Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self
TLDR
A predictive, inferential perspective on interoception: 'interoceptive inference' conceives of subjective feeling states (emotions) as arising from actively-inferred generative (predictive) models of the causes of interoceptive afferents.About:
This article is published in Trends in Cognitive Sciences.The article was published on 2013-11-01 and is currently open access. It has received 1104 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Perspective (graphical) & Cognition.read more
Citations
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"Cognitive, social, and physiological determinants of emotional state": Erratum
TL;DR: The problem of which cues, internal or external, permit a person to label and identify his own emotional state has been with us since the days that James first tendered his doctrine that "the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact".
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Interoceptive predictions in the brain
TL;DR: The Embodied Predictive Interoception Coding model is introduced, which integrates an anatomical model of corticocortical connections with Bayesian active inference principles, to propose that agranular visceromotor cortices contribute to interoception by issuing interoceptive predictions.
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Knowing your own heart: distinguishing interoceptive accuracy from interoceptive awareness.
Sarah N. Garfinkel,Sarah N. Garfinkel,Anil K. Seth,Adam B. Barrett,Keisuke Suzuki,Hugo D. Critchley +5 more
TL;DR: Empirical support for dissociation between dimensions of interoceptive accuracy, sensibility and awareness is provided and set the context for defining how the relative balance of accuracy, Sensibility and Awareness dimensions explain cognitive, emotional and clinical associations of interOceptive ability.
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The theory of constructed emotion: an active inference account of interoception and categorization.
TL;DR: This article begins with the structure and function of the brain, and from there deduce what the biological basis of emotions might be, and concludes that the answer is a brain-based, computational account called the theory of constructed emotion.
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Active inference: A process theory
Karl J. Friston,Thomas H. B. FitzGerald,Francesco Rigoli,Philipp Schwartenbeck,Giovanni Pezzulo +4 more
TL;DR: The fact that a gradient descent appears to be a valid description of neuronal activity means that variational free energy is a Lyapunov function for neuronal dynamics, which therefore conform to Hamilton’s principle of least action.
References
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Emotional effects produced by the injection of adrenalin.
Hadley Cantril,William A. Hunt +1 more
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Neural basis of contagious itch and why some people are more prone to it
TL;DR: This study established that the social contagion of itch is essentially a normative response (experienced by most people), and that the degree of contagion is related to trait differences in neuroticism (i.e., the tendency to experience negative emotions), but not to empathy.
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The person in the mirror: using the enfacement illusion to investigate the experiential structure of self-identification.
TL;DR: The conscious experience of changes in self-identification is investigated with principal component analyses (PCA) that revealed that while the conscious experience during synchronous IMS focused on resemblance and similarity with the other's face, during asynchronous IMS it focused on multisensory stimulation.
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Feeling numb: temperature, but not thermal pain, modulates feeling of body ownership.
TL;DR: While thermosensation is an important driver of body ownership, pain seems to bypass the multisensory mechanisms of embodiment.
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Dreaming the Whole Cat: Generative Models, Predictive Processing, and the Enactivist Conception of Perceptual Experience
TL;DR: This article present an alternative (prediction-and-generative-model-based) account that neatly accommodates all the positive evidence that Ward cites on behalf of this enactivist conception, and that (I argue) makes richer and more satisfying contact with the full sweep of human experience.