Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria
Artur Czumaj,Berthold Vöcking +1 more
- pp 413-420
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In this article, the worst-case coordination ratio on m parallel links was shown to be Θ(log m/log log log log m) where m is the number of parallel links.Abstract:
The coordination ratio is a game theoretic measure that aims to reflect the price of selfish routing in a network. We show the worst-case coordination ratio on m parallel links (of possibly different speeds) isΘ(log m/log log log m)Our bound is asymptotically tight and it entirely resolves an question posed recently by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [3].read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
How bad is selfish routing
Tim Roughgarden,Éva Tardos +1 more
TL;DR: The degradation in network performance due to unregulated traffic is quantified and it is proved that if the latency of each edge is a linear function of its congestion, then the total latency of the routes chosen by selfish network users is at most 4/3 times the minimum possible total latency.
Journal ArticleDOI
Worst-case equilibria
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose the price of anarchy, which is the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum, as a measure of the effectiveness of the system.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
TL;DR: It is established that the fair cost allocation protocol is in fact a useful mechanism for inducing strategic behavior to form near-optimal equilibria, and its results are extended to cases in which users are seeking to balance network design costs with latencies in the constructed network.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation
TL;DR: It is established that the fair cost allocation protocol is in fact a useful mechanism for inducing strategic behavior to form near-optimal equilibria, and its results are extended to cases in which users are seeking to balance network design costs with latencies in the constructed network.
Journal ArticleDOI
Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
Ramesh Johari,John N. Tsitsiklis +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the properties of a congestion game in which users of a congested resource anticipate the effect of their actions on the price of the resource and show that the selfish behavior of the users leads to an aggregate utility that is no worse than 3/4 of the maximum possible aggregate utility.
References
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Worst-case equilibria
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum as a measure of the effectiveness of the system and derive upper and lower bounds for this ratio in a model in which several agents share a very simple network.