to prove: ‘molecular chaos.’ The program of ‘Einselection’ (environmentally induced superselection) within Everettian approaches faces a similar ‘Loschmidt’s Paradox’: the universe, according to the Everettian picture, is a closed system obeying only unitary dynamics, and it therefore contains no distinguishable environmental subsystems with the necessary ‘phase randomness’ to effect einselection of a pointer observable. The theoretically unjustified assumption of distinguishable environmental subsystems is the hidden premise that makes the derivation of einselection circular. In effect, it presupposes the ‘emergent’ structures from the beginning. Thus the problem of basis ambiguity remains unsolved in Everettian interpretations.

The epistemology of climate models and some of its implications for climate science and the philosophy of science

Abstract: I bring out the limitations of four important views of what the target of useful climate model assessment is. Three of these views are drawn from philosophy. They include the views of Elisabeth Lloyd and Wendy Parker, and an application of Bayesian confirmation theory. The fourth view I criticise is based on the actual practice of climate model assessment. In bringing out the limitations of these four views, I argue that an approach to climate model assessment that neither demands too much of such assessment nor threatens to be unreliable will, in typical cases, have to aim at something other than the confirmation of claims about how the climate system actually is. This means, I suggest, that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC׳s) focus on establishing confidence in climate model explanations and predictions is misguided. So too, it means that standard epistemologies of science with pretensions to generality, e.g., Bayesian epistemologies, fail to illuminate the assessment of climate models. I go on to outline a view that neither demands too much nor threatens to be unreliable, a view according to which useful climate model assessment typically aims to show that certain climatic scenarios are real possibilities and, when the scenarios are determined to be real possibilities, partially to determine how remote they are.

The primitive ontology of quantum physics: guidelines for an assessment of the proposals

Abstract: The paper seeks to make progress from stating primitive ontology theories of quantum physics – notably Bohmian mechanics, the GRW matter density theory and the GRW flash theory – to assessing these theories. Four criteria are set out: (a) internal coherence; (b) empirical adequacy; (c) relationship to other theories; (d) explanatory value. The paper argues that the stock objections against these theories do not withstand scrutiny. Its focus then is on their explanatory value: they pursue different strategies to ground the textbook formalism of quantum mechanics, and they develop different explanations of quantum non-locality. In conclusion, it is argued that Bohmian mechanics offers a better prospect for making quantum non-locality intelligible than the GRW matter density theory and the GRW flash theory.

Interpreting the Modal Kochen–Specker theorem: Possibility and many worlds in quantum mechanics

Abstract: In this paper we attempt to physically interpret the Modal Kochen-Specker (MKS) theorem. In order to do so, we analyze the features of the possible properties about quantum systems arising from the elements in an orthomodular lattice and distinguish the use of “possibility” in the classical and quantum formalisms. Taking into account the modal and many worlds non-collapse interpretation of the projection postulate, we discuss how the MKS theorem rules the constrains to actualization, and thus, the relation between actual and possible realms.

Entanglement and disentanglement in relativistic quantum mechanics

Abstract: A satisfactory formulation of relativistic quantum mechanics requires that one be able to represent the entangled states of spacelike separated systems and describe how such states evolve. This paper presents two stories that one must be able to tell coherently in order to understand relativistic entangled systems. These stories help to illustrate why one׳s understanding of entanglement in relativistic quantum mechanics must ultimately depend on the details of one׳s strategy for addressing the quantum measurement problem.

'But one must not legalize the mentioned sin': Phenomenological vs. dynamical treatments of rods and clocks in Einstein's thought

Abstract: The paper offers a historical overview of Einstein's oscillating attitude towards a "phenomenological" and "dynamical" treatment of rods and clocks in relativity theory. Contrary to what it has been usually claimed in recent literature, it is argued that this distinction should not be understood in the framework of opposition between principle and constructive theories. In particular Einstein does not seem to have plead for a "dynamical" explanation for the phenomenon rods contraction and clock dilation which was initially described only "kinematically". On the contrary textual evidence shows that, according to Einstein, a realistic microscopic model of rods and clocks was needed to account for the very existence of measuring devices of "identical construction" which always measure the same unit of time and the same unit of length. In fact, it will be shown that the empirical meaningfulness of both relativity theories depends on what, following Max Born, one might call the "principle of the physical identity of the units of measure". In the attempt to justify the validity of such principle, Einstein was forced by different interlocutors, in particular Hermann Weyl and Wolfgang Pauli, to deal with the genuine epistemological, rather then physical question whether a theory should be able or not to described the material devices that serve to its own verification

Change in Hamiltonian general relativity from the lack of a time-like Killing vector field

Abstract: In General Relativity in Hamiltonian form, change has seemed to be missing, defined only asymptotically, or otherwise obscured at best, because the Hamiltonian is a sum of first-class constraints and a boundary term and thus supposedly generates gauge transformations. Attention to the gauge generator G of Rosenfeld, Anderson, Bergmann, Castellani et al., a specially tuned sum of first-class constraints, facilitates seeing that a solitary first-class constraint in fact generates not a gauge transformation, but a bad physical change in electromagnetism (changing the electric field) or General Relativity. The change spoils the Lagrangian constraints, Gauss׳s law or the Gauss–Codazzi relations describing embedding of space into space–time, in terms of the physically relevant velocities rather than auxiliary canonical momenta. While Maudlin and Healey have defended change in GR much as G. E. Moore resisted skepticism, there remains a need to exhibit the technical flaws in the no-change argument. Insistence on Hamiltonian–Lagrangian equivalence, a theme emphasized by Mukunda, Castellani, Sugano, Pons, Salisbury, Shepley and Sundermeyer among others, holds the key. Taking objective change to be ineliminable time dependence, one recalls that there is change in vacuum GR just in case there is no time-like vector field ξ α satisfying Killing׳s equation £ ξ g μ ν = 0 , because then there exists no coordinate system such that everything is independent of time. Throwing away the spatial dependence of GR for convenience, one finds explicitly that the time evolution from Hamilton׳s equations is real change just when there is no time-like Killing vector. The inclusion of a massive scalar field is simple. No obstruction is expected in including spatial dependence and coupling more general matter fields. Hence change is real and local even in the Hamiltonian formalism. The considerations here resolve the Earman–Maudlin standoff over change in Hamiltonian General Relativity: the Hamiltonian formalism is helpful, and, suitably reformed, it does not have absurd consequences for change. Hence the classical problem of time is resolved, apart from the issue of observables, for which the solution is outlined. The Lagrangian-equivalent Hamiltonian analysis of change in General Relativity is compared to Belot and Earman׳s treatment. The more serious quantum problem of time, however, is not automatically resolved due to issues of quantum constraint imposition.

Do we have a theory of early universe cosmology

Abstract: The inationary scenario has become the paradigm of early universe cosmology, and - in conjuction with ideas from superstring theory - has led to speculations about an \inationary multiverse". From a point of view of

Predictability crisis in early universe cosmology

Abstract: Inflationary cosmology has been widely accepted due to its successful predictions: for a “generic” initial state, inflation produces a homogeneous, flat, bubble with an appropriate spectrum of density perturbations. However, the discovery that inflation is “generically eternal,” leading to a vast multiverse of inflationary bubbles with different low-energy physics, threatens to undermine this account. There is a “predictability crisis” in eternal inflation, because extracting predictions apparently requires a well-defined measure over the multiverse. This has led to discussions of anthropic predictions based on a measure over the multiverse, and an assumption that we are typical observers. I will give a pessimistic assessment of attempts to make predictions in this sense, emphasizing in particular problems that arise even if a unique measure can be found.

On the philosophy of cosmology

Abstract: This paper gives an overview of significant issues in the philosophy of cosmology, starting off by emphasizing the uniqueness of the universe and the way models are used in description and explanation. It then considers, basic limits on observations; the need to test alternatives; ways to test consistency; and implications of the uniqueness of the universe as regards distinguishing laws of physics from contingent conditions. It goes on to look at the idea of a multiverse as a scientific explanation of facts about fine-tuning, in particular considering criteria for a scientific theory and for justifying unseen entities. It considers the relation between physical laws and the natures of existence, and emphasizes limits on our knowledge of the physics relevant to the early universe (the physics horizon), and the non-physical nature of some claimed infinities. The final section looks briefly at deeper issues, commenting on the scope of enquiry of cosmological theory and the limits of science in relation to the creation of the universe.

Non-standard models and the sociology of cosmology

Abstract: I review some theoretical ideas in cosmology different from the standard "Big Bang": the quasi-steady state model, the plasma cosmology model, non-cosmological redshifts, alternatives to non-baryonic dark matter and/or dark energy, and others. Cosmologists do not usually work within the framework of alternative cosmologies because they feel that these are not at present as competitive as the standard model. Certainly, they are not so developed, and they are not so developed because cosmologists do not work on them. It is a vicious circle. The fact that most cosmologists do not pay them any attention and only dedicate their research time to the standard model is to a great extent due to a sociological phenomenon (the "snowball effect" or "groupthink"). We might well wonder whether cosmology, our knowledge of the Universe as a whole, is a science like other fields of physics or a predominant ideology.

On the empirical equivalence between special relativity and Lorentz׳s ether theory

Abstract: In this paper I argue that the case of Einstein’s special relativity vs. Hendrik Lorentz’s ether theory can be decided in terms of empirical evidence, in spite of the predictive equivalence between the theories. In the historical and philosophical literature this case has been typically addressed focusing on non-empirical features (non-empirical virtues in special relativity and/or non-empirical flaws in the ether theory). I claim that non-empirical features are not enough to provide a fully objective and uniquely determined choice in instances of empirical equivalence. However, I argue that if we consider arguments proposed by Richard Boyd and by Larry Laudan and Jarret Leplin, a choice based on non-consequential empirical evidence favoring Einstein’s theory can be made.

Testability and Epistemic Shifts in Modern Cosmology

Abstract: During the last decade new developments in theoretical and speculative cosmology have reopened the old discussion of cosmology's scientific status and the more general question of the demarcation between science and non-science. The multiverse hypothesis, in particular, is central to this discussion and controversial because it seems to disagree with methodological and epistemic standards traditionally accepted in the physical sciences. But what are these standards and how sacrosanct are they? Does anthropic multiverse cosmology rest on evaluation criteria that conflict with and go beyond those ordinarily accepted, so that it constitutes an “epistemic shift” in fundamental physics? The paper offers a brief characterization of the modern multiverse and also refers to a few earlier attempts to introduce epistemic shifts in the science of the universe. It further discusses the several meanings of testability, addresses the question of falsifiability as a sine qua non for a theory being scientific, and briefly compares the situation in cosmology with the one in systematic biology. Multiverse theory is not generally falsifiable, which has led to proposals from some physicists to overrule not only Popperian standards but also other evaluation criteria of a philosophical nature. However, this is hardly possible and nor is it possible to get rid of explicit philosophical considerations in some other aspects of cosmological research, however advanced it becomes.

Measurements according to Consistent Histories

Abstract: We critically evaluate the treatment of the notion of measurement in the Consistent Histories approach to quantum mechanics. We find such a treatment unsatisfactory because it relies, often implicitly, on elements external to those provided by the formalism. In particular, we note that, in order for the formalism to be informative when dealing with measurement scenarios, one needs to assume that the appropriate choice of framework is such that apparatuses are always in states of well defined pointer positions after measurements. The problem is that there is nothing in the formalism to justify this assumption. We conclude that the Consistent Histories approach, contrary to what is claimed by its proponents, fails to provide a truly satisfactory resolution for the measurement problem in quantum theory.

The problem of confirmation in the Everett interpretation

Abstract: I argue that the Oxford school Everett interpretation is internally incoherent, because we cannot claim that in an Everettian universe the kinds of reasoning we have used to arrive at our beliefs about quantum mechanics would lead us to form true beliefs. I show that in an Everettian context, the experimental evidence that we have available could not provide empirical confirmation for quantum mechanics, and moreover that we would not even be able to establish reference to the theoretical entities of quantum mechanics. I then consider a range of existing Everettian approaches to the probability problem and show that they do not succeed in overcoming this incoherence.

On under-determination in cosmology

Abstract: I discuss how modern cosmology illustrates under-determination of theoretical hypotheses by data, in ways that are different from most philosophical discussions. I emphasise cosmology's concern with what data could in principle be collected by a single observer (Section 2 ); and I give a broadly sceptical discussion of cosmology's appeal to the cosmological principle as a way of breaking the under-determination (Section 3 ). I confine most of the discussion to the history of the observable universe from about one second after the Big Bang, as described by the mainstream cosmological model: in effect, what cosmologists in the early 1970s dubbed the ‘standard model’, as elaborated since then. But in the closing Section 4 , I broach some questions about times earlier than one second.

No superluminal propagation for classical relativistic and relativistic quantum fields

Abstract: A criterion is proposed to ensure that classical relativistic fields do not propagate superluminally. If this criterion does indeed serve as a sufficient condition for no superluminal propagation it follows that various other criteria found in the physics literature cannot serve as necessary conditions since they can fail although the proffered condition holds. The rejected criteria rely on energy conditions that are believed to hold for most classical fields used in actual applications. But these energy conditions are known to fail at small scales for quantum fields. It is argued that such a failure is not necessarily a cause for concern about superluminal propagation in the quantum regime since the proffered criterion of no superluminal propagation for classical fields has a natural analog for quantum fields and, further, this quantum analog condition provably holds for some quantum fields despite the violation of energy conditions. The apparatus developed here also offers a different approach to treating the Reichenbach–Salmon cases of “pseudo-causal processes” and helps to clarify the issue of whether relativity theory is consistent with superluminal propagation.

Individuality, distinguishability, and (non-)entanglement: A defense of Leibniz׳s principle

Abstract: The paper provides a philosophical interpretation of Ghirardi, Marinatto, and Weber׳s physical criterion of (non-)entanglement in terms of individuality and distinguishability. It firstly clarifies the relation between ontology and labeling, and then defends the non-standard view that non-similar particles and similar fermions are individuated by a traditional version of Leibniz׳s principle of the identity of indiscernibles. It will be argued that Leibniz׳s principle is satisfied explicitly in non-entangled states, whereas in entangled states it can be defended via the summing defense.

Against the empirical viability of the Deutsch-Wallace-Everett approach to quantum mechanics

Abstract: The subjective Everettian approach to quantum mechanics presented by Deutsch and Wallace fails to constitute an empirically viable theory of quantum phenomena. The decision theoretic implementation of the Born rule realized in this approach provides no basis for rejecting Everettian quantum mechanics in the face of empirical data that contradicts the Born rule. The approach of Greaves and Myrvold, which provides a subjective implementation of the Born rule as well but derives it from empirical data rather than decision theoretic arguments, avoids the problem faced by Deutsch and Wallace and is empirically viable. However, there is good reason to cast doubts on its scientific value.

On the CPT theorem

Abstract: We provide a careful development and rigorous proof of the CPT theorem within the framework of mainstream (Lagrangian) quantum field theory. This is in contrast to the usual rigorous proofs in purely axiomatic frameworks, and non-rigorous proof-sketches in the mainstream approach. We construct the CPT transformation for a general field directly, without appealing to the enumerative classification of representations, and in a manner that is clearly related to the requirements of our proof. Our approach applies equally in Minkowski spacetimes of any dimension at least three, and is in principle neutral between classical and quantum field theories: the quantum CPT theorem has a natural classical analogue. The key mathematical tool is that of complexification; this tool is central to the existing axiomatic proofs, but plays no overt role in the usual mainstream approaches to CPT.

Poincare on clocks in motion

Abstract: Recently-discovered manuscripts throw new light on Poincare׳s discovery of the Lorentz group, and his ether-based interpretation of the Lorentz transformation. At first, Poincare postulated longitudinal contraction of bodies in motion with respect to the ether, and ignored time deformation. In April, 1909, he acknowledged time deformation due to translation, obtaining thereby a theory of relativity more compatible with those of Einstein and Minkowski.

The trouble with orbits: The Stark effect in the old and the new quantum theory ☆

Abstract: The old quantum theory and Schrodinger׳s wave mechanics (and other forms of quantum mechanics) give the same results for the line splittings in the first-order Stark effect in hydrogen, the leading terms in the splitting of the spectral lines emitted by a hydrogen atom in an external electric field. We examine the account of the effect in the old quantum theory, which was hailed as a major success of that theory, from the point of view of wave mechanics. First, we show how the new quantum mechanics solves a fundamental problem that one runs into in the old quantum theory with the Stark effect. It turns out that, even without an external field, it depends on the coordinates in which the quantum conditions are imposed which electron orbits are allowed in a hydrogen atom. The allowed energy levels and hence the line splittings are independent of the coordinates used but the size and eccentricity of the orbits are not. In the new quantum theory, this worrisome non-uniqueness of orbits turns into the perfectly innocuous non-uniqueness of bases in Hilbert space. Second, we review how the so-called WKB (Wentzel–Kramers–Brillouin) approximation method for solving the Schrodinger equation reproduces the quantum conditions of the old quantum theory amended by some additional half-integer terms. These extra terms remove the need for some arbitrary extra restrictions on the allowed orbits that the old quantum theory required over and above the basic quantum conditions.

Squaring the circle: Gleb Wataghin and the prehistory of quantum gravity

Abstract: The early history of the attempts to unify quantum theory with the general theory of relativity is depicted through the work of the Italian physicist Gleb Wataghin, who, in the context of quantum electrodynamics, has anticipated some of the ideas that the quantum gravity community is entertaining today.

A categorial approach to relativistic locality

Abstract: Relativistic locality is interpreted in this paper as a web of conditions expressing the compatibility of a physical theory with the underlying causal structure of spacetime. Four components of this web are distinguished: spatiotemporal locality, along with three distinct notions of causal locality, dubbed CL-Independence, CL-Dependence, and CL-Dynamic. These four conditions can be regimented using concepts from the categorical approach to quantum field theory initiated by Brunetti, Fredenhagen, and Verch (2003). A covariant functor representing a general quantum field theory is defined to be causally local if it satisfies the three CL conditions. Any such theory is viewed as fully compliant with relativistic locality. We survey current results indicating the extent to which an algebraic quantum field theory satisfying the Haag–Kastler axioms is causally local.

Does cosmological expansion affect local physics

Abstract: In this contribution I wish to address the question whether, and how, the global cosmological expansion influences local physics, like particle orbits and black hole geometries. Regarding the former I argue that a pseudo Newtonian picture can be quite accurate if “expansion” is taken to be an attribute of the inertial structure rather than of “space” in some substantivalist sense. This contradicts the often-heard suggestion to imagine cosmological expansion as that of “space itself”. Regarding isolated objects in full General Relativity, like black holes, I emphasise the need for proper geometric characterisations in order to meaningfully compare them in different spacetimes, like static and expanding ones. Examples are discussed in some detail to clearly map out the problems. A slightly extended version of this contribution may be found at philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10033.

Can the ontological models framework accommodate Bohmian mechanics

Abstract: The ontological models framework has been proposed as a tool to prove general results about many competing interpretations of quantum mechanics at once. I argue that the ontological models framework is at best ambiguous, and at worst unable to accomplish its task of representing even the most well known interpretations of quantum mechanics. I show that when the framework is made mathematically precise, it cannot accommodate Bohmian mechanics, a well known interpretation of quantum mechanics in terms of hidden variables.

On the interpretive role of theories of gravity and ‘ugly’ solutions to the total evidence for dark matter

Abstract: Peter Kosso (2013) discusses the weak gravitational lensing observations of the Bullet Cluster and argues that dark matter can be detected in this system solely through the equivalence principle without the need to specify a full theory of gravity. This paper argues that Kosso gets some of the details wrong in his analysis of the implications of the Bullet Cluster observations for the Dark Matter Double Bind and the possibility of constructing robust tests of theories of gravity at galactic and greater scales. Even the Bullet Cluster evidence is not sufficiently detailed to allow precision tests of General Relativity that would distinguish it from its rivals at galactic and greater scales. Taking into account the total evidence available, we cannot rule out “ugly” solutions to the dynamical discrepancy in astrophysics that involve both a large quantity of dark matter and a theory of gravity whose predictions differ significantly from those of General Relativity for interactions taking place at galactic and greater scales.