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Open AccessJournal ArticleDOI

Conditional cooperation: Type stability across games

Michael Eichenseer, +1 more
- 01 Mar 2020 - 
- Vol. 188, pp 108941
TLDR
In this paper, the authors explore the within subject stability of cooperation preferences in a one-shot public goods game and a sequential prisoner's dilemma game, and they find that the prisoner-s dilemma performs well in identifying conditional cooperators while it is only an imperfect tool for identifying selfish types.
About: 
This article is published in Economics Letters.The article was published on 2020-03-01 and is currently open access. It has received 3 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Public goods game & Dilemma.

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Decision-making in complex and uncertain environments - Experimental studies in behavioral economics

Johannes Moser
TL;DR: In this article, a large body of empirical evidence that people do not always behave according to game theoretic predictions in many economic or social environments is presented, and the authors address issues related to such forms of boundedly rational behavior and non-standard utility maximization.
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Nasty and Noble Notes: Interdependence Structures Drive Self-Serving Gossip.

Terence D. Dores Cruz, +3 more
- 25 May 2023 - 
TL;DR: In this article , the authors examined the trustworthiness of gossip in a scenario study (Nsenders = 350, Nobservations = 700) and an interactive laboratory experiment (Nenders = 126; Nobservants = 3024).
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Social Preferences and the Variability of Conditional Cooperation

Malte Baader, +3 more
- 01 Jan 2022 - 
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors examined how the incentive to defect in a social dilemma game affects conditional cooperation and found that most second-movers change strategies between games, consistent with both social preference models and stochastic choice models.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

One bad apple? Heterogeneity and information in public good provision

Angela C. M. de Oliveira, +2 more
- 01 Jan 2015 - 
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors identify two mechanisms for the effect of selfish players' behavior: selfish players contribute less, and selfish players induce lower contributions from the conditional cooperators, and this effect increases the number of selfish participants.
Journal ArticleDOI

Strong, Bold, and Kind: Self-Control and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Martin G. Kocher, +5 more
- 31 Mar 2017 - 
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed a model that relates self-control to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas, and test the model in a laboratory public goods experiment, and found a robust association between stronger self control and higher levels of cooperation, and the association is at its strongest when the decision maker's risk aversion is low and the cooperation levels of others high.
Journal ArticleDOI

Identifying discrete behavioural types: a re-analysis of public goods game contributions by hierarchical clustering

Francesco Fallucchi, +2 more
TL;DR: This work re-analyse data from six previous studies of public goods voluntary contribution games and constructs a typology of behaviour based on a similarity measure between strategies that produces a classification in which different types are more clearly distinguished in terms of strategic behaviour and the resulting economic implications.
Journal ArticleDOI

Revealed preferences in a sequential prisoners’ dilemma: A horse-race between six utility functions

Topi Miettinen, +3 more
- 01 May 2020 - 
TL;DR: The authors investigate behavior and beliefs in a sequential prisoner's dilemma, where each subject had to choose an action as first mover and a conditional action as second mover, and all subjects also had to state their beliefs about others' second-mover choices.
Journal ArticleDOI

The role of leaders in inducing and maintaining cooperation: The CC strategy

Michael Kosfeld
- 01 Jun 2020 - 
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss recent findings from behavioral economic experiments in the lab and in the field on the role of leaders in human cooperation and derive three implications for leadership, which are summarized under the notion CC strategy.
Frequently Asked Questions (10)
Q1. What have the authors contributed in "Conditional cooperation: type stability across games" ?

In this paper, the authors use an experimental setup to classify cooperation types using a sequential prisoner ’ s dilemma and a one shot sequential public goods game. In these two games, the authors examine the within subject stability of cooperation preferences. Regarding discrete behavioral types, the authors find that the prisoner ’ s dilemma performs well in identifying conditional cooperators while it is only an imperfect tool for identifying selfish types in the public goods game. Their results suggest that subjects classified as conditional cooperators in the prisoner ’ s dilemma match others ’ contributions in the public goods game to a significantly larger degree compared to other types, which indicates a substantial consistency. 

The resulting payoff of player i with initial endowment yi = 20 POINTS is given by:πi = yi − gi + α 4∑j=1gjwhere gi ∈ [0, 20] denotes individual contributions and α = 0.4 is the marginal per capita return (MPCR) of the public good. 

In total, 232 participants took part in the experiment earning $2.85 on average with an average completion time of approximately 13 minutes. 

individuals classified as ‘selfish’ in SPD, are classified as ‘selfish’ according to FGF-T only in around 34.6% of the cases. 

Compared to subjects classified as ‘selfish’ in SPD, contributions of ‘conditional cooperators’ (CC) have a decisively steeper slope in the contributions of others, i.e., they match others’ contributions to a larger degree. 

The refinement of Thöni and Volk (2018) of FGF (FGF-T hereafter) resembles a theory-driven approach and is based on the Pearson correlation coefficient. 

This indicates that SPD performs well in identifying subjects who have a consistent pattern of conditional cooperation across games, while this does not hold for selfish types. 

Given that a subject is of CC type in SPD, the probability is 93.3% to be classified as CC as well according to FGF-T (refinement of Thöni and Volk, 2018) and 88.8% according to FGF-F (refinement of Fallucchi, Luccasen, and Turocy, 2018), respectively. 

If the authors look at the conditional relative frequencies,we see that conditional on being classified as CC type in SPD, the relative frequency is 88.8% to be classified as either WCC or SCC according to FGF-F. 

By contrast, a subject classified as selfish in SPD is only selfish in 39.7% of the cases according to FGF-F.Starting from FGF-F, a subject sorted in the group of selfish types according to FGF-F, is also selfish in SPD in 72.1% of the cases.