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Open AccessJournal ArticleDOI

Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions

Tuomas Sandholm
- 01 Feb 2002 - 
- Vol. 135, Iss: 1, pp 1-54
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TLDR
The algorithm allows combinatorial auctions to scale up to significantly larger numbers of items and bids than prior approaches to optimal winner determination by capitalizing on the fact that the space of bids is sparsely populated in practice.
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This article is published in Artificial Intelligence.The article was published on 2002-02-01 and is currently open access. It has received 1045 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Combinatorial auction & Common value auction.

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Citations
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Proceedings ArticleDOI

A Web-Based Auction Platform for Electricity Retail Markets

TL;DR: Experimental results showed that the performance critical component of the platform performs quite satisfactory in terms of solution time & memory loads and the winner determination problem of combinatorial auctions - known to be NP-Hard is solved by using available commercial off the shelf optimizer.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

An auction mechanism for polynomial-time execution with combinatorial constraints

TL;DR: The conjecture that for a large class of auction instances, given a reasonable restriction on the input each bidder can provide, there exists an auction mechanism where the winner determination problem can be solved in polynomial time, at the same time as the expected result is more efficient than that of a conventional combinatorial auction is given.
Journal ArticleDOI

PP-VCA: A Privacy-Preserving and Verifiable Combinatorial Auction Mechanism

TL;DR: This paper exploits a privacy-preserving and verifiable combinatorial auction protocol (PP-VCA) to protect bidders’ privacy and ensure the correct auction price in a secure manner, in which a one-way and monotonically increasing function to protect a bidder’s bid is designed.
Proceedings Article

Market Clearing with Supply and Demand Curves

TL;DR: This work presents a fast polynomial-time algorithm for nondiscriminatory clearing, and shows that discriminatory clearing is NP-complete (even in a very special case); it is shown that in the more restricted setting of linear curves, even discriminatory markets can be cleared fast in polynometric time.
Book ChapterDOI

Computing a Payoff Division in the Least Core for MC-nets Coalitional Games

TL;DR: This work proposes a new algorithm that exploits the constraint generation technique to solve the linear programming problem that potentially has a huge number of constraints, and results are striking since, using 8 GB memory, the proposed algorithm can successfully compute a payoff division in the least core for the instances with up to 100 agents.
References
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Book

Introduction to Algorithms

TL;DR: The updated new edition of the classic Introduction to Algorithms is intended primarily for use in undergraduate or graduate courses in algorithms or data structures and presents a rich variety of algorithms and covers them in considerable depth while making their design and analysis accessible to all levels of readers.
Book ChapterDOI

Reducibility Among Combinatorial Problems

TL;DR: The work of Dantzig, Fulkerson, Hoffman, Edmonds, Lawler and other pioneers on network flows, matching and matroids acquainted me with the elegant and efficient algorithms that were sometimes possible.
Book

Integer programming

TL;DR: The principles of integer programming are directed toward finding solutions to problems from the fields of economic planning, engineering design, and combinatorial optimization as mentioned in this paper, which is a standard of graduate-level courses since 1972.
Journal ArticleDOI

Incentives in Teams

Theodore Groves
- 01 Jul 1973 - 
TL;DR: This paper analyzes the problem of inducing the members of an organization to behave as if they formed a team and exhibits a particular set of compensation rules, an optimal incentive structure, that leads to team behavior.