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Journal ArticleDOI

Informal institutions and comparative politics: a research agenda

TLDR
Levitsky et al. as mentioned in this paper developed a framework for studying informal institutions and integrating them into comparative institutional analysis, based on a typology of four patterns of formal-informal institutional interaction: complementary, accommodating, competing, and substitutive.
Abstract
Mainstream comparative research on political institutions focuses primarily on formal rules. Yet in many contexts, informal institutions, ranging from bureaucratic and legislative norms to clientelism and patrimonialism, shape even more strongly political behavior and outcomes. Scholars who fail to consider these informal rules of the game risk missing many of the most important incentives and constraints that underlie political behavior. In this article we develop a framework for studying informal institutions and integrating them into comparative institutional analysis. The framework is based on a typology of four patterns of formal-informal institutional interaction: complementary, accommodating, competing, and substitutive. We then explore two issues largely ignored in the literature on this subject: the reasons and mechanisms behind the emergence of informal institutions, and the nature of their stability and change. Finally, we consider challenges in research on informal institutions, including issues of identification, measurement, and comparison.Gretchen Helmke's book Courts Under Constraints: Judges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina, will be published by Cambridge University Press. Steven Levitsky is the author of Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective and is currently writing a book on competitive authoritarian regimes in the post–Cold War era. The authors thank the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University and the Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame for generously sponsoring conferences on informal institutions. The authors also gratefully acknowledge comments from Jorge Dominguez, Anna Grzymala-Busse, Dennis Galvan, Goran Hyden, Jack Knight, Lisa Martin, Hillel Soifer, Benjamin Smith, Susan Stokes, Maria Victoria Murillo, and Kurt Weyland, as well as three anonymous reviewers and the editors of Perspectives on Politics.

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A conceptual framework for analysing adaptive capacity and multi-level learning processes in resource governance regimes

TL;DR: In this article, the authors develop a conceptual framework addressing the dynamics and adaptive capacity of resource governance regimes as multi-level learning processes, where the influence of formal and informal institutions, the role of state and non-state actors, the nature of multilevel interactions and the relative importance of bureaucratic hierarchies, markets and networks are identified as major structural characteristics of governance regimes.
Journal ArticleDOI

Social Learning and Water Resources Management

TL;DR: In this paper, the role of frames and boundary management in processes of learning at different levels and time scales is investigated, based on conceptual considerations and empirical insights, suggest that the development of such institutional settings involves continued processes of social learning.
Journal ArticleDOI

Institutional Perspectives on Entrepreneurial Behavior in Challenging Environments

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the institutional embeddedness of entrepreneurial behavior and propose suggestions as to how to extend the current institutional approach by emphasizing that institutions not only influence entrepreneurs but entrepreneurs may also influence institutional development by contributing to institutional change.
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Differences in managerial discretion across countries: how nation‐level institutions affect the degree to which ceos matter

TL;DR: The concept of managerial discretion provides a theoretical fulcrum for resolving the debate about whether chief executive officers (CEOs) have much influence over company outcomes as discussed by the authors, and it has been shown that discretion mediates the relationship between national institutions and CEO effects on firm performance.
References
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Book

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TL;DR: Douglass C. North as discussed by the authors developed an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and over time.
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Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the role that institutions, defined as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, play in economic performance and how those institutions change and how a model of dynamic institutions explains the differential performance of economies through time.
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