Political economy of Ramsey taxation
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In this article, the authors study the dynamic taxation of capital and labor in the Ramsey model under the assumption that taxes and public good provision are decided by a self-interested politician who cannot commit to policies.About:
This article is published in Journal of Public Economics.The article was published on 2011-08-01 and is currently open access. It has received 64 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Subgame perfect equilibrium & Capital (economics).read more
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Journal ArticleDOI
A dynamic theory of public spending, taxation and debt
Marco Battaglini,Stephen Coate +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a dynamic political economy theory of public spending, taxation and debt, where policy choices are made by a legislature consisting of representatives elected by geographically defined districts.
Book ChapterDOI
The political economy of government debt
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors review the literature which explains why and under which circumstances governments accumulate more debt than it would be consistent with optimal fiscal policy and discuss numerical rules or institutional designs which might lead to a moderation of these distortions.
Journal ArticleDOI
Optimal Dynamic Carbon Taxes in a Climate–Economy Model with Distortionary Fiscal Policy
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors theoretically characterizes and quantifies optimal carbon taxes in a dynamic general equilibrium climate-economy model with distortionary fiscal policy, showing that the optimal carbon tax schedules are 8-24% lower when there are distortionary taxes, compared to the setting with lump-sum taxes.
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The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: Accountability, Commitment, and Responsiveness
John Duggan,Cesar Martinelli +1 more
TL;DR: The authors survey the literature on dynamic elections in the traditional settings of spatial preferences and rent seeking under perfect and imperfect monitoring of politicians, and show that repeated elections mitigate the commitment problems of politicians and voters, and that a responsive democracy result holds under general conditions.
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Book
Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy
Torsten Persson,Guido Tabellini +1 more
TL;DR: The authors combine the best of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science, and propose a unified approach to the field of political economics, and identify the main outstanding problems.
Journal ArticleDOI
A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the problem of adjusting the marginal utility of money to different people in a purely competitive system with no foreign trade and assume that private and social net products are always equal or have been made so by State interference not included in the taxation.
Journal ArticleDOI
Incumbent performance and electoral control
TL;DR: In the pure theory of electoral competition, citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred as discussed by the authors. But these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability.
Book
Recursive Macroeconomic Theory
TL;DR: In this paper, an introduction to recursive methods for dynamic macroeconomics is presented, including standard applications such as asset pricing, and advanced material, including analyses of reputational mechanisms and contract design.