Showing papers in "The Philosophical Quarterly in 2008"

What's wrong with contextualism?

Abstract: This paper addresses two worries that might be raised about contextualism in epistemology and that carry over to its moral analogues: that contextualism robs epistemology (and moral theory) of a proper subject-matter, and that contextualism robs knowledge claims (and moral claims) of their objectivity. Two theses are defended: (1) that these worries are appropriately directed at interest-dependent theories in general rather than at contextualism in particular, and (2) that the two worries are over-stated in any case. Finally, the paper offers some considerations in favour of attributor contextualism over ‘subject-sensitive invariantism’, both in epistemology and in moral theory. But here we note an interesting result: the very considerations that support contextualism as a semantic thesis, threaten to rob that position of its anti-sceptical force.

Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism

Abstract: Moral relativism provides a compelling explanation of linguistic data involving ordinary moral expressions like ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. But it is a very radical view. Because relativism relativizes sentence truth to contexts of assessment it forces us to revise standard linguistic theory. If, however, no competing theory explains all of the evidence, perhaps it is time for a paradigm shift. However, I argue that a version of moral contextualism can account for the same data as relativism without relativizing sentence truth to contexts of assessment. This version of moral contextualism is thus preferable to relativism on methodological grounds.

The Extensionality of Parthood and Composition

Abstract: I focus on three mereological principles: the extensionality of parthood (EP), the uniqueness of composition (UC), and the extensionality of composition (EC) These principles are not equivalent Nevertheless they are closely related (and often equated), since they all reflect the basic nominalistic dictum ‘No difference without a difference maker’ All of them, individually or collectively, have been challenged on philosophical grounds In the first part I argue that such challenges do not quite threaten (EP), because they are either self-defeating or unsupported In the second part I argue that they do little to undermine the tenability of (UC) and (EC) either

Intentional action and the praise-blame asymmetry

Abstract: Recent empirical research by Joshua Knobe has uncovered two asymmetries in judgements about intentional action and moral responsibility. First., people are more inclined to say that a side effect was brought about intentionally when they regard that side effect as bad than when they regard it as good. Secondly, people are more inclined to ascribe blame to someone for bad effects than they are inclined to ascribe praise for good effects. These findings suggest that the notion of intentional action has a normative component. I propose a theory of intentional action on which one acts intentionally if one fails to be motivated to avoid a bad effect. This explains the asymmetry concerning intentional action. The praise-blame asymmetry is explained in terms of the claim that praise depends on being appropriately motivated, whereas blame does not.

A New Defence of Anselmian Theism

Abstract: Anselmian theists, for whom God is the being than which no greater can be thought, usually infer that he is an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent being. Critics have attacked these claims by numerous distinct arguments, such as the paradox of the stone, the argument from God's inability to sin, and the argument from evil. Anselmian theists have responded to these arguments by constructing an independent response to each. This way of defending Anselmian theism is uneconomical. I seek to establish a new defence which undercuts almost all the existing arguments against Anselmian theism at once. In developing this defence, I consider the possibility that the Anselmian God is not an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent being.

Modal Knowledge, Counterfactual Knowledge and the Role of Experience

Abstract: In recent work Timothy Williamson argues that the epistemology of metaphysical modality is a special case of the epistemology of counterfactuals. I argue that Williamson has not provided an adequate argument for this controversial claim, and that it is not obvious how what he says should be supplemented in order to derive such an argument. But I suggest that an important moral of his discussion survives this point. The moral is that experience could play an epistemic role which is more epistemically significant than a mere ‘enabling’ role but not equivalent to an evidential role.

McGINN ON EXISTENCE

Abstract: I compare the theory of existence and being (and of non-existence and non-being) presented in Colin McGinn's Logical Properties with those of well known predecessors such as Quine, Frege and Meinong. More recently, neo-Meinongians have held that being and existence are different concepts, and that although nothing lacks being, there are things which do not exist; possibilists have held that there are mere possibilia, things which possibly exist but do not actually exist. I examine a thesis advanced by McGinn which these two positions have also endorsed, namely, that there are things which do not exist. I survey the function of 'existential quantification', and finally contend that the predicate 'does not exist' has at least three meanings, meanings which are determined by the context in which the predicate occurs and which are importantly different from one another.

Variable Versus Fixed‐Rate Rule‐Utilitarianism

Abstract: Fixed-rate versions of rule-consequentialism and rule-utilitarianism evaluate rules in terms of the expected net value of one particular level of social acceptance, but one far enough below 100% social acceptance to make salient the complexities created by partial compliance. Variable-rate versions of rule-consequentialism and rule-utilitarianism instead evaluate rules in terms of their expected net value at all different levels of social acceptance. Brad Hooker has advocated a fixed-rate version. Michael Ridge has argued that the variable-rate version is better. The debate continues here. Of particular interest is the difference between the implications of Hooker's and Ridge's rules about doing good for others.

Greco on Knowledge: Virtues, Contexts, Achievements

Abstract: I discuss John Greco's paper ‘What's Wrong with Contextualism?’, in which he outlines a theory of knowledge which is virtue-theoretic while also being allied to a form of attributor contextualism about ‘knows’.

Desiring the bad Under the Guise of the Good

Abstract: Desire is commonly spoken of as a state in which the desired object seems good, which apparently ascribes an evaluative element to desire. I offer a new defence of this old idea. As traditionally conceived, this view faces serious objections related to its way of characterizing desire's evaluative content. I develop an alternative conception of evaluative mental content which is plausible in its own right, allows the evaluative desire theorist to avoid the standard objections, and sheds interesting new light on the idea of evaluative experience.

Scepticism and the imagination model of dreaming

Abstract: As a solution to dream scepticism, Ernest Sosa has argued that when we dream, we do not believe the contents of our dreams, but rather imagine them. Thus dreams do not cause false beliefs; so my beliefs cannot be false as a result of being caused by dreams. I argue that even assuming that Sosa is correct about the nature of dream experience, belief in wakefulness on these grounds is epistemically irresponsible. The proper upshot of the imagination model is to recharacterize the way we think about dream scepticism: the sceptical threat is not that we have false beliefs. So even though dreams do not involve false beliefs, they still pose a sceptical threat, which I elaborate.

Forbidden Ways of Life

Abstract: I examine an objection against autonomy-minded liberalism sometimes made by philosophers such as John Rawls and William Galston, that it rules out ways of life which do not themselves value freedom or autonomy. This objection is incorrect, because one need not value autonomy in order to live an autonomous life. Hence autonomy-minded liberalism need not rule out such ways of life. I suggest a modified objection which does work, namely that autonomy-minded liberalism must rule out ways of life that could not develop under an autonomy-promoting education. I conclude by suggesting some reasons why autonomy-minded liberals should bite the bullet and accept this.

When is Circularity in Definitions Benign

Abstract: I aim to show how and why some definitions can be benignly circular. According to Lloyd Humberstone, a definition that is analytically circular need not be inferentially circular and so might serve to illuminate the application-conditions for a concept. I begin by tidying up some problems with Humberstone's account. I then show that circular definitions of a kind commonly thought to be benign have inferentially circular truth-conditions and so are malign by Humberstone's test. But his test is too demanding. The inferences we actually use to establish the applicability of, e.g., colour concepts are designed to establish warranted assertability and not truth. Understood thus, dispositional analyses are not inferentially circular.

Sea Battle Semantics

Abstract: The assumption that the future is open makes well known problems for traditional semantics. According to a commonly held intuition, today's occurrence of the sentence ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow’, while truth-valueless today, will have a determinate truth-value by tomorrow night. Yet given traditional semantics, sentences that are truth-valueless now cannot later ‘become’ true. Relativistic semantics has been claimed to do a better job of accommodating intuitions about future contingents than non-relativistic semantics does. However, intuitions about future contingents cannot by themselves give good reasons for shifting to a new paradigm, for despite the initial appearances, standard non-relativistic semantics (plus an account of truth-value gaps) can accommodate both intuitions about future contingents.

Some good and bad news for ethical intuitionism

Abstract: The core doctrine of ethical intuitionism is that some of our ethical knowledge is non-inferential. Against this, Sturgeon has recently objected that if ethical intuitionists accept a certain plausible rationale for the autonomy of ethics, then their foundationalism commits them to an implausible epistemology outside ethics. I show that irrespective of whether ethical intuitionists take non-inferential ethical knowledge to be a priori or a posteriori, their commitment to the autonomy of ethics and foundationalism does not entail any implausible non-inferential knowledge in areas outside ethics (such as the past, the future, or the unobservable). However, each form of intuitionism does require a controversial stand on certain unresolved issues outside ethics.

Solving the Problem of Easy Knowledge

Abstract: Stewart Cohen argues that several epistemological theories fall victim to the problem of easy knowledge: they allow us to know far too easily that certain sceptical hypotheses are false and that how things seem is a reliable indicator of how they are. This problem is a result of the theories' interaction with an epistemic closure principle. Cohen suggests that the theories should be modified. I argue that attempts to solve the problem should focus on closure instead; a new and plausible epistemic closure principle can solve the problem of easy knowledge. My solution offers a uniform and more successful response to different versions of the problem of easy knowledge.

Shame and Punishment in kant's Doctrine of Right

Abstract: In the Doctrine of Right, Kant claims that killings motivated by the fear of disgrace should be punished less severely than other murders. I consider how Kant understands the mitigating force of such motives, and argue that Kant takes agents to have a moral right to defend their honour. Unlike other rights, however, this right of honour can only be defended personally, so that individuals remain in a ‘state of nature’ with regard to any such rights, regardless of their political situation. According to Kant, we should be lenient in these cases because the malefactors are caught between two kinds of authentic normative demand, at a point where the proper authority of the state collides with a certain authority which individuals must claim for themselves.

Two Arguments against Realism

Abstract: Over the last 20 years or so, Hilary Putnam has developed a series of arguments which use basic theorems of model theory to undermine semantic realism. Here, I discuss two generalizations of these arguments. The rst employs some new forms of model theory to generate substantially stronger conclusions than Putnam’s original arguments generated. The second illustrates a method for replacing the model theory in Putnam’s arguments with results from other branches of science|in particular, with results from astronomy. Now, I should say at the outset that neither of these new arguments is supposed to be persuasive: each of them fails, and fails rather badly, when regarded as a serious objection to realism. Nevertheless, the arguments serve three purposes. First, the parallels between my new arguments and Putnam’s original arguments help to highlight what’s really going on in the latter, and the obvious aws in my arguments help to isolate the corresponding aws in Putnam’s arguments. Second, these new arguments expose the inadequacy of several recent defenses of Putnam. (Very roughly, I argue that if these defenses saved Putnam’s arguments, then they would save my arguments as well. But, my arguments are unsalvageable. So, the defenses don’t save Putnam.) Finally, the arguments present a new challenge to Putnam and his defenders: to provide a formulation of the model-theoretic argument which makes that argument seem compelling without doing the same for mine.

The paradox of Moore's proof of an external world

Abstract: Moore's proof of an external world is a piece of reasoning whose premises, in context, are true and warranted and whose conclusion is perfectly acceptable, and yet immediately seems flawed. I argue that neither Wright's nor Pryor's readings of the proof can explain this paradox. Rather, one must take the proof as responding to a sceptical challenge to our right to claim to have warrant for our ordinary empirical beliefs, either for any particular empirical belief we might have, or for belief in the existence of an external world itself. I show how Wright's and Pryor's positions are of interest when taken in connection with Humean scepticism, but that it is only linking it with Cartesian scepticism which can explain why the proof strikes us as an obvious failure.

A dilemma for particularist virtue ethics

Abstract: There is an obvious affinity between virtue ethics and particularism. Both stress the complexity of the moral life, the inadequacy of rule-following as a guide to moral deliberation, and the importance of judgement in discerning the morally relevant features of particular situations. Yet it remains an open question how deep the affinity goes. I argue that the radical form of particularism defended by Jonathan Dancy has surprisingly strong implications for virtue ethics. Adopting such a view would require the virtue theorist either to adopt an unattractive model of moral motivation or to embrace a fairly strong version of the unity of the virtues.

A problem for guidance control

Abstract: Central to Fischer and Ravizza's theory of moral responsibility is the concept of guidance control, which involves two conditions: (1) moderate reasons-responsiveness, and (2) mechanism ownership. We raise a worry for Fischer and Ravizza's account of (1). If an agent acts contrary to reasons which he could not recognize, this should lead us to conclude that he is not morally responsible for his behaviour; but according to Fischer and Ravizza's account, he satisfies the conditions for guidance control and is therefore morally responsible. We consider ways in which the account of guidance control might be mended.

From e = k to scepticism?

Abstract: In a recent article Dylan Dodd has argued that anyone who holds that all knowledge is evidence must concede that we know next to nothing about the external world. The argument is intended to show that any infallibilist account of knowledge is committed to scepticism, and that anyone who identifies our evidence with the propositions we know is committed to infallibilism. I shall offer some reasons for thinking Dodd's argument is unsound, and explain where his argument goes wrong.

Subject sensitive invariantism: in memoriam

Abstract: Subject sensitive invariantism is the view that whether a subject knows depends on what is at stake for that subject: the truth-value of a knowledge-attribution is sensitive to the subject's practical interests. I argue that subject sensitive invariantism cannot accept a very plausible principle for memory to transmit knowledge. I argue, furthermore, that semantic contextualism and contrastivism can accept this plausible principle for memory to transmit knowledge. I conclude that semantic contextualism and contrastivism are in a dialectical position better than subject sensitive invariantism is. © 2007 The Author.

Problems for sinnott‐armstrong's moral contrastivism

Abstract: In his recent book Moral Skepticisms Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues in great detail for contrastivism with respect to justified moral belief and moral knowledge. I raise three questions concerning this view. First, how would Sinnott-Armstrong account for constraints on admissible contrast classes? Secondly, how would he deal with notorious problems concerning relevant reference classes? Finally, how can he account for basic features of moral agency? It turns out that the last problem is the most serious one for his account.

Contesting Pyrrhonian Contrastivism

Abstract: I air three kinds of problem to which Sinnott-Armstrong's epistemological contrastivism seems to be exposed: (a) the theory gives an unplausible account of justification attributions; (b) the Pyrrhonism which results from its inability to identify relevant contrast classes bars us from epistemic responsibility; (c) contextualism does just as well as Pyrrhonism, despite Sinnott-Armstrong's arguments to the contrary. © 2008 The Author.

Moderate classy pyrrhonian moral scepticism

Abstract: This precis summarizes my book Moral Skepticisms, with emphasis on my contrastivist analysis of justified moral belief and my Pyrrhonian moral scepticism based on meta-scepticism about relevance. This complex moral epistemology escapes a common paradox facing moral philosophers.

On the aesthetic function of art

Abstract: The Aesthetic Function of Art is a work of consummate craftsmanship. Gary Iseminger is an analytic philosopher's philosopher. He proceeds with clarity and precision at every turn. He defines concepts and distinctions with the sharpness that typically dispels ambiguity. His overall argumentative strategy is ingenious, and his arguments, step by step, are transparent and deductively impeccable. The book is like a finely wrought cabinet. Even if one does not concur with Iseminger's ultimate conclusion, an updated version of the aesthetic definition of art which he calls 'the new aestheticism', the book will be instructive, since many of the innovative moves, distinctions and clarifications that Iseminger constructs along the way will be useful to philosophers of different and even opposed camps. The easiest way to situate this book is to classify it, as I have, as an example of the aesthetic theory of art. Indeed, it is probably the most sophisticated and best defended version of the aesthetic theory of art to date. But Iseminger's book is more than merely a simple variation on the aesthetic theory of art, since he not only follows in the spirit of traditional aesthetic theories of art, but also exploits the insights of certain institutional theories of art and historical approaches to it. Iseminger labels his view 'the new aestheticism', and contrasts it with traditional aestheticism, represented by Monroe Beardsley's statement of the aesthetic theory of art. One way in which the new aestheticism departs from traditional aestheticism is immediately apparent in how these views characterize art. For traditional aestheticism, 'Something is a work of art if and only if its function is to afford aesthetic experience' (p. 8). In contrast, according to new aestheticism, 'The function of the artworld is to promote aesthetic communication'. Perhaps the most striking divergence between these two formulations is the difference between their respective objects of enquiry. Traditional aestheticism is concerned with defining the work of art, whereas the new aestheticism is describing the persisting function of the artworld and the practice of art. That is, the object of the definition of traditional aestheticism is the single artwork this painting and that concerto; in contrast, what the new aestheticism aspires to capture is the function of all (or most?) of the activities and practices that go into producing the inventory of the artworld, namely, the bulk of