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Preferences for Truth-Telling
TLDR
The authors show that people lie surprisingly little and formalize a wide range of potential explanations for the observed behavior, identify testable predictions that can distinguish between the models and conduct new experiments to do so.Abstract:
Private information is at the heart of many economic activities. For decades, economists have assumed that individuals are willing to misreport private information if this maximizes their material payoff. We combine data from 72 experimental studies in economics, psychology and sociology, and show that, in fact, people lie surprisingly little. We then formalize a wide range of potential explanations for the observed behavior, identify testable predictions that can distinguish between the models and conduct new experiments to do so. None of the most popular explanations suggested in the literature can explain the data. We show that only combining a preference for being honest with a preference for being seen as honest can organize the empirical evidence.read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
Lying Aversion and the Size of the Lie
TL;DR: Gneezy et al. as discussed by the authors presented a model of lying costs that generates hypotheses regarding behavior and found that the highest fraction of lies are from reporting the maximal outcome, but some participants do not make the maximal lie.
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Incentives and cheating
TL;DR: It is found that for many participants, the decision to lie follows a simple cost–benefit analysis: they compare the intrinsic cost of lying with the incentives to lie; once the incentives are higher than the cost, they switch from telling the truth to lying.
The Truth About Lies: A Meta-Analysis on Dishonest Behavior
TL;DR: This meta-analysis reviews four of the most widely used experimental paradigms: sender–receiver games, die-roll tasks, coin-flip tasks, and matrix tasks and shows that dishonest behavior depends on both situational factors and personal factors, such as the participant’s gender and age.
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Lies in disguise – A theoretical analysis of cheating
TL;DR: A game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher & Follmi-Heusi (2013) finds that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived to cheat.
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The frame of the game: Loss-framing increases dishonest behavior
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the idea that people will more likely engage in dishonest behavior to reduce the extent of a loss compared to increasing the amount of a gain and found that people react more sensitively toward a possible loss compared with a possible gain (i.e., loss aversion).
References
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Book
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Amos Tversky,Daniel Kahneman +1 more
TL;DR: The authors described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: representativeness, availability of instances or scenarios, and adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value is available.
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z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
TL;DR: Z-Tree as mentioned in this paper is a toolbox for ready-made economic experiments, which allows programming almost any kind of experiments in a short time and is stable and easy to use.
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A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation
TL;DR: This article showed that if a fraction of the people exhibit inequality aversion, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish, and they also showed that when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperations are maintained.
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ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Gary E. Bolton,Axel Ockenfels +1 more
TL;DR: The authors demonstrate that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, and demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people were motivated by either their payoff or their relative standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern, which explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is played a role and games where competitive behavior is observed.