Committee selection with multimodal preferences
Pallavi Jain,Nimrod Talmon +1 more
- Vol. 325, pp 123-130
TLDR
This work designs efficient algorithms for certain cases of committee selection with multimodal preferences and discusses applications of the model and the computational complexity of several generalizations of known committee scoring rules to this setting.Abstract:
We study committee selection with multimodal preferences: Assuming a set of candidatesA, a set of voters V , and ` layers, where each voter v ∈ V has ordinal preferences over the alternatives for each layer separately, the task is to select a committee S ⊆ A of size k. We discuss applications of our model and study the computational complexity of several generalizations of known committee scoring rules (specifically, k-Borda and Chamberlin–Courant) to our setting, as well as discuss domain restrictions for our model. While most problems we encounter are computationally intractable in general, we nevertheless design efficient algorithms for certain cases.read more
Citations
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
Position-Based Matching with Multi-Modal Preferences
TL;DR: In this article , the authors introduce three position-based matching models, which minimize the "dissatisfaction score", which measures matchings from different perspectives, and present diverse complexity results for these three models, among others, polynomial-time solvability for the first model.
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Stable Matching with Multilayer Approval Preferences: Approvals can be Harder than Strict Preferences
TL;DR: In this paper , the complexity of stable matching problems with multilayer approval preferences was studied and eleven stability notions derived from three well-established stability notions for stable matchings with ties and four adaptions proposed by Chen et al.
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Distortion in Attribute Approval Committee Elections
Dorothea Baumeister,Linus Boes +1 more
TL;DR: In this article , the distortion in attribute approval committee elections is studied, where each candidate satisfies a variety of attributes in different categories (e.g., academic degree, work experience, lo-cation).
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Multi-votes Election Control by Selecting Rules
Aizhong Zhou,Jianliang Xu +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors considered a new model of election control that by assigning different rules to the votes from different layers, makes the special candidate p being the winner of the election (a rule can be assigned to different layers).
References
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Multiwinner Elections with Diversity Constraints
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Stable Matching with Uncertain Pairwise Preferences
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