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MonographDOI

Foundations of Human Sociality - Economic Experiments and Ethnographic: Evidence From Fifteen Small-Scale Societies

TLDR
In this article, the authors measure social norms and preferences using experimental games and find substantial variation among social groups in Bargaining and Public Goods Behavior in an Egalitarian Society of Hunter-Gatherers.
Abstract
1. Introduction and Guide to the Volume 2. Overview and Synthesis 3. Measuring Social Norms and Preferences Using Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Sciences 4. Coalitional Effects on Reciprocal Fairness in the Ultimatum Game: A Case from the Ecuadorian Amazon 5. Comparative Experimental Evidence from Machiguenga, Mapuche, Huinca, and American Populations Shows Substantial Variation Among Social Groups in Bargaining and Public Goods Behavior 6. Dictators and Ultimatums in an Egalitarian Society of Hunter-Gatherers - the Hadza of Tanzania 7. Does Market Exposure Affect Economic Game Behavior? The Ultimatum Game and the Public Goods Game Among the Tsimane of Bolivia 8. Market Integration, Reciprocity, and Fairness in Rural Papua New Guinea: Results from a Two-Village Ultimatum Game Experiment 9. Ultimatum Game with an Ethnicity Manipulation: Results from Khovdiin Bulgan Sum, Mongolia 10. Kinship, Familiarity, and Trust: An Experimental Investigation 11. Community Structure, Mobility, and the Strength of Norms in an Africa Society: the Sangu of Tanzania 12. Market Integration and Fairness: Evidence from Ultimatum, Dictator, and Public Goods Experiments in East Africa 13. Economic Experiments to Examine Fairness and Cooperation among the Ache Indians of Paraguay 14. The Ultimatum Game, Fairness, and Cooperation among Big Game Hunters

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Book

The WEIRDest People in the World

TL;DR: A review of the comparative database from across the behavioral sciences suggests both that there is substantial variability in experimental results across populations and that WEIRD subjects are particularly unusual compared with the rest of the species – frequent outliers.
Journal ArticleDOI

E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty‐first Century The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture

TL;DR: The authors found that in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods residents of all races tend to "hunker down" and trust (even of one's own race) is lower, altruism and community cooperation rarer, friends fewer.
Journal ArticleDOI

The structure and dynamics of multilayer networks

TL;DR: This work offers a comprehensive review on both structural and dynamical organization of graphs made of diverse relationships (layers) between its constituents, and cover several relevant issues, from a full redefinition of the basic structural measures, to understanding how the multilayer nature of the network affects processes and dynamics.
Journal ArticleDOI

Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors describe the intellectual journey that has taken the last half century from when they began graduate studies in the late 1950s to the development of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty

TL;DR: Cumulative prospect theory as discussed by the authors applies to uncertain as well as to risky prospects with any number of outcomes, and it allows different weighting functions for gains and for losses, and two principles, diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion, are invoked to explain the characteristic curvature of the value function and the weighting function.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism

TL;DR: In this paper, a model is presented to account for the natural selection of what is termed reciprocally altruistic behavior, and the model shows how selection can operate against the cheater (non-reciprocator) in the system.
Journal ArticleDOI

A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation

TL;DR: This paper showed that if some people care about equity, the puzzles can be resolved and that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selesh types dominate equilibrium behavior in cooperative games.
Journal ArticleDOI

A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation

TL;DR: This article showed that if a fraction of the people exhibit inequality aversion, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish, and they also showed that when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperations are maintained.
Journal ArticleDOI

ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition

TL;DR: The authors demonstrate that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, and demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people were motivated by either their payoff or their relative standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern, which explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is played a role and games where competitive behavior is observed.