Journal ArticleDOI
The Package Assignment Model
Reads0
Chats0
TLDR
In the single seller (auction) version, a necessary and sufficient condition is given for the Vickrey payoff point to be implementable by a pricing equilibrium.About:
This article is published in Journal of Economic Theory.The article was published on 2002-12-01. It has received 328 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Linear programming & Stochastic game.read more
Citations
More filters
Book
Algorithmic Game Theory
TL;DR: A new era of theoretical computer science addresses fundamental problems about auctions, networks, and human behavior in a bid to solve the challenges of 21st Century finance.
Book
Combinatorial Auctions
TL;DR: It's important for you to start having that hobby that will lead you to join in better concept of life and reading will be a positive activity to do every time.
Journal ArticleDOI
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
Sven de Vries,Rakesh Vohra +1 more
TL;DR: The state of knowledge about the design of combinatorial auctions is surveyed and some new insights are presented.
Journal ArticleDOI
Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
Lawrence M. Ausubel,Paul Milgrom +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a family of ascending package auction models is introduced in which bidders may determine their own packages on which to bid and the outcome is a point in the core of the exchange economy for the reported preferences.
Journal ArticleDOI
Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
TL;DR: It is shown that the allocation problem among submodular valuations is NP-hard, and an efficient greedy 2-approximation algorithm is presented that generalizes to the case of limited complementarities.
References
More filters
Posted Content
Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
Journal ArticleDOI
Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
Journal ArticleDOI
The assignment game I: The core
Lloyd S. Shapley,Martin Shubik +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that the optimal assignment game is a dual problem of a linear programming problem dual to optimal assignment, and that these outcomes correspond exactly to the price lists that competitively balance supply and demand.
Journal ArticleDOI
Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes
TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied competitive adjustment processes in labor markets with perfect information but heterogeneous firms and workers and showed that equilibrium in such markets exists and is stable, in spite of workers' discrete choices among jobs, provided that all workers are gross substitutes from each firm's standpoint.