Open AccessJournal Article
Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action and Cognitive Extension.
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This article is published in Humana.Mente.The article was published on 2010-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 787 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Cognition & Action (philosophy).read more
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Networks of the Brain
TL;DR: Models of Network Growth All networks, whether they are social, technological, or biological, are the result of a growth process, and many continue to grow for prolonged periods of time, continually modifying their connectivity structure throughout their entire existence.
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Thinking with external representations
TL;DR: Seven ways external representations enhance cognitive power are discussed: they change the cost structure of the inferential landscape; they provide a structure that can serve as a shareable object of thought; they facilitate re-representation; they are often a more natural representation of structure than mental representations; and they lower the cost of controlling thought—they help coordinate thought.
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Organizing Thoughts and Connecting Brains: Material Practices and the Transition from Individual to Group-Level Prospective Sensemaking
Ileana Stigliani,Davide Ravasi +1 more
TL;DR: This paper developed a process model that accounts for the interplay between conversational and material practices in the transition from individual to group-level sensemaking, and unpack how the materialization of cognitive work supports the collective construction of new shared understandings.
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Embodied cognition and the magical future of interaction design
TL;DR: The theory of embodied cognition can provide HCI practitioners and theorists with new ideas about interaction and new principles for better designs, and these ideas have major implications for interaction design, especially the design of tangible, physical, context aware, and telepresence systems.
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Minds - Extended or Scaffolded
Kim Sterelny,Kim Sterelny +1 more
TL;DR: It is argued that extended mind cases are limiting cases of environmental scaffolding, and while the extended mind picture is not false, the niche construction model is a more helpful framework for understanding human action.
References
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Emoting the Situated Mind A Taxonomy of Affective Material Scaffolds: A Taxonomy of Affective Material Scaffolds
TL;DR: A taxonomy of material affective scaffolds is proposed, based not only on properties of objects but also on the user’s stance towards objects, which in turn depends on other contextual factors.
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Einfühlung as the breath of art: six modes of embodiment
TL;DR: Robert Vischer’s concept of Einfühlung, feeling-into, translated as empathy, serves as the departure point for a proposal about viewing art using the body for a non-imitative form of empathy termed a transomatization and for other embodied operations.
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Foundational Issues of ‘Technosphere Science’ – The Case for a New Scientific Discipline
TL;DR: The case for establishing ‘technosphere science’ as an independent scientific discipline that draws on results of many other disciplines, reaching from physics to the humanities, with economics as a major contributing discipline is submits.
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Semantic inferentialism as (a form of) active externalism
TL;DR: The authors show that a theory of meaning can be at the same time a variety of active externalism, and that the role of the environment (both in its social and natural form) is not passive in the sense assumed by the alternative approaches to content externalism.
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Group Minds and Natural Kinds
TL;DR: In this article, the authors evaluate a defensive move made by some proponents of the view that groups have mental or cognitive states of their own: to concede that group states and individual states aren't of the same specific natural kinds, while holding that groups instantiate different species of mental states from those instantiated by humans, and arrive at a tentative conclusion: what is common to models of individual cognitive processing and models of group processing does not suffice to establish sameness of cognitive (or mental) kinds, properties, or state-types across individuals and extant groups, not even at a