Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
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TLDR
The algorithm allows combinatorial auctions to scale up to significantly larger numbers of items and bids than prior approaches to optimal winner determination by capitalizing on the fact that the space of bids is sparsely populated in practice.About:
This article is published in Artificial Intelligence.The article was published on 2002-02-01 and is currently open access. It has received 1045 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Combinatorial auction & Common value auction.read more
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Journal ArticleDOI
Side constraints and non-price attributes in markets
Tuomas Sandholm,Subhash Suri +1 more
TL;DR: It is shown that side constraints (such as budget, limit on the number of winners, and exclusive-or) have a significant impact on the complexity of market clearing.
Journal ArticleDOI
Extremal behaviour in multiagent contract negotiation
TL;DR: This paper addresses the issue of the number of restricted rational deals that may be required to implement a particular reallocation when it is possible to do so and constructs examples showing that this number may be exponential, even when all of the agent utility functions are monotonic.
Book ChapterDOI
Nash Social Welfare in Multiagent Resource Allocation
Sara Ramezani,Ulle Endriss +1 more
TL;DR: The problem of finding an optimal outcome is NP-hard for a number of different languages for representing agent preferences; new results regarding convergence to Nash-optimal outcomes in a distributed negotiation framework are established and algorithms similar to those applied in combinatorial auctions are designed and tested.
Journal ArticleDOI
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Bidder-Determined Combinations
TL;DR: It is shown that the use of approximate single-item prices with endogenous bidding always produces allocations that are at least as efficient as those from bidding with a fixed set of packages based on package pricing.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
On the computational power of iterative auctions
Liad Blumrosen,Noam Nisan +1 more
TL;DR: A large number of results are proved showing the boundaries of what can be achieved by auctions of this kind, first on auctions that use a polynomial number of demand queries, and then on different kinds of ascending-price auctions.
References
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Book
Introduction to Algorithms
TL;DR: The updated new edition of the classic Introduction to Algorithms is intended primarily for use in undergraduate or graduate courses in algorithms or data structures and presents a rich variety of algorithms and covers them in considerable depth while making their design and analysis accessible to all levels of readers.
Book ChapterDOI
Reducibility Among Combinatorial Problems
TL;DR: The work of Dantzig, Fulkerson, Hoffman, Edmonds, Lawler and other pioneers on network flows, matching and matroids acquainted me with the elegant and efficient algorithms that were sometimes possible.
Book
Integer programming
TL;DR: The principles of integer programming are directed toward finding solutions to problems from the fields of economic planning, engineering design, and combinatorial optimization as mentioned in this paper, which is a standard of graduate-level courses since 1972.
Journal ArticleDOI
Incentives in Teams
TL;DR: This paper analyzes the problem of inducing the members of an organization to behave as if they formed a team and exhibits a particular set of compensation rules, an optimal incentive structure, that leads to team behavior.