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Open AccessJournal ArticleDOI

Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions

Tuomas Sandholm
- 01 Feb 2002 - 
- Vol. 135, Iss: 1, pp 1-54
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TLDR
The algorithm allows combinatorial auctions to scale up to significantly larger numbers of items and bids than prior approaches to optimal winner determination by capitalizing on the fact that the space of bids is sparsely populated in practice.
About
This article is published in Artificial Intelligence.The article was published on 2002-02-01 and is currently open access. It has received 1045 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Combinatorial auction & Common value auction.

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Citations
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Book ChapterDOI

Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that the amount of information elicited is a vanishing fraction of the information collected in traditional direct revelation mechanisms, where bidders reveal all their valuation information.
Journal ArticleDOI

A Branch-and-Price Algorithm and New Test Problems for Spectrum Auctions

TL;DR: A branch-and-price algorithm based on a set-packing formulation originally proposed by Dietrich and Forrest that can solve all but one test problem within 10 minutes, appears to be very robust, and for difficult instances compares favorably to the natural formulation solved using a commercial optimization package with default settings.
Journal ArticleDOI

Optimization in electronic markets: examples in combinatorial auctions

TL;DR: An analysis of the complexity of the problem to assign bids to bidders in combinatorial auctions shows that the case of identical assets can be solved in polynomial time, and an algorithm to solve small and medium sized instances in a limited time using standard software is presented.
Book ChapterDOI

Grid resource commercialization: economic engineering and delivery scenarios

TL;DR: This chapter provides a conceptual framework for Grid resource commercialization including both the understanding of the underlying resource commodity characteristics and also the delivery context, and derives required architectural features for commercialization using inspiration from conventional utilities and considering the deliverycontext of Grid resources.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges

TL;DR: This paper gives an example of how additional bidders can make the outcome much worse under the VCG mechanism (but not under a first price mechanism); derive necessary and sufficient conditions for such an effective collusion to be possible under theVCG mechanism; study the computational complexity of deciding whether these conditions hold.
References
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Book

Introduction to Algorithms

TL;DR: The updated new edition of the classic Introduction to Algorithms is intended primarily for use in undergraduate or graduate courses in algorithms or data structures and presents a rich variety of algorithms and covers them in considerable depth while making their design and analysis accessible to all levels of readers.
Book ChapterDOI

Reducibility Among Combinatorial Problems

TL;DR: The work of Dantzig, Fulkerson, Hoffman, Edmonds, Lawler and other pioneers on network flows, matching and matroids acquainted me with the elegant and efficient algorithms that were sometimes possible.
Book

Integer programming

TL;DR: The principles of integer programming are directed toward finding solutions to problems from the fields of economic planning, engineering design, and combinatorial optimization as mentioned in this paper, which is a standard of graduate-level courses since 1972.
Journal ArticleDOI

Incentives in Teams

Theodore Groves
- 01 Jul 1973 - 
TL;DR: This paper analyzes the problem of inducing the members of an organization to behave as if they formed a team and exhibits a particular set of compensation rules, an optimal incentive structure, that leads to team behavior.