Committee selection with multimodal preferences
Pallavi Jain,Nimrod Talmon +1 more
- Vol. 325, pp 123-130
TLDR
This work designs efficient algorithms for certain cases of committee selection with multimodal preferences and discusses applications of the model and the computational complexity of several generalizations of known committee scoring rules to this setting.Abstract:
We study committee selection with multimodal preferences: Assuming a set of candidatesA, a set of voters V , and ` layers, where each voter v ∈ V has ordinal preferences over the alternatives for each layer separately, the task is to select a committee S ⊆ A of size k. We discuss applications of our model and study the computational complexity of several generalizations of known committee scoring rules (specifically, k-Borda and Chamberlin–Courant) to our setting, as well as discuss domain restrictions for our model. While most problems we encounter are computationally intractable in general, we nevertheless design efficient algorithms for certain cases.read more
Citations
More filters
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Position-Based Matching with Multi-Modal Preferences
TL;DR: In this article , the authors introduce three position-based matching models, which minimize the "dissatisfaction score", which measures matchings from different perspectives, and present diverse complexity results for these three models, among others, polynomial-time solvability for the first model.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Stable Matching with Multilayer Approval Preferences: Approvals can be Harder than Strict Preferences
TL;DR: In this paper , the complexity of stable matching problems with multilayer approval preferences was studied and eleven stability notions derived from three well-established stability notions for stable matchings with ties and four adaptions proposed by Chen et al.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Distortion in Attribute Approval Committee Elections
Dorothea Baumeister,Linus Boes +1 more
TL;DR: In this article , the distortion in attribute approval committee elections is studied, where each candidate satisfies a variety of attributes in different categories (e.g., academic degree, work experience, lo-cation).
Journal ArticleDOI
Multi-votes Election Control by Selecting Rules
Aizhong Zhou,Jianliang Xu +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors considered a new model of election control that by assigning different rules to the votes from different layers, makes the special candidate p being the winner of the election (a rule can be assigned to different layers).
References
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
On the Rationale of Group Decision-making
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a type of reasoning which will contribute to the development of the theory of tradeunions, the firm, and the cartel; and provide the basis for a theory of the equilibrium distribution of taxation or of public expenditure.
Journal ArticleDOI
Fixed-parameter tractability and completeness II: on completeness for W [1]
TL;DR: This work shows that INDEPENDENT SET is complete for W, and the W Hierarchy of parameterized problems was defined, and complete problems were identified for the classes W [ t ] for t ⩾ 2.
Journal ArticleDOI
On the complexity of achieving proportional representation
TL;DR: It is demonstrated that winner selection in two prominent proportional representation voting systems is a computationally intractable problem—implying that these systems are impractical when the assembly is large, and in settings where the size of the Assembly is constant, the problem can be solved in polynomial time.
Journal ArticleDOI
On the computation of fully proportional representation
TL;DR: This work investigates two systems of fully proportional representation suggested by Chamberlin & Courant and Monroe and investigates the parameterized complexity of winner determination of the two classical and two new rules with respect to several parameters.