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Open AccessJournal ArticleDOI

Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions

Tuomas Sandholm
- 01 Feb 2002 - 
- Vol. 135, Iss: 1, pp 1-54
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TLDR
The algorithm allows combinatorial auctions to scale up to significantly larger numbers of items and bids than prior approaches to optimal winner determination by capitalizing on the fact that the space of bids is sparsely populated in practice.
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This article is published in Artificial Intelligence.The article was published on 2002-02-01 and is currently open access. It has received 1045 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Combinatorial auction & Common value auction.

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Book ChapterDOI

Approximation algorithms for k-duplicates combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders

TL;DR: This paper studies the problem of maximizing welfare in combinatorial auctions with k duplicates of each item, where bidders are subadditive, and gives a factor-O (√m) approximation algorithm for k-duplicates combinatorially auctions with sub additive valuations using value queries.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with vcg payments

Abstract: In a combinatorial auction, there are multiple items for sale, and bidders are allowed to place a bid on a bundle of these items rather than just on the individual items. A key problem in this and similar settings is that of strategic bidding, where bidders misreport their true preferences in order to effect a better outcome for themselves. The VCG payment scheme is the canonical method for motivating the bidders to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG payment scheme: the problem of revenue guarantees, and that of collusion. The existence of such problems is known by many; in this paper, we lay out their full extent. We study four settings: combinatorial forward auctions with free disposal, combinatorial reverse auctions with free disposal, combinatorial forward (or reverse) auctions without free disposal, and combinatorial exchanges. In each setting, we give an example of how additional bidders (colluders) can make the outcome much worse (less revenue or higher cost) under the VCG payment scheme (but not under a first price scheme); derive necessary and sufficient conditions for such an effective collusion to be possible under the VCG payment scheme; and (when nontrivial) study the computational complexity of deciding whether these conditions hold.

Monte carlo algorithms for expected utility estimation in dynamic purchasing

TL;DR: In this article, the authors describe a theory for decision-making in a dynamic purchasing environment where one of possibly many bundles of items must be purchased from possibly many suppliers, and use the PQR protocol to facilitate the exchange of probabilistic and temporal information between suppliers and purchasers.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

The Implementation of Zoning for Winner Determination in Combinatorial Spectrum Auction

TL;DR: The Brute Force and Dynamic Programming technique is used and results establish that the partially zone is producing the highest revenue, followed by partually block zone scheme, then the all or nothing scheme.

Incrementally Refined Acquaintance Model for Distributed Planning in a Semi-Trusted Environment

TL;DR: A specific interaction protocol based on incremental improvement of the social knowledge of agents, the Incrementally Refined Acquaintance Model (IRAM), is presented and justification for its deployment in a specific distributed planning scenario is provided.
References
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Book

Introduction to Algorithms

TL;DR: The updated new edition of the classic Introduction to Algorithms is intended primarily for use in undergraduate or graduate courses in algorithms or data structures and presents a rich variety of algorithms and covers them in considerable depth while making their design and analysis accessible to all levels of readers.
Book ChapterDOI

Reducibility Among Combinatorial Problems

TL;DR: The work of Dantzig, Fulkerson, Hoffman, Edmonds, Lawler and other pioneers on network flows, matching and matroids acquainted me with the elegant and efficient algorithms that were sometimes possible.
Book

Integer programming

TL;DR: The principles of integer programming are directed toward finding solutions to problems from the fields of economic planning, engineering design, and combinatorial optimization as mentioned in this paper, which is a standard of graduate-level courses since 1972.
Journal ArticleDOI

Incentives in Teams

Theodore Groves
- 01 Jul 1973 - 
TL;DR: This paper analyzes the problem of inducing the members of an organization to behave as if they formed a team and exhibits a particular set of compensation rules, an optimal incentive structure, that leads to team behavior.