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Open AccessProceedings Article

An evaluation of the Google Chrome extension security architecture

TLDR
A security review of 100 Chrome extensions finds that banning HTTP scripts and inline scripts would prevent 47 of the 50 most severe vulnerabilities with only modest impact on developers.
Abstract
Vulnerabilities in browser extensions put users at risk by providing a way for website and network attackers to gain access to users' private data and credentials. Extensions can also introduce vulnerabilities into the websites that they modify. In 2009, Google Chrome introduced a new extension platform with several features intended to prevent and mitigate extension vulnerabilities: strong isolation between websites and extensions, privilege separation within an extension, and an extension permission system. We performed a security review of 100 Chrome extensions and found 70 vulnerabilities across 40 extensions. Given these vulnerabilities, we evaluate how well each of the security mechanisms defends against extension vulnerabilities. We find that the mechanisms mostly succeed at preventing direct web attacks on extensions, but new security mechanisms are needed to protect users from network attacks on extensions, website metadata attacks on extensions, and vulnerabilities that extensions add to websites. We propose and evaluate additional defenses, and we conclude that banning HTTP scripts and inline scripts would prevent 47 of the 50 most severe vulnerabilities with only modest impact on developers.

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How You Get Shot in the Back: A Systematical Study about Cryptojacking in the Real World

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Protecting users by confining JavaScript with COWL

TL;DR: COWL introduces label-based mandatory access control to browsing contexts in a way that is fully backward-compatible with legacy web content and allows both the inclusion of untrusted scripts in applications and the building of mashups that combine sensitive information from multiple mutually distrusting origins, all while protecting users' privacy.
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Trends and lessons from three years fighting malicious extensions

TL;DR: This work exposes wide-spread efforts by criminals to abuse the Chrome Web Store as a platform for distributing malicious extensions and highlights that the extension abuse ecosystem is drastically different from malicious binaries: miscreants profit from web traffic and user tracking rather than email spam or banking theft.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

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TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the mechanics of protecting computer-stored information from unauthorized use or modification, focusing on those architectural structures-whether hardware or software-that are necessary to support information protection.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

Android permissions demystified

TL;DR: Stowaway, a tool that detects overprivilege in compiled Android applications, is built and finds that about one-third of applications are overprivileged.
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Preventing privilege escalation

TL;DR: The design and analysis of the "Systrace" facility is presented which supports fine grained process confinement, intrusion detection, auditing and privilege elevation, and it is shown that Systrace is efficient and does not impose significant performance penalties.
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The effectiveness of application permissions

TL;DR: The results indicate that application permissions can have a positive impact on system security when applications' permission requirements are declared up-front by the developer, but can be improved.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

The eval that men do: A large-scale study of the use of eval in javascript applications

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a large-scale study of the use of eval in JavaScript-based web applications, and provide statistics on the nature and content of strings used in eval expressions, as well as their provenance and data obtained by observing their dynamic behavior.
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