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The consequences of inaction on carbon dioxide removal

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In this article, the authors investigated the implications of delaying carbon dioxide removal (CDR) actions, focusing on integrating direct air capture and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (DACCS and BECCS) into the European Union power mix.
Abstract
Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) will be essential to meet the climate targets, so enabling its deployment at the right time will be decisive. Here, we investigate the still poorly understood implications of delaying CDR actions, focusing on integrating direct air capture and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (DACCS and BECCS) into the European Union power mix. Under an indicative target of − 50 Gt of net CO2 by 2100, delayed CDR would cost an extra of 0.12 − 0.19 trillion EUR per year of inaction. Moreover, postponing CDR beyond mid-century would substantially reduce the removal potential to almost half (− 35.60 Gt CO2) due to the underused biomass and land resources and the maximum technology diffusion speed. The effective design of BECCS and DACCS systems calls for long-term planning starting from now and aligned with the evolving power systems. Our quantitative analysis of the consequences of inaction on CDR —with climate targets at risk and fair CDR contributions at stake —should help to break the current impasse and incentivize early actions worldwide.

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References
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Journal ArticleDOI

An inter-model assessment of the role of direct air capture in deep mitigation pathways.

TL;DR: Comparisons using multi-model regarding the role of DACCS in 1.5 and 2 degree scenarios are made and it is found that DACCS allows to postpone mitigation and reduce the climate policy costs.
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Framework for modelling data uncertainty in life cycle inventories

TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a framework for data uncertainty assessment in life cycle inventories (LCI), where data uncertainty is divided into two categories: lack of data (data gaps) and data inaccuracy.
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Biomass-based negative emissions difficult to reconcile with planetary boundaries

TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the feasibility of NE via BECCS from dedicated plantations and potential trade-offs with planetary boundaries (PBs) for multiple socio-economic pathways.
Journal ArticleDOI

Economic mitigation challenges: how further delay closes the door for achieving climate targets

TL;DR: In this article, the authors use an integrated energy-economy-climate modeling system to examine how a further delay of cooperative action and technology availability affect climate mitigation challenges, and show that with comprehensive emissions reductions starting after 2015 and full technology availability, the maximum 21st century warming may still be limited below 2°C with a likely probability and at moderate economic impacts.
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Q1. What contributions have the authors mentioned in the paper "The consequences of inaction on carbon dioxide removal" ?

Here, the authors investigate the still poorly understood implications of delaying CDR actions, focusing on integrating direct air capture and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage ( DACCS and BECCS ) into the European Union power mix. Moreover, postponing CDR beyond midcentury would substantially reduce the removal potential to almost half ( −35. 60 Gt CO2 ) due to the underused biomass and land resources and the maximum technology diffusion speed. 

Here the authors studied the implications of delaying the roll-out of CDR to raise concerns on the need to set effective plans to promote its large-scale deployment at the right time to avoid extra costs and miss climate targets. Moreover, delaying CDR actions would critically limit the removal potential ( e. g., −73. After 2050, the maximum CDR potential would be reduced to −56. Retrofitting the existing coal and gas-fired power plants with CCS to decarbonize the power sector would limit the storage capacity available, potentially raising competition issues with atmospheric CO2 sequestration. 

delaying the CDR deployment would lead to the underuse of biomass and land resources, tighter bounds on the BECCS and DACCS facilities, and domestic storage sites depleted with fossil carbon, which altogether would reduce the future ability of individual countries on CDR. 

Forestry residues would contribute the most to the CO2 removal (i.e., 45% of the total gross CO2 removed by 2100), while miscanthus production would occupy all the marginal land available due to its overall superior carbon sequestration potential, removing −15.87 Gt CO2 by 2100 (17% of the total gross removed) and becoming the main carbon sink in some countries (i.e., −6.16 Gt CO2 removed in Spain). 

The main barriers for CDR deployment include the lack of consensus on the need to start CDR today —as it is often perceived as “a problem for later” —, the absence of market incentives and strong political drivers, and governance challenges. 

BECCS becomes relevant in the generation portfolio, providing firm capacity and ancillary services to support the high penetration of intermittent technologies with dispatchable carbon-negative electricity. 

BECCS plants would13be mostly installed near the biomass sources, leading to decentralized supply chains spread across the EU territory. 

86% of the residues and 90% of the marginal land available from 2055 to 2100 would be exploited, representing only 63% and 57% of their respective total potentials (if actions were started in 2020 and continued until 2100). 

The CDR deployment to date has been minimal20,21 with only 1.5 million t CO2/yr removed via BECCS9,22 and around 0.01 million t CO2/yr18 with DAC technologies, often deployed without long term CO2 storage. 

Gt of CO2 by 2100 (i.e., 42% of the total gross −72.94 Gt of CO2 removed), while the DACCS share starting after 2080 would become negligible (i.e., <2%). 

Only four countries would deliver almost half of the gross removal by 2100, with France and Spain at the top deploying both BECCS and DACCS, followed by Germany and Sweden deploying only BECCS (i.e., 44.37 Gt out of 94.05 

Some countries would be almost self-sufficient in terms of biomass resources, like Portugal, which would transport CO2 to the Spanish geological sites due to its low geological capacity. 

Some regions would be net exporters of biomass (e.g., France or Sweden) and some net importers (e.g., Netherland, Germany, or Denmark). 

The removal potential would be limited by the maximum diffusion rates of BECCS and DACCS, which8would even impede reaching CO2 neutrality in the EU power sector (+1.54 Gt of net CO2 emissions by 2100) and constrain the use of residues and land to 40% and 20% of their maximum availability from 2020 to 2100, respectively. 

This behavior is due to the unused biomass and land resources, the main factors constraining BECCS, which accumulate almost linearly over time. 

The authors found that postponing CDR could substantially increase the total cost of the power system, with each year of inaction translating into 0.12–0.19 trillion EUR2015 of extra cost to meet the - 50 Gt of net CO2 target. 

net negative CO2 emissions would not be achieved until 2070 due to the need to offset the residual emissions taking place until that year. 

France, Germany, Sweden, and Poland would provide most of the biomass resources, i.e., 54% of the total gross CO2 removed via BECCS (−38.99 out of −72.59 Gt of CO2 removed with BECCS, Fig. 3b). 

in the United Kingdom, which lacks enough biomass resources to exploit its storage capacity only with BECCS, −3.64 Gt CO2 would be removed with DACCS and stored in domestic geological sites. 

The overall storage efficiency —i.e., total net CO2 removed per kg of CO2 stored— would reach 81%, where most geological sites would store the biogenic CO2 captured via BECCS (71%), a smaller amount of atmospheric CO2 captured with DACCS (24%), and finally the captured emissions linked to the heating needs of DACCS (5%). 

In the “Now” scenario, DACCS would be established in eleven countries, with France, Spain, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Romania providing 97% of the gross removal from DACCS (i.e., −18,72 out of the −21.46 Gt CO2 by 2100), all of them with enough geological sites for storing the captured CO2 domestically (Fig. 3b). 

In practice, this roadmap would require a substantial number of DACCS facilities across the EU, i.e., around 268, with a capacity of 1 Mt CO2/yr (i.e., the largest DAC plant under development today), out of which 83 would be installed in France, 61 in Spain and 46 in the United Kingdom. 

The largest exchanges of biomass and CO2 would occur between France-the Netherlands, and the Netherlandsthe United Kingdom, respectively (Fig. 4a, b). 

In practice, however, future technological, social, and environmental barriers remain largely unexplored29–31, which may hinder the implementation of CDR and the attainment of the longterm temperature targets26,32–35.