Showing papers in "Theory & Psychology in 2008"

Positive Psychology: History in the Remaking?

Abstract: Positive psychology has figured itself as no less than a revolutionary reorientation of psychology, one that makes individual `flourishing' the primary object of study and intervention. There are c...

Positive Psychology, Ethnocentrism, and the Disguised Ideology of Individualism

Abstract: This article aims to examine critically the attempts by positive psychologists to develop a science of happiness and positive human functioning that transcends temporal and cultural boundaries. Current efforts in positive psychology are deconstructed to reveal an adherence to the dominant Western conception of self and its accompanying vision of the good life as personal fulfillment. It is argued that in failing to recognize the tacit cultural and moral assumptions underlying their investigations, positive psychologists not only distort the outlooks of cultures that do not subscribe to an individualistic framework, they also insulate themselves from reflecting critically on their work. Alternative forms of inquiry are offered to assist positive psychology in overcoming these limitations.

Why P Values Are Not a Useful Measure of Evidence in Statistical Significance Testing

Abstract: Reporting p values from statistical significance tests is common in psychology's empirical literature. Sir Ronald Fisher saw the p value as playing a useful role in knowledge development by acting as an `objective' measure of inductive evidence against the null hypothesis. We review several reasons why the p value is an unobjective and inadequate measure of evidence when statistically testing hypotheses. A common theme throughout many of these reasons is that p values exaggerate the evidence against H0. This, in turn, calls into question the validity of much published work based on comparatively small, including .05, p values. Indeed, if researchers were fully informed about the limitations of the p value as a measure of evidence, this inferential index could not possibly enjoy its ongoing ubiquity. Replication with extension research focusing on sample statistics, effect sizes, and their confidence intervals is a better vehicle for reliable knowledge development than using p values. Fisher would also hav...

From Speculation to Epistemological Violence in Psychology: A Critical-Hermeneutic Reconstruction

Abstract: Based on historical and theoretical reflections it is argued that speculation cannot be eradicated from psychology and that it is a necessary part of empirical research, specifically when it concer...

From Continence to Virtue: Recovering Goodness, Character Unity, and Character Types for Positive Psychology

Abstract: Character is central to positive psychology's efforts to understand and promote human flourishing. Despite the importance of character and ubiquitous references to Aristotle, virtue theory remains underdeveloped in positive psychology. This article elaborates three key aspects of virtue ethics for understanding flourishing: goodness, the unity of character, and character types. Positive psychologists have not developed a substantial concept of what is good, which is essential because virtues are defined as the enduring personal qualities necessary for pursuing particular goods. Positive psychologists present virtue in a fragmented manner, focusing on a few `signature strengths,' whereas virtue ethicists generally emphasize the unity of character and the development of a full range of virtues. Because positive psychologists have not recognized the four character types in addition to virtuous character, they often misconstrue the continent character as virtuous, and many of their descriptors of the good lif...

Problematic Ontological Underpinnings of Positive Psychology: A Strong Relational Alternative

Abstract: In this article, we contend that many of the problems delineated in this special issue on positive psychology stem from an unexamined philosophical premise—its ontology. The world of `ontology' is vast and somewhat ill defined, but here we mean simply assumptions of what is ultimately real and fundamental, especially regarding the self. We first clarify and compare two major ontologies of the self, one that we argue underlies and spawns problems for positive psychology and one that we will describe as a promising alternative for the project of positive psychology. We focus on three important features of this project: (1) commitment to an ideal of the `disinterested observer'; (2) emotional satisfaction as a key conception; and (3) the tendency to view human phenomena as decontextualized from culture, history, and even physical situations. These features will display both how one set of ontological premises has underlain mainstream positive psychology and how the alternative offers a fresh perspective that...

Positive Psychology and Philosophy of Social Science

Abstract: Many of the shortcomings of `positive psychology' seem to stem from its unreflectively perpetuating key assumptions of the very mainstream social science it censures for being too `negative.' Philosophical hermeneutics and related social theory perspectives allow us to identify and critically examine such assumptions, including a one-sided individualism and narrow instrumentalism. Hermeneutics allows us to make sense of the `disguised ideology' that imbues positive psychology and much modern social science, suggests that social inquiry is best seen as a kind of dialogic understanding, and may allow us to take the measure of deep human limitations without falling into cynicism or despair.

Can there be such a thing as embodied embedded cognitive neuroscience

Abstract: Contemporary cognitive neuroscience, for the most part, aims to figure out how cognitive processes are realized in the brain. This research goal betrays the field's commitment to the philosophical position that cognizing is something that the brain does. Since the 1990s, philosophers and cognitive scientists have started to question this position, arguing that the brain constitutes only one of several contributing factors to cognition, the other factors being the body and the world. This latter position we refer to as embodied embedded cognition (EEC). Although cognitive neuroscience's research practice and EEC do not seem to fit well together at present, it is pertinent to ask if a variant of cognitive neuroscience can be developed that sets itself research goals that are more congenial to the EEC view. In this paper we investigate this possibility. We put forth a new guiding metaphor of the role of the brain in cognitive behavior to replace the current cognitivist metaphor of the brain as an information-processing device. We also identify a research agenda that naturally arises from our metaphor. In this way we hope to provide an impetus for cognitive neuroscientists to pursue an EEC-inspired research program.

The Skillful Body as a Concernful System of Possible Actions Phenomena and Neurodynamics

Abstract: For Merleau-Ponty, consciousness in skillful coping is a matter of prereflective `I can' and not explicit `I think that.' The body unifies many domain-specific capacities. There exists a direct link between the perceived possibilities for action in the situation (`affordances') and the organism's capacities. From Merleau-Ponty's descriptions it is clear that in a flow of skillful actions, the leading `I can' may change from moment to moment without explicit deliberation. How these transitions occur, however, is less clear. Given that Merleau-Ponty suggested that a better understanding of the self-organization of brain and behavior is important, I will re-read his descriptions of skillful coping in the light of recent ideas on neurodynamics. Affective processes play a crucial role in evaluating the motivational significance of objects and contribute to the individual's prereflective responsiveness to relevant affordances.

Thinking through Positive Psychology

Abstract: Positive psychology offers a needed corrective to deficiencies in mainstream psychology. However, there have been relatively few attempts to systematically analyze and assess this movement. This sp...

Identity as Self-Interpretation:

Abstract: The hermeneutic tradition in psychology and the social sciences claims that we should understand human identity in terms of self-interpretation. This article is an attempt to spell out what it means to think of identity as self-interpretation. First, two dimensions of identity as self-interpretation are outlined: that we can only have an identity if we are committed to issues of moral worth; and that self-interpretation involves a temporal dimension that has a narrative form. Second, I outline four levels of self-interpretation in order to show that identity is not confined to either social or mental representations, but is dispersed across bodies, persons, practices, and society. Often there are discrepancies and conflicts between levels of self-interpretation, which can lead to social progress but also to social pathologies. Finally, I analyse some pathological aspects of a dominating Western self-interpretation in the current consumer society, which frames identity formation in terms of self-realization.

On the Possibility of Unification: The Reality and Nature of the Crisis in Psychology

Abstract: In this article it is argued that—in spite of contrary semantic and substantive criticisms that have been put forward—the crisis in psychology is a real problem facing the discipline. The crisis is...

The Rasch Model from the Perspective of the Representational Theory of Measurement

Abstract: Representational measurement theory is the dominant theory of measurement within the philosophy of science; and the area in which the theory of conjoint measurement was developed. For many years it has been argued the Rasch model is conjoint measurement by several psychometricians. This paper critiques this argument from the perspective of representational measurement theory. It concludes that the Rasch model is not conjoint measurement as the model does not demonstrate the existence of a representation theorem between an empirical relational structure and a numerical relational structure. Psychologists seriously interested in investigating traits for quantitative structure should use the theory of conjoint measurement itself rather than the Rasch model. This is not to say, however, that empirical relationships between conjoint measurement and the Rasch model are precluded. The paper concludes by suggesting some relevant research avenues.

From Meehl to Fast and Frugal Heuristics (and Back) New Insights into How to Bridge the Clinical—Actuarial Divide

Abstract: It is difficult to overestimate Paul Meehl's influence on judgment and decision-making research. His 'disturbing little book' (Meehl, 1986, p. 370) Clinical versus Statistical Prediction: A Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the Evidence (1954) is known as an attack on human judgment and a call for replacing clinicians with actuarial methods. More than 40 years later, fast and frugal heuristics - proposed as models of human judgment - were formalized, tested, and found to be surprisingly accurate, often more so than the actuarial models that Meehl advocated. We ask three questions: Do the findings of the two programs contradict each other? More generally, how are the programs conceptually connected? Is there anything they can learn from each other? After demonstrating that there need not be a contradiction, we show that both programs converge in their concern to develop (a) domain-specific models of judgment and (b) nonlinear process models that arise from the bounded nature of judgment. We then elaborate the differences between the programs and discuss how these differences can be viewed as mutually instructive: First, we show that the fast and frugal heuristic models can help bridge the clinical - actuarial divide, that is, they can be developed into actuarial methods that are both accurate and easy to implement by the unaided clinical judge. We then argue that Meehl's insistence on improving judgment makes clear the importance of examining the degree to which heuristics are used in the clinical domain and how acceptable they would be as actuarial tools.

Contemporary Epistemological Research in Education : Reconciliation and Reconceptualization of the Field

Abstract: In this article the authors challenge contemporary epistemolog- ical research within educational settings. After a reconciliation of the current models which treat epistemological beliefs as static and mechani- cal, the authors present a teaching experience to illustrate their enactivist view that epistemological beliefs should be conceptualized as fluid and dynamic constructs, emerging in web-like configurations. Answers to epistemological questions unfold within the interstices and mutual interactions between people and their environment. Boundaries between student-teacher, individual-community, cognition-bodily experience are becoming blurred. From this enactivist perspective the researcher's role changes considerably. Instead of determining teachers' personal traits and epistemological make-up, the researcher should sensitize teachers to the subtle ways epistemological beliefs are enmeshed within their day-to-day professional lives, focusing on the complex fabric of the teaching practice.

Authoritarianism The Role of Threat, Evolutionary Psychology, and the Will to Power

Abstract: It has been demonstrated empirically and theoretically that threat is a primary contributor to the increased manifestations of the authoritarian personality. However, most conceptualizations of aut...

Special Section: The Problem of Psychology and the Integration of Human Knowledge: Contrasting Wilson's Consilience with the Tree of Knowledge System

Abstract: The central thesis of this essay is that the problem of psychology lies at the very heart of the difficulties associated with integrating human knowledge. The startling consequence of this insight ...

Conjoint Measurement and the Rasch Paradox: A Response to Kyngdon

Abstract: Unlike Andrew Kyngdon, I think the issue he has addressed is most informatively considered outside the confines of the representational theory of measurement. Then it becomes clear that while the theory of conjoint measurement is about situations like that treated by the Rasch model, the former isolates a different feature of those situations to the latter. But, if the relevant attributes are already presumed to be quantitative, the perceived differences are minimized and the Rasch model might seem to be a version of conjoint measurement. It is on this basis that Rasch modellers pursue their paradoxical quest for measurement. However, because the relevant attributes are not actually known to be quantitative, use of the Rasch model to measure psychological attributes remains logically dependent upon the outcome of research involving the theory of conjoint measurement or something very similar.

Toward a Reflexive Positive Psychology Insights from the Chinese Buddhist Notion of Emptiness

Abstract: This paper claims that the missing value dimension in positive psychology's model of the good life is attributable to its focus on the unreflective first-order desires, as exemplified by hope theory, and its misguided claim of scientific neutrality that renders invisible the moral maps of human experiences. It is argued that the solution of the problem lies in self-reflexivity, which is an extra mental space needed for the drawing and redrawing of moral maps. Exposition of self-reflexivity shows how a self-to-self transaction adds a so far neglected intrapersonal dimension to cross-cultural analysis, and how moral maps are rendered visible and transformative in second-order desires, as exemplified by the Chinese Buddhist notions of savoring and `emptiness.'

The Rasch Model and Conjoint Measurement Theory from the Perspective of Psychometrics

Abstract: Kyngdon argues that psychometricians have erroneously claimed the Rasch model to be an instance of representational measurement, because the Rasch model does not map a bona fide empirical relational system (ERS) into a numerical relational system (NRS). While we agree that one does not automatically achieve a conjoint measurement representation upon fitting a Rasch model, we do not agree that the Rasch model could not in principle yield such a representation. In our view, whether this is possible depends on what one is prepared to accept as an empirical relational system. This is a philosophical question that extends beyond the scope of the formal structures advanced in representationalism and psychometrics; a question, moreover, that is not currently settled. We examine some of the ways in which one may react to this question, and conclude that Kyngdon’s argument depends on a specific, and perhaps too strong, interpretation of representationalism and psychometric models.

An Interactivist-Hermeneutic Metatheory for Positive Psychology

Abstract: Drawing on Bickhard's interactivism along with philosophical hermeneutics, we outline a plausible ontology of human action and development that might serve as a metatheory for positive psychology. Our nondualistic metatheory rests on a distributed notion of agency. The kinds of morally imbued social practices that are identified by hermeneutic theorists constitute one level of agency. At the first level of agency, persons are already committed, at least by implication, to folk psychologies that cover positive emotion, positive traits, and positive institutions. Higher levels of agency and knowing emerge through the process of development. The higher knowing levels incorporate the capacity for conscious self-reflexive awareness, which permits the person to consciously deliberate and form theories of the good person and the good life. These more consciously formed positive folk psychologies are always in a dialectical relationship with the more implicit and embodied understandings of the good life as manife...

'Mind as feeling' or affective relations?: A contribution to the school of Andersonian realism.

Abstract: Andersonian realism is a determinist, empiricist position that acknowledges the important distinction between qualities and relations. However, Anderson's 'mind as feeling' thesis, proposing that the mind's qualities are emotional, is problematic since it fails to account for 'feelings' themselves. O'Neil's (1934) alternative relational account of affects, in conjunction with Maze's (1983) theory of instinctual drives, provides a coherent platform for developing a comprehensive realist account of affects. In discussing the relation between affects, cognition and motivation, affects are viewed as drive-evaluative phenomena, and 'feelings' are known bodily states arising in conjunction with motivationally driven environmental evaluations. The role that affects play in a revised desire/belief model of behaviour explanation is discussed.

Special Section: Religion as a Large-Scale Justification System: Does the Justification Hypothesis Explain Animistic Attribution?

Abstract: One important goal in Henriques' (2003) Tree of Knowledge (ToK) System is to develop a theory of the emergence of culture. The Justification Hypothesis (JH), which is offered as the missing joint point connecting the cultural sciences to the other sciences, is hoped to be the key to understanding how the evolution of the human mind led to the emergence of cultures conceived as large-scale justification systems. This essay suggests that the origins of religion are connected to human evolution through the development of a Theory of Mind (ToM) and the looking-glass self (Shaffer, 2005). Since ToM is dependent upon the ability to perceive the intentions behind the actions of others, a capacity known as `mind-reading' (Bering, 2002), the JH suggests that religion will emerge as humans turn their mind-reading capacities toward naturally occurring events and engage in animistic attribution (Shaffer, 1984). Religion produces moral codes to help individuals justify themselves, but also produces theodicies which se...

Psychoanalytic Theory and Psychology Conditions of Possibility for Clinical and Cultural Practice

Abstract: This special issue addresses a series of critical theoretical questions concerning the emergence and history of psychoanalysis in different cultural settings. Contributors from different parts of the world bring their particular local vantage points to bear on traditions of psychoanalysis, treated here as forms of clinical practice and as an array of cultural representations of internal mental states and social relations. The theoretical focus is on the status of psychoanalysis as a form of knowledge (positioned alongside and in contradistinction to psychology), on the nature of knowledge in psychology (of others by practitioners and researchers), and on forms of popularized self-knowledge (including the relationship between that self-knowledge and professional claims). The inclusion of such material in a psychology journal begs a series of questions about the relationship between psychoanalysis and psychology and the historical conjuncture at which it would seem appropriate to re-examine this relationshi...

Honor as a Moral Category: A Historical-Linguistic Analysis

Abstract: In Henry IV, Part I, Shakespeare has the witty character Falstaff, in his cynical way, declare that honor is only a word. The scene is the preparation for the Battle of Shrewsbury, which is to be the climax of the play. The evening before the battle, Falstaff says farewell to Prince Henry and tells him that he wishes it were near bedtime and that all is well. The Prince retorts: “Why, thou owest God a death” and exits. Alone, Falstaff begins to ponder the source of his motivation for joining the battle and risking his life. He concludes that honor, the great motivator, is worthless except for those who are dead: What is honour? A word. What is in that word honour? What is that honour? Air. A trim reckoning! Who hath it? He that died a-Wednesday. Doth he feel it? No. Doth he hear it? No. ‘Tis insensible, then? Yea, to the dead. But will it not live with the living? No. Why? Detraction will not suffer it. Therefore I’ll none of it. Honour is a mere scutcheon-and so ends my catechism. (Shakespeare, 1598/1994, V.l.127–141)

Towards an embodiment of goals

Abstract: This paper discusses both a dissociation view and a dynamic view with respect to the study of voluntary, goal-directed behavior. The dissociation view builds on the recently reintroduced ideomotor principle, and conceives of clearly dissociated and hierarchical roles for the planning and control of action. The dynamic view has a more integral and dynamic conception of how planning, control, and timing merge in the guidance of behavior. This view, however, lacks a clear way of encompassing the goaldirectedness of behavior. For behavior to be effective and efficient, sensory information has to play an equally important role in guiding action as goal-related information does. As a third view, a dynamic action-selection approach is introduced by combining aspects of the former two. This model is able to merge ideomotor and sensorimotor processes continuously and in real time. In discussing the action-selection approach, a special emphasis is given to the role of long-term influences like preferences and goals.

Demonstration in Experimental Phenomenology How to Bring out Perceptual Laws

Abstract: This paper analyses the method of demonstration in experimental phenomenology. The theoretical basis of experimental phenomenology and meanings of demonstration in psychology are examined. The term `demonstration' in psychology typically means the presentation of concrete illustrations of facts generally to teach or to persuade scientifically, the reference to conclusive observational proof derived from theoretical arguments and opposition to the definition of experiment. The methodological inadequacies of these meanings for experimental phenomenology are illustrated. In experimental phenomenology the aim of the demonstration is to show the evidence for a law using a non-propositional argument. Two examples of demonstration from the studies of Wertheimer and Michotte are analysed.

On Looking Inward Revisiting the Role of Introspection in Neuroscientific and Psychiatric Research

Abstract: Much of mainstream psychology and psychiatry has come under the umbrella of cognitive neuroscience and attempts to provide mechanistic accounts of mental processes. On the other hand, therapeutically oriented branches of psychiatry are concerned with giving accounts at a personal, experiential level of explanation. Relating introspective evidence (first-person perspective) to objective (third-person perspective) evidence is a key challenge for psychology and psychiatry and will be of significance for the unification of the two approaches. In this paper we show that in current neuroscientific experiments different forms of introspective evidence are used. Guided introspection inplies a conscious response to an ongoing stimulus. In unguided introspection, subjects are invited to report freely about 'what it is like' to be a subject undergoing an experiment. In neurophenomenology, a method is offered to guide reflexive examination of ongoing subjective experience. Some neurophenomenologists presuppose that it is possible to derive phenomenological 'invariants' from the analysis of phenomenal experience. We conclude that contemporary neuroscience allows subjective report to be part of its methodology, but that the added value and specificity of the neurophenomenological training remain to be established.

The Sources of Cooperation: On Strong Reciprocity and its Theoretical Implications

Abstract: This article focuses on the explanations of human cooperation that dominate the fields of psychology, philosophy, economics, and other social sciences. It argues that these accounts all frame cooperation in egois- tic terms and thus cannot solve the evolutionary puzzle of strong reciproc- ity, defined as a propensity to cooperate with others similarly disposed and to punish others who violate norms, even at a personal cost and without any prospect of present or future rewards. This article shows that strong reci- procity accounts for the uniquely high levels of human cooperation and is best explained by referring to the important role of culture in natural selec- tion. In the end, it aims to analyze the implications of these insights for the interdisciplinary aim of understanding the sources of cooperation.

Shallow Reductionism and the Problem of Complexity in Psychology

Abstract: In his recent book The Mind Doesn't Work That Way, Fodor argues that computational modeling of global cognitive processes, such as abductive everyday reasoning, has not been successful. In this article the problem is analyzed in the framework of algorithmic information theory. It is argued that the failed approaches are characterized by shallow reductionism, which is rejected in favor of deep reductionism and nonreductionism.