Journal ArticleDOI
Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style
TLDR
In this paper, an analysis of the Nash equilibria of choices to vote strategically or nonstrategically in the Powell amendment is presented, where some legislators apparently voted strategically and others, equally able to do so, still did not.Abstract:
This article is aimed at integrating two kinds of analysis of legislators' calculations of advantage. We assume that legislators operate in two arenas, in the legislative arena itself, where their calculations of advantage concern simply their effectiveness in voting (Farquharson), and in the electoral arena, where their calculations concern the rewards for their position-taking as well as their effectiveness (Fenno). Our analysis is introduced by an interpretation of voting on the Powell amendment, 1956, when some legislators apparently voted strategically and others, equally able to do so, still did not. We then develop an expected utility model of voting that accounts for such divergent choices in terms of legislators' individual beliefs about the distribution of opinions in the legislature (Farquharson) and in their constituencies (Fenno). We conclude with an analysis of the Nash equilibria of choices to vote strategically or nonstrategically.read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a theory of ratification in the context of domestic political games and international political games, which is applicable to many other political phenomena, such as dependency, legislative committees, and multiparty coalitions.
Journal ArticleDOI
A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics
TL;DR: In this article, the behavioral and information cost assumptions that underlie instrumental rationality and the consequent a-institutional world of neoclassical theory are described and described. But they do not specify and describe the behavioral cost assumptions of instrumental rationality.
Book ChapterDOI
The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the power of congressional standing committees rests on their domination of conference committees and that the parent houses must approve or disapprove of conference reports without amendment.
Book
Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives
Gary W. Cox,Mathew D. McCubbins +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the majority party has cartelized agenda power in the U.S. House since the adoption of Reed's rules in 1890 and present a series of empirical tests of that theory's predictions.
Journal ArticleDOI
Institutions and economic growth: An historical introduction
TL;DR: In this paper, the interdependence of political and economic institutions is examined against premises in neoclassical theories of economies, which maintain that population and savings are the principal determinants of economic growth.
References
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Book
An Economic Theory of Democracy
TL;DR: Downs presents a rational calculus of voting that has inspired much of the later work on voting and turnout as discussed by the authors, particularly significant was his conclusion that a rational voter should almost never bother to vote.
Book
Social Choice and Individual Values
TL;DR: Saari as mentioned in this paper introduced Arrow's Theorem and founded the field of social choice theory in economics and political science, and introduced a new foreword by Nobel laureate Eric Maskin, introducing Arrow's seminal book to a new generation of students and researchers.
Journal ArticleDOI
Social Choice and Individual Values.
Leo A. Goodman,Kenneth J. Arrow +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a destination search and find the appropriate manuals for their products, providing you with many Social Choice And Individual Values. You can find the manual you are interested in in printed form or even consider it online.
Book
Congress: The Electoral Connection
TL;DR: Mayhew argues that the principal motivation of legislators is reelection and that the pursuit of this goal affects the way they behave and the way that they make public policy as mentioned in this paper, and he argues that this is the case in many cases.