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Open AccessJournal ArticleDOI

Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions

Tuomas Sandholm
- 01 Feb 2002 - 
- Vol. 135, Iss: 1, pp 1-54
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TLDR
The algorithm allows combinatorial auctions to scale up to significantly larger numbers of items and bids than prior approaches to optimal winner determination by capitalizing on the fact that the space of bids is sparsely populated in practice.
About
This article is published in Artificial Intelligence.The article was published on 2002-02-01 and is currently open access. It has received 1045 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Combinatorial auction & Common value auction.

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Citations
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Book

Algorithmic Game Theory

TL;DR: A new era of theoretical computer science addresses fundamental problems about auctions, networks, and human behavior in a bid to solve the challenges of 21st Century finance.
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Combinatorial Auctions

TL;DR: It's important for you to start having that hobby that will lead you to join in better concept of life and reading will be a positive activity to do every time.
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Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey

TL;DR: The state of knowledge about the design of combinatorial auctions is surveyed and some new insights are presented.
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Market-Based Multirobot Coordination: A Survey and Analysis

TL;DR: An introduction to market-based multirobot coordination is provided, a review and analysis of the state of the art in the field, and a discussion of remaining research challenges are discussed.
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Consensus-Based Decentralized Auctions for Robust Task Allocation

TL;DR: This paper addresses task allocation to coordinate a fleet of autonomous vehicles by presenting two decentralized algorithms: the consensus-based auction algorithm (CBAA) and its generalization to the multi-assignment problem, i.e., theensus-based bundle algorithm ( CBBA).
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

Selling Spectrum Rights

TL;DR: The design of the FCC spectrum-license auction is a case study in the application of economic theory as discussed by the authors, and auction theory helped address policy questions such as: Should an open auction or a sealed-bid auction be used? Should the licenses be auctioned sequentially or simultaneously, should the government allow bids for combinations of licenses, or should it accept only single-license bids? How should the auction be structured to promote the interests of minority-owned and other designated firms?
Posted Content

Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction

TL;DR: The uses of economic theory in the initial design and later improvement of the “simultaneous ascending auction,” which was developed initially for the sale of radio spectrum licenses in the United States, is reviewed.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions

TL;DR: It is proved that the LP approach is an optimal allocation if and only if prices can be attached to single items in the auction, and suggests greedy and branch-andbound heuristics based on LP for other cases.
Journal ArticleDOI

Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction

TL;DR: In this article, the authors review the uses of economic theory in the initial design and later improvement of the simultaneous ascending auction, which was developed initially for the sale of radio spectrum licenses in the United States.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

The Michigan Internet AuctionBot: a configurable auction server for human and software agents

TL;DR: The Michigan Internet AuctionBot is a scalable and robust auction server that supports both software and human agents and is used extensively in classroom exercises and is available to the general Internet population.